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ABSTRACT
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December 2017
Natalia Escobar Pemberthy, B.A. Universidad EAFIT
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MSc, London School of Economics and Political Science
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Boston
Directed by Professor Maria Ivanova
Global environmental conventions are created to address and resolve global
environmental problems. Assessments of the achievement of specific environmental
goals, however, indicate that there is room for progress and that stronger collective action
is required. Given that there are no empirical instruments to measure implementation and
to determine the factors behind individual countries’ results, challenges emerge that
require the expansion of existing analytical frameworks around environmental
conventions and their role as global governance instruments. This study develops an
empirical instrument – the Environmental Conventions Index – to assess the
implementation of global environmental conventions, determining the main trends for
both countries and conventions. Using a mixed methods approach, it analyzes the
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implementation of four conventions in two clusters – pollution and conservation – by all
member states and illustrates trends over time (15 years). The study also examines the
underlying reasons for countries’ performance and explains the governance mechanisms
of international environmental agreements. As the international community is at
crossroads in the solution of global environmental challenges and the implementation of
new agendas for sustainable development, countries’ commitment to international
environmental goals should occupy center stage in the political debate.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION

Environment is the foundation for human life. The natural environment—land,
water, air, and living species—has been humanity’s source of sustenance, shelter,
services, and spirituality. However, population growth and the quest for economic growth
have drastically transformed the environment, affecting the functioning of planetary
systems in ways that threaten Earth’s resilience and adaptation capacity. Recent
scholarship has pointed to the urgency of the environmental crisis. We have crossed four
of a total of nine planetary boundaries that have been defined as the “safe operating
space” within which humans can function (Steffen et al., 2015). Human pressure on
climate change, biodiversity, chemicals, and land has exceeded the levels required for the
stability of earth systems. In addition, the inequality behind economic growth has brought
dynamism and advancement in human welfare for some, while others face economic,
social, and environmental challenges. Ultimately, we clearly need to integrate the three
dimensions of sustainable development—people, planet, and prosperity—in the context
of peaceful societies and global partnerships.1

1

This logical construction of people, planet, prosperity, peace, and partnership was defined by the 2030
UN Sustainable Development Agenda, as critical areas for action for humanity and the planet towards the
promotion of sustainable development (UN General Assembly, 2015).

1

Traditionally, environmental issues were local concerns, since their sources and
consequences seemed confined to a certain physical space. Solutions to environmental
concerns were thought to lie within the actors and functions of national governments.
Problems like pollution, biodiversity loss, deforestation, climate change, ozone layer
depletion, and desertification, however, have brought attention to the planetary dimension
of the environmental challenge. Even problems such as deforestation and desertification,
which are connected to specific territories, are now considered to have regional and
global consequences. The traditional understanding of these issues as local or national is
no longer accurate; they need to be mapped from an international perspective, as
concerns for global governance and human security. Moreover, most contemporary
environmental problems are multidimensional, complex, and defy clear delimitations. In
fact, environmental issues are clear examples of the interconnectedness of the
contemporary world and the need for international cooperation.
Almost five decades ago states began to recognize their inability to address
critical environmental problems on a national basis. At the same time, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) started calling for new international initiatives to facilitate
cooperative responses on environmental protection and conservation. Under the auspices
of the United Nations (UN), the architecture for global environmental governance took
shape around the establishment, in 1972, of the UN Environment Programme, known
previously as UNEP and today as UN Environment. Created from the international
community’s conviction of “the urgent need for intensified action, at the national and
international level, in order to limit and, where possible, to eliminate the impairment of

2

the human environment” (United Nations, 1968) UN Environment started numerous
initiatives involving international environmental cooperation.
Since 1972, the international community has undertaken multiple efforts to create
institutions and mechanisms that bring governments and other actors together on specific
environmental agendas for action, especially global environmental conventions.
However, in the specific case of these agreements, there is no systematic assessment that
evaluates the progress in their implementation, and how countries are translating these
global commitments into national policies. This dissertation aims to bring empirical data
and analysis to the question of the implementation of global environmental conventions,
in order to improve these processes and to expand the analytical framework on the
concepts of implementation and effectiveness in global governance.
Also known as multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), environmental
conventions are agreements between multiple governments “intended as legally binding
with a primary stated purpose of preventing or managing human impacts on natural
resources” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 431; 2016).2 These international legal instruments address
global environmental problems, raise awareness, gather information, and promote
coordinated action towards effective solutions (Brunée, 2006; Haas, Keohane, & Levy,
1993; Mitchell, 2010; Steiner, Kimball, & Scanlon, 2003) (see Table 1). However,
environmental challenges persist. In 2016, the Second Meeting the UN Environment
Assembly (UNEA) called attention to the effects of air pollution on health, estimating

2

This study uses the term global environmental conventions instead of multilateral environmental
agreements to reflect that the agreements included in this study are considered truly global because of their
membership and scope. As a concept, multilateral environmental agreements can also refer to treaties with
a smaller list of countries.

3

that “7 million people across the world die each year due to everyday exposure to poor air
quality”, 7 percent of which are caused directly by chemical pollution (UNEP & WHO,
2016, p. 3). In a similar pattern, the 2016 Red List published by the International Union
for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) called attention to the global extinction crisis (IUCN,
2016). Ecosystems and biota across the world remain threatened by the adverse effects of
economic activities and climate change. For example, the total global area of wetlands
declined an estimated 64-71 percent in the twentieth century (Ramsar Secretariat, 2015e).
These issues raise questions about the extent to which international cooperation
functions, about the success of implementation of specific mechanisms such as the global
environmental conventions, and about whether, and to what extent, international
agreements contribute to solving environmental problems.
As environmental conventions increased over the years in both number and
membership, they transformed into decisive global frameworks to guide policy responses
to protect the environment (Brown-Weiss & Jacobson, 1998; DeSombre, 2004; Mitchell,
2003). The academic literature about these global governance instruments has addressed
various issues, from the process of negotiation and treaty formation (Bodansky, 2010;
Chasek, 1997; Dimitrov, 2003; Gehring, 2007; Susskind, 1994; Susskind, Dolin, &
Breslin, 1992) to their operationalization for the achievement of global environmental
goals (Breitmeier, Underdal, & Young, 2011; Breitmeier, Young, & Zürn, 2006; BrownWeiss & Jacobson, 1998; Cameron, Werksman, & Roderick, 1996; Choucri, 1995; Hanf
& Underdal, 2000; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995; Miles et al., 2002; Victor, Raustiala,
& Skolnikoff, 1998; Oran R. Young, 1979; Oran R. Young & Levy, 1999), and to the
interactions between the governing bodies of agreements and their state parties (Andresen
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& Skjærseth, 1999; Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhüner, 2009; Biermann & Bauer, 2003;
Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2013; Desai, 2010; Sandford, 1994; Wiersema, 2009).
Additionally, the policy world reinforced the importance of environmental conventions
both globally and nationally. In 2012, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development
(Rio+20) recognized the importance of MEAs and highlighted their contributions to
sustainable development (United Nations, 2012a). The concern at the core of the analysis
of global environmental conventions, however, has been their effectiveness in the solution
of global environmental problems.
Frequently, international legal scholars tend to view the implementation of
international commitments as the norm. As first suggested by in his 1979 book How
Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, “almost all nations observe almost all
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time”
(p. 661). In the case of international environmental conventions, different studies have
approached the question of their implementation through different methodologies. During
the 1990s and early 2000s, qualitative and quantitative analyses assessed whether states
had taken the steps required to achieve international environmental agreements and their
outcomes (Breitmeier et al., 2006; Miles et al., 2002; Victor et al., 1998; Oran R. Young,
1999). Almost all these studies, however, agree that measuring the effects of global
environmental conventions on national policies and the environment is difficult. Factors
such as the structure and clarity of obligations defined by the conventions, as well as lack
of agreement about what constitutes compliance and implementation, impede the
establishment of concrete methodologies to provide empirical systematic data across
countries and conventions, to help us understand the extent to which countries have
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translated their global environmental commitments into national policies that improve the
state of the environment. To overcome these obstacles, we must first understand how
environmental conventions are being implemented at the national level. In other words,
assessing national implementation of conventions and explaining why countries perform
differently is essential to understanding the dynamics and effectiveness of global
conventions in addressing environmental challenges.
Many stakeholders have recognized the positive effects of conventions on global
environmental problems. In 2012, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development
(Rio+20) acknowledged the “significant contributions to sustainable development made
by the multilateral environmental agreements” (United Nations, 2012a para. 89).
International cooperation is needed to address increasingly complex environmental
problems, and multilateral agreements have contributed to the definition of policies, aims,
and actions of countries to achieve environmental conservation and sustainability (UNEP,
2012b; UNEP, University of Joensuu, & Government of Canada, 2007). Regarding
specific conventions, for example, an 2016 evaluation of the Stockholm Convention
stated that it provides a dynamic framework to regulate persistent organic pollutants
(POPs)—a group of chemicals with common features including persistence,
bioaccumulation, and long-range transport—throughout their lifecycle (Stockholm
Convention, 2016b). CITES as well has listed more than 35,000 species that are now
protected by tools such as trade measures, species management plans, and enforcement
actions (CITES, 2013a).
However, assessments of specific environmental goals indicate that there is still
room for progress and that stronger collective action is required. In 2012, the fifth edition
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of Global Environmental Outlook (GEO-5) evaluated the progress of ninety global
environmental goals from existing MEAs and non-legally binding instruments.3 A
summary of those results, published as Measuring Progress: Environmental Goals &
Gaps, found that only three out of thirty-five goals summarized there have achieved
significant progress, and that “there has been little or no progress or further deterioration
on about half of the goals and objectives assessed by the GEO-5” (UNEP, 2012a, 2012b).
Furthermore, several research and data gaps were identified. The main conclusion was
that the “international community (had) made very uneven progress in achieving these
goals and improving the state of the environment” (UNEP, 2012b, p. 31). Given the
urgency of environmental threats, new analytical frameworks are required to study the
policy and legal instruments that address them. Analyzing environmental conventions
requires then, empirical data collection and coordination, and the definition of
measurable indicators that establish international standards, make data available for all
countries, and improve knowledge about global environmental conventions, their
implementation, and effectiveness.
This dissertation addresses that challenge. As part of my work at the Center for
Governance and Sustainability at the University of Massachusetts Boston, I worked as
one of the principal investigators in the design of an empirical instrument—the
Environmental Conventions Index (ECI)—to assess the implementation of global
environmental conventions. This instrument thus establishes a foundation for the

3

These goals were defined as part of an initiative started by the Government of Switzerland to identify
specific indicators that served for the establishment of a reliable baseline against which to measure progress
and to establish monitoring systems for the collection of data on critical environmental issues at regular
intervals (UNEP, 2012d).
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assessment of countries’ progress on their international environmental obligations and
contributes new insights to the literature on global environmental governance and
international environmental law. The ECI is part of a broader research and outreach
initiative—the Environmental Conventions Project—that not only aims to assess
implementation, but to generate a policy space to support countries in the fulfillment of
their global environmental commitments. Ultimately, this work could help countries
better achieve their obligations under the global environmental conventions, thus
providing opportunities for learning and contributing to the solution of global
environmental problems.
Using quantitative and qualitative methods to analyze the information from
governments and conventions, my analysis offers insights into the actual role of
multilateral environmental agreements in the broader system of global governance and
their contribution to sustainable development. Previous efforts in international
environmental politics scholarship lack the broad scope of this assessment and the
standardized empirical approach, and therefore offer limited evidence on which to build
theory and provide practical advice to policy-makers. As the international community
moves forward with the implementation of a new agenda for sustainable development,
empirical data and evidence-based understanding are imperative, and countries’
commitment to international environmental goals should occupy center stage in the
political debate.
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International cooperation for the environment
Global governance—the definition, implementation, and monitoring of global
policies—describes the extent to which collective choices will benefit humanity and
protect the environment. Laws, institutions, international organizations, international
agreements, government agencies, local initiatives, and decision-making processes
belong to the systems of governance established by the international community to act
together on specific agendas for action. In the case of the environmental challenge, the
extent to which global governance instruments are being implemented is a particularly
difficult and important question, whose answer will determine the future of the
environment and our progress towards sustainable development.
In 1972, the international community held its first-ever global summit on the
environment. Three years earlier, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
recommended to the UN General Assembly the definition of specific mechanisms to
discuss member states’ views on problems of the human environment; to evaluate the
progress already being made by governments, international organizations, and NGOs;
and to identify areas requiring international cooperation (United Nations, 1968). The
international community recognized that “a growing class of environmental problems,
because they are regional or global in extent or because they affect the common
international realm, will require extensive cooperation among nations and action by
international organizations in the common interest” (United Nations, 1972), and that
managing these problems requires “a cooperative spirit by all countries, big and small, on
an equal footing” (United Nations, 1972, Principle 24).
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These efforts flourished during the next two decades, and as UN Environment
evolved into the anchor institution for the global environment (Ivanova, 2009), other
governance mechanisms—including several global environmental conventions—were
negotiated. To achieve sustainable development, it was clear that effective international
cooperation structures were required (WCED, 1987). In 1992, the UN Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED)—also known as the Earth Summit—
reaffirmed governments’ intention to establish “new levels of cooperation among states,
key sectors of societies and people” (United Nations, 1992a). Its implementation plan,
known as Agenda 21, defined international legal instruments and mechanisms as crucial
to achieving sustainable development. UNCED also acknowledged the essential
importance of countries' participation in these mechanisms, the need for implementation
strategies, and the importance of assessing the implementation of these instruments to
ensure the efficacy and effectiveness of international cooperation (UNCED, 1992).
Twenty years later, Rio+20 reinforced this message as countries agreed “to promote
policy coherence at all relevant levels, improve efficiency, […] and enhance coordination
and cooperation among (the) multilateral environmental agreements” (United Nations,
2012a para. 89).
Within this framework, multiple international environmental law mechanisms
have been established to promote environmental conservation, including bilateral and
multilateral agreements to bring governments and other actors together on specific
environmental agendas (United Nations, 1972), particularly global environmental
conventions. These agreements were initially created in the nineteenth century to manage
shared environmental resources (DeSombre, 2004). Starting in the 1970s, however, they
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experienced two fundamental changes. First, the creation of UN Environment constituted
a new framework for global environmental governance. Second, the number of
conventions began to increase (see Figure 1). Thus, environmental conventions became
key to the system of global environmental governance, with the goal of centralizing
commitments and innovations around environmental problems (Steiner et al., 2003).
The number of environmental agreements has now reached more than 1,250
(Brown-Weiss & Jacobson, 1998; DeSombre, 2004; Mitchell, 2016) (see Figure 1),
addressing transboundary environmental problems such as climate change, biodiversity
loss, and chemical pollution. However, only perhaps fifteen of them could be considered
truly global in both membership (universal) and scope (global) (see Table 1). Over the
same period, these conventions have also experienced a significant increase in
membership (see Figure 2).
Figure 1 Historical evolution in number of international environmental agreements
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Table 1 Global Environmental Conventions
Start
Year

Parties
(No.)

Atmosphere

• UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

1992

197

Biodiversity

• Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
• Convention on International Wetlands (Ramsar Convention)
• Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES)
• Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species (CMS)

1992
1971
1973

196
169
183

1979

124

Chemicals
and Waste

• Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
• Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes
• Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure
• Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer

2001
1989

181
185

1998
1987

157
197

Land

• UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)

1994

196

Data to December 31, 2016. Sources: (Basel Convention, 2016b; CBD, 2015; CITES, 2016c; CMS, 2016;
Ozone Secretariat, 2014; Ramsar Convention, 2015b; Rotterdam Convention, 2017; Stockholm
Convention, 2017; UNCCD, 2016; UNFCCC, 2015)

Environmental conventions thus serve as institutional frameworks that deliver
various functions: they set agendas, proscribe behaviors, prescribe actions, contribute to
the raise awareness about environmental issues, reduce uncertainty around regulation,
and generate policy responses (Brunée, 2006; Haas et al., 1993; Mitchell, 2010; Steiner et
al., 2003). Environmental conventions also contribute to policy specialization, opening
spaces for the participation of civil society and for the use of innovative instruments to
solve environmental challenges. As DeSombre explains, “in the area of international
environmental politics, the agreements that get adopted are rarely the end product, but
instead create the framework and the process that guide responses to the environmental
problem in question” (2004, p. 84).
The academic literature on global environmental conventions addresses multiple
issues. Some researchers study the negotiation and treaty-making processes and how
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Figure 2 Membership in global environmental conventions
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agreements are structured as international law instruments (Bodansky, 2010; Dimitrov,
2003; Susskind, 1994; Susskind et al., 1992). Others address the reasons behind
countries’ decisions to solve environmental problems through international organizations.
These reasons may include the maximization of their interests, commitment to the
common good, and willingness to institutionalize international behavior in order to
enhance capacity and power (Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Barkin, 2006; Krasner, 1983).
Another strand of the literature evaluates the agreements’ institutional performance, their
effectiveness in addressing global environmental problems, and the factors that determine
countries’ and conventions’ achievement of their goals (Breitmeier et al., 2011;
Breitmeier et al., 2006; Brown-Weiss & Jacobson, 1998; Cameron et al., 1996; Choucri,
1995; Hanf & Underdal, 2000; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995; Miles et al., 2002;
Victor et al., 1998; Oran R. Young, 1979, 1999). Part of the literature also gives special
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attention to the interactions between member states and the conventions, how do they
operate in principal-agent dynamic, and how this influences implementation.
The analysis of institutional performance is particularly relevant to this study. The
conventions established specific mechanisms to evaluate and monitor countries’
compliance and implementation. For example, during the sixth meeting of the
Conference of the Parties (COP) of the Basel Convention in 2002, state parties
established the Committee for Administering the Mechanism for Promoting
Implementation and Compliance to help countries comply with their obligations and to
facilitate, promote, monitor, and aim to secure the implementation of, and compliance
with, obligations under the agreement (Basel Convention, 2002). In the case of the
Ramsar Convention, those functions were assigned directly to the COP (UNESCO, 1971
Art. 6). Other conventions, as the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
(POPs), are still discussing the definition of a specific compliance mechanism
(Stockholm Convention, 2015). The Conferences of the Parties (COPs) are the main
executive body in environmental conventions, that brings together all parties to take stock
of implementation and adopt decisions for the future of the agreement.
Despite these efforts, the global environment continues to degrade at an alarming
pace, and planetary boundaries are being pushed to new limits. This raises key questions
about the institutional performance of the environmental conventions, including how
national policies based on international environmental commitments contribute to solving
global environmental problems. In other words, are the conventions, as they are being
implemented by states, improving the global environment? Answering this question
would make possible to determine the role of conventions as instruments of global
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governance, while offering an analytical and empirical framework on their process of
implementation. Understanding how the conventions function will also provide insights
about states’ capacity requirements to accomplish behavioral changes and outcomes at
the national level.

Governance and global environmental challenges4
Changes in global environmental patterns indelibly transform the future of
humanity. Natural disasters and abrupt changes in environmental conditions have altered
the parameters supporting the existence of life forms and the subsistence of ecosystems.
The erosion of environmental quality has undermined prosperity by damaging human
health and the stability of Earth’s systems. In the second part of the twentieth century,
concerns about the impact and acceleration of industrialization fueled a growing
realization that humanity is now a principal driver of the scale and magnitude of
environmental change. Deforestation, rising global temperatures and sea levels, increased
emissions of greenhouse gases, extinction of species, and destruction of natural habitats
are some outcomes affecting Earth’s natural stability. Understanding the connections
among drivers of environmental change is essential for identifying possible solutions,
thereby preserving environmental benefits for human societies and economies.

4

This section relies heavily on the findings of the 2012 Global Environmental Outlook (GEO) and its main
summary, Measuring Progress: Environmental Goals and Gaps (UNEP, 2012b). The GEO, issued
periodically by UN Environment, responds to the reporting requirements of the sustainable development
agenda, offering a comprehensive assessment of the state of the environment and the main policies
associated with it. A newer version published in 2016 does not offer a global perspective, since the analysis
was only presented at the regional level. The section also includes data collected in key documents
published by some of the conventions and NGOs.
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Only about 40 percent of Earth’s surface is covered by land, and much of that is
uninhabitable. Pressure from population growth, economic development, and global
markets has caused more than 30 percent of the usable land to be devoted to agriculture.
As a result, the extent of natural habitats has declined 20 percent or more since 1980, and
valuable ecosystem services have consequently been lost. Wetlands, for example,
continue to decline globally to a startling extent. Social and economic factors, together
with infrastructure development, land conversion, deforestation, changes in water
temperatures, and invasion by alien species, decreased the extent of world wetlands 64-71
percent in the twentieth century (Ramsar Secretariat, 2015e), costing more than US$ 20
trillion annually in ecosystem services.
At the same time, the effective and equitable management of protected areas, and
their connectivity with ecosystem services, still need improvement. In 2014, 15.2 percent
of the world’s terrestrial and freshwater environments were covered by protected area
agreements, which is below the goals established at the international level. In addition,
according to IUCN, 26 percent of 5,500 mammals, 13 percent of 11,100 birds, 42 percent
of 6,500 amphibians, 33 percent of 860 reef-forming corals, and 62 percent of 300 cycads
are considered at risk of extinction (IUCN, 2016). In 2016, for the first time ever, giraffes
were listed as a vulnerable species on the IUCN Red List. The global giraffe population
has plummeted by up to 40 percent over the last thirty years, driven by habitat loss, civil
unrest, and illegal hunting. Ultimately, all forms of biodiversity loss result in new risks
for the multiple benefits that humans receive from biodiversity. As overexploitation has
resulted in net economic growth, it has also been accompanied by reduction in other
ecosystem services.
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Global chemical pollution and wastes are two other acute problems for human
health, livelihoods, and the environment. While chemicals play an important role in
human life, economic development and prosperity, they can also have adverse impacts.
The number of chemicals continues to grow rapidly, and sales of new chemicals to the
developing world have more than doubled. Efforts to eliminate the production and use of
POPs have achieved important successes, but the pollution they generate is still
widespread. In addition, many developing countries lack policies governing the
transboundary movement of hazardous waste, resulting in unregulated dumping and
human exposure. The diversity and potential consequences of such impacts, combined
with limited capacity of developing countries and economies in transition to handle them,
make the management of chemicals and waste a cross-cutting issue. Nonetheless,
developing these policies depends greatly on scientific knowledge and data, the absence
of which definitively constitutes a barrier to the effective management and minimization
of chemicals and wastes.
Water supply and quality, atmospheric depletion, and climate change are among
other challenges that environmental policies face. Increasing efficiency in the use of
water resources is vital to cover human water demands, which are increasing due to
growing population and economic activities. In 2011, forty-one countries experienced
water stress, and even though the proportion of people without access to clean water
declined from 23 percent in 1990 to 9 percent in 2015, there are still important gaps in
rural areas and across regions, and access to drinking water of adequate quality and
quantity remains one of the largest human health problems globally. Although the extent
of the Antarctic ozone hole slightly reduced in the 2010s, some ozone-depleting
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substances are still present in the environment and need to be destroyed or recycled
(UNEP, 2012a). In 2016, parties to the Montreal Protocol agreed on new strategies to
phase out hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), a category of replacement chemicals for ozonedepleting substances with high global warming potential (UNEP, 2016d). Furthermore,
climate change continues to threaten food security and biodiversity, and it is likely to
increase sea levels, droughts, and other extreme weather events worldwide. While these
concerns are particularly prevalent, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases
continue to increase to levels that are likely to push global temperatures to more than 2°C
above the pre-industrial average. Controlling emissions and temperatures requires
movement toward low-carbon economies and solutions. Governments need to view
climate change, air quality, and stratospheric ozone depletion in an integrated way that
supports economic development and saves human lives, enhancing the quality of life and
protecting the environment.

From agreements to behavioral change: The implementation puzzle
As the GEO asserts, “harmful environmental changes are taking place in an
increasingly globalized, industrialized and interconnected world” heightening the risks
and reducing the opportunities for the advancement of human well-being (UNEP, 2012a,
p. 458). The complexity of environmental processes and our limited understanding make
it hard to predict thresholds and effects. In this context, the international system requires
“a polycentric governance approach (…) to attain effective, efficient and equitable
outcomes.” The successful implementation of global environmental conventions through
goal setting, metric development, data collection, and resource mobilization is therefore
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fundamental to coordinating, integrating, and systematizing efforts to protect the
environment and promote sustainability. Therefore, evaluating their implementation and
effectiveness is particularly important. Existing assessments of international law
instruments in general, and global environmental conventions in particular, focus on
compliance, implementation, and effectiveness. The analysis of the literature on both
perspectives includes the three concepts. Compliance refers to conformance to
expectations, the adherence of state parties to the agreement’s obligations (Chayes &
Chayes, 1993; Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1997;
Simmons, 2000; Oran R. Young, 1979). Implementation refers to the adoption of
domestic regulations to fulfill international commitments (Jacobson & Brown-Weiss,
1995; Mitchell, 2001; Simmons, 1998; Victor et al., 1998; Oran R. Young, 1979).
Effectiveness means fulfilling the goals of the agreement and resolving the environmental
problem in question (Bernstein & Cashore, 2012; Miles et al., 2002; Mitchell, 2001;
Simmons, 1998).
This study analyzes implementation to assess whether state parties to a particular
convention have put in place the necessary conditions to achieve the goals of the
agreement, and therefore be effective in addressing the global problems central to each
convention. To this end, my analysis will be grounded in the compliance and
implementation literature. However, analyzing implementation is a difficult task. Each
convention’s definition of implementation differs, which increases the difficulty of
defining a standard measurement for evaluation. In addition, most academic studies view
implementation from a limited perspective that connects specific agreements to the
solution of environmental global problems but omits the process of adopting the national
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policies required for complying with those obligations. Thus, implementation and
effectiveness of global environmental conventions have been seen by analysts as
pivotally determined by the capacity and resources of member countries. In addition,
countries in which certain environmental issues are more urgent, are expected to have
higher implementation and effectiveness on the agreements that address those pressing
problems.
Overall, states with higher levels of economic capacity and more stable political
situations achieve better implementation in terms of their objectives as parties to
environmental conventions. Systemic factors also influence the process of translating
global environmental obligations into national policies. However, discussions of the
determinants of implementation cover multiple issues, which makes it difficult to
establish solid overarching causality relationships.
Three gaps--conceptual, empirical, and methodological--characterize the literature
on global environmental conventions. Most conceptual analyses concentrate on
effectiveness, without understanding first how the conventions are being translated into
national environmental policies. The causal connections between conventions as
instruments of governance and the solution of environmental challenges need to follow a
systematic approach that incorporates the measures—informational, institutional,
regulatory, technical, and financial—that countries enact to fulfill their global
commitments. In other words, assessing individual countries’ implementation of
environmental conventions and explaining why countries perform differently is essential
to understanding the dynamics and effectiveness of international environmental
organizations and their contributions to addressing global challenges. Secondly, studies
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need to offer empirical standard metrics that allow for comparisons across conventions
and countries. Specific targets need to be identified and adequate data collected to
measure progress under the same parameters for all countries and conventions. And
finally, there is a fundamental gap regarding scale. Most analyses only offer information
for a limited number of countries, whereas other studies focus on a specific agreement
without offering national data that allows comparison among cases. Third, the absence of
an accurate, up-to-date empirical indicator that estimates the implementation of global
environmental conventions leads to the lack of a systematic explanation for the
determinants of the process, and fails to connect the implementation of the conventions to
the policy actions that countries and international organizations can develop to address
weaknesses and improve performance in meeting global environmental goals.
Therefore, studies need to be recalibrated to determine how conventions are being
implemented across all member states over a period of time, in order to understand why
countries perform differently. In addition, the same methodology should be applied to
different agreements to evaluate how the nature of different environmental issues, and the
institutional arrangements of different conventions, impact the process of
implementation. In this context, I will examine the implementation of global
environmental conventions in four agreements and two issue areas—biodiversity and
chemicals and waste (see Table 2), as a way to offer a better understanding of the process
of implementation and effectiveness, and to provide input for policy-making processes.
By analyzing and raising attention to the implementation of global environmental
conventions, policy-makers and academic researchers can help solve global planetary
challenges and proscribe human activities that are harmful to the environment.
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Table 2 Global environmental conventions included in this study
• Ramsar Convention on Wetlands
• Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)
• Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
(Basel Convention)
• Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm Convention)

Measuring implementation: The Environmental Conventions Index
To address the need for an empirical indicator that measures the implementation
of global environmental conventions, the research team at the Center for Governance and
Sustainability designed an empirical instrument—the Environmental Conventions Index
(ECI), which assesses the actions that signatory countries have taken to fulfill their
commitments. The index derives a composite score from the answers to the questions that
state parties submit in national reports to each convention’s secretariat; thus, the index
illustrates trends between countries, within countries (across issues and over time), and
across conventions. Aligning the data from these agreements is a particularly complex
and time-consuming effort, as each convention has its own reporting platform,
requirements, and timeline.
The methodological approach I used includes description, assessment, and
explanation, as is appropriate for a social sciences analysis (King, Keohane, & Verba,
1994). Through a multi-stage protocol (see Chapter 3), the research team I was part of
collected the reports submitted by state parties to the four conventions over a 15-year
period (2001-2015) 5; identified implementation indicators for each convention, including
the creation of necessary institutions and evidence of the technical capacity to comply
5

For each convention, this study includes data for every country that has submitted at least one report in
the years 2001-2015. For more information on the selection of case studies, the reporting requirements, and
the characterization of the dataset, see Chapter 3.
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with obligations; and created and applied scoring scales for each indicator. More than
100,000 data points were coded to build a reliable dataset that includes the data reported
by each country. Countries were ranked on their progress toward each convention’s goals
using an ordinal scale from 0 to 5, with 5 being the highest level of implementation. As a
quantitative metric, the index is then comparable by country and by convention.
The index has some important distinguishing characteristics. First, it examines
data related to the national implementation of the hard legal obligations defined by the
conventions. Second, it assesses whether signatory countries provided the required
information, created the necessary institutions, and possess the technical capacity to
comply with their obligations. This feedback is important to the convention secretariats,
as it will help them to determine how to allocate institutional and financial resources, and
how to improve national capacities for implementation. And third, by using a
standardized metric, the index makes it possible to establish connections between
environmental conventions and to understand changes in policy behaviors and
environmental quality, providing an accurate description that enhances explanatory
power. In addition, by using a large-n analysis, this study evaluates implementation
results for every country party to the four conventions analyzed here (see Table 2) for
which information was available for 2001 through 2015.
Data from the ECI also sets a performance baseline and promotes learning. The
index expands the scale of existing studies about the implementation and effectiveness of
global environmental conventions, to include more countries and to compare different
conventions across the same parameters. This allows for the identification of patterns that
reflect on traditional assumptions about the extent of implementation and the factors that
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determine it, and call for alternative explanations of the observed facts. The empirical
model developed by this study can be integrated with current theoretical assumptions to
offer an alternative explanation to the role of the environmental conventions as global
governance mechanisms. The index could also be used as the dependent variable in
quantitative and qualitative analyses of multiple factors to test theoretical assumptions
about the determinants of the process of implementation. This will provide insights for
policy recommendations, addressing conventional beliefs about countries’ capacities, the
nature of environmental issues, the characteristics of the agreements, and roles of the
international system, as well as broadening our understanding of interactions between
state parties and conventions in defining national policies to achieve global objectives.
Identifying the factors that determine implementation in each country is central to
understanding national results, to establish best practices, and to identify challenges that
must be addressed to improve countries’ implementation of global environmental
commitments.
In addition, my methodological approach can be applied not only to other
environmental conventions but also to international law instruments in other policy areas
that require assessments of their translation into domestic policies. Moreover, the use of
national reports as sources of information for the construction of the ECI provides
valuable insights about the nature of these information mechanisms, about the
information requirements of global environmental conventions in particular and
international law agreements in general, and about how these requirements contribute to
compliance, implementation, and enforcement.
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Fulfilling global environmental goals requires information, assessment, and
monitoring. This dissertation covers all three elements, contributing to the system of
global environmental governance by developing an analytical and political data baseline
of national performance in global environmental conventions, based on the ECI. At the
intellectual level, this research bridges a gap in the existing literature about the
implementation of global environmental conventions. The ECI brings empirical evidence
to the analysis of implementation, and informs countries and conventions about the extent
of their progress in fulfilling their international environmental obligations, allowing them
to compare results across countries and conventions for the years analyzed. Measuring
and understanding implementation is needed to articulate and analyze best practices that
could be used by scholars and policy-makers to help improve outcomes. If the challenge
of implementation is not addressed through evidence-based global responses,
environmental problems will persist, eroding the legitimacy of the governance system
and preventing it from providing solutions to issues central to human well-being and
sustainable development. The international community stands at a crossroads in the path
to solving global environmental challenges, as it attempts to begin implementing the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which include specific targets related to
different environmental conventions. Thus, it is critical to define new strategies for
globally agreed environmental goals to occupy center stage in the political debate.

Organization of this study
In this analysis, I seek to accomplish three goals: first, to assess the level of
implementation of global environmental conventions in the select case studies; second, to
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evaluate the main trends regarding the level of implementation across types of countries
and regions to offer a preliminary evaluation of the reasons why countries perform
differently; and third, to provide information on national policies and measures that
inform the relevance of the index, identifying best practices and challenges for each
convention’s implementation at the national level. Implementing the conventions requires
behavioral changes at the institutional, informational, regulatory, and technical levels
intended to eventually improve the environment or at least prevent its further
deterioration. Offering evidence on how each country is implementing these changes
opens a window to better examine the dynamics of implementation, thus improving the
literature and informing policy-makers. The ECI also answers many questions about how
the obligations and actions defined by the conventions move parties towards the ultimate
goal of solving the problems addressed by the conventions. Each chapter provides a piece
of this analysis, revealing different aspects of the process of implementation and
revealing its main successes and challenges.
In Chapter 2, I set the conceptual foundation for the analysis by laying out a
detailed characterization of global environmental conventions and the main debates that
exist—both in academia and in the policy world—about their nature, formation,
functioning, and implementation. I describe the previous efforts to assess implementation
to typify gaps in the literature. The chapter discusses the importance of the conventions
as instruments of governance, and the need to evaluate progress in their implementation,
as a way to improve their results. This also responds to new debates about the ideas of
treaty congestion, the interactions among the existing conventions, the emergence and
implementation of new conventions, the connection between environmental agreements

26

and other policy areas—such as trade and human rights—and their contribution to the
implementation of the sustainable development agenda.
Chapter 3 presents the methodology and technical notes for this study. Departing
from a general description of the methodologies used in such analyses, I discuss the
characteristics of the dataset, the structure and construction of the ECI, and the
methodological protocol used in each step. Chapter 3 also introduces the qualitative
methodology used to build the country profiles presented in Chapter 6. Finally, this
chapter demonstrates the value of the index’s methodology and its replicability in other
policy areas.
Chapters 4 and 5 analyze the implementation of the conventions in (1) chemicals
and waste and (2) biodiversity. They are presented separately to emphasize the patterns of
results in each cluster. Each chapter has a similar structure: After introducing each
convention, I discuss its membership, national reporting of results, and level of
implementation. Each section highlights average results, historical trends, comparisons
across developed and developing countries and across regions, as well as top and bottom
performers. Chapter 4 explains how countries with greater technical capacities, access to
technology, and possibilities for data collection and monitoring achieve better results in
implementing their obligations under the Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes and the
Stockholm Convention on POPs. Furthermore, existing disparities in implementation
across types of countries and regions call for targeted policy instruments in capacity
building and technical assistance, particularly regarding information collection
mechanisms. Chapter 5 discusses the implementation of the Ramsar and CITES
biodiversity conventions. I show that the nature of the problems of wetlands conservation
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and illegal wildlife trade result in different levels of implementation, highlighting the
positive results that some developing countries are obtaining. The biodiversity
conventions also present specific arguments about the role that their governance bodies
have in the process of implementation. I also devote special attention to the connection
between the conventions’ organizational structures and procedures, and their level of
implementation.
Chapter 6 connects the results of the ECI with qualitative analyses at the national
level. Given the innovative nature of the index, it is important to evaluate whether its
results reflect policy actions that countries are taking to fulfill their international
environmental obligations. Using ten countries—Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Canada,
Colombia, Czech Republic, Germany, Mozambique, the Republic of Korea (South Korea
from now on), and Thailand—I show that the positive results of the index correspond to
the existence of governance instruments such as regulation and policy frameworks, as
well as to specific initiatives countries have established to address their obligations.
Consequently, countries with lower scores face challenges with these same issues. The
countries register different national results across clusters (and within clusters in some
cases), confirming that the process of implementation results from a series of changes
that can be evaluated empirically and quantitatively. Such analysis offers standard
metrics that provide insights to policy and contribute to the literature about global
environmental conventions and their implementation and effectiveness. Understanding
how countries are translating their global environmental obligations at the national level
will serve as the foundation for creating a policy space for discussion about
implementation that could potentially improve the performance of countries and of
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conventions. These profiles were part of a collaborative project developed between the
Center for Governance and Sustainability and the Law Division of UN Environment.
Building on these empirical findings and the interpretative analysis, in Chapter 7,
I offer conclusions on the dynamics of the implementation process, its results, and the
insights that inform improvement. These conclusions contribute to current policy debates
on the role of global environmental conventions within the system of environmental
governance and the implementation of the sustainable development agenda. This
discussion shows a path for future research and explains how the framework established
for the ECI forms a foundation to measure the extent of the conventions’ effectiveness in
the solution of problems such as pollution and biodiversity loss, and in the promotion of
the environmentally sustainable management of chemicals and wetlands conservation.
While multiple studies have previously tried to evaluate the implementation of
environmental conventions, a systematic approach that identifies the steps towards
implementation, and measures their progress, provides a new repository of data across
countries and conventions. This can then be the departure point for analyses and policy
recommendations that improve performance. Furthermore, from this systematic analysis,
new steps in this research agenda could focus on the results of individual countries,
increasing the salience of environmental issues in national foreign policies that have
traditionally been dominated by security, conflict, and development challenges.
Ultimately, better understanding of implementation offers the space for policy action and
cooperation. Within this space, it would be possible to create a new generation of
leadership, at the national level and in the global institutions, as well as in the higher
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education system, that motivates organizations to produce this type of analysis and to
support policy-making processes with academic rigor and engagement.
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CHAPTER 2
ENVIRONMENTAL CONVENTIONS: DEFINITION, FUNCTIONS AND
IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter presents an overview of the key issues in the academic literature
regarding the global environmental agreements. As discussed in Chapter 1, the research
agenda regarding environmental conventions addresses multiple dimensions, from the
process of regime formation to their operationalization, functioning, effectiveness,
evolution, and consequences (Breitmeier et al., 2006). This chapter creates a conceptual
framework for this study, discussing first the scope and functions of these agreements,
the factors considered in the process of treaty negotiation and formation, and the
institutional arrangements established and their role in the agreements’ operation. This
chapter provides the foundation for discussions on the institutional performance of
environmental conventions’—including the theoretical perspective on the concepts of
compliance, implementation, and effectiveness—and on how implementation can be
measured, promoted, and ensured. This chapter also investigates selected studies
assessing the implementation and effectiveness of global environmental conventions. In
sum, in this chapter I contextualize the gap in the academic literature that this study
attempts to bridge, and I frame the concept of implementation of the environmental
conventions within the system of global environmental governance.
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Global environmental conventions are the main law-making fora to protect the
environment (Gehring, 2007; Mäler, 1990). They are “intergovernmental document(s)
intended as legally binding with a primary stated purpose of preventing or managing
human impacts on natural resources” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 431). Subject to the regulations
of the Law of the Treaties (Vienna Convention), environmental conventions are the result
of a voluntary agreement in which states have committed to bind themselves to
international obligations and multilateral rules at multiple levels (Birnie, Boyle, &
Redgwell, 2009; Gehring, 2007; Mäler, 1990). These conventions also establish
institutional frameworks and mechanisms for participating states to receive support for
achieving the specific objectives defined for each environmental issue, as well as to
provide important principles guiding the interactions among states and other actors
(Gehring, 2007). Even though global environmental conventions have been part of the
system of international environmental law since the nineteenth century, the past five
decades have seen an expansion of the system of international environmental
cooperation—creating more agreements, supporting developing countries in defining
their environmental policies, expanding the membership of existing agreements, opening
them to the participation of non-state actors, and promoting sustainable development
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 1992; UNEP et al., 2007).
Conventions such as the 1971 Ramsar Convention and the 1973 CITES were
negotiated and concluded in the context of the same environmental concerns that led to
the creation of UN Environment. Soon thereafter, and under the auspices of UN
Environment, negotiations concluded for the Convention on Migratory Species (1979),
whose purpose is the global conservation of wildlife and habitat by protecting terrestrial,
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marine, and avian migratory species throughout their ranges. UN Environment was also
the main force behind efforts related to the management of chemicals and wastes.
Concerns about environmental damage and the effects of harmful phenomena such as
pollution and the degradation of the ozone layer on human health and the environment
(Tolba & Rummel-Bulska, 1998) led to the establishment of the Vienna Convention for
the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1987) and the Basel Convention on the
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes (1989).
Around the time that preparations were underway for the 1992 Earth Summit,
countries agreed on the need to move forward with the commitments established by
previous MEAs by developing and applying domestic policies conducive to progress
toward sustainable development (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1992; UNEP et al.,
2007). At the same time the so-called Rio Conventions were also adopted: The
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (1992), and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (1994). With these
treaties, conventions moved from specific sectoral approaches into more holistic
perspectives that—instead of focusing on specific environmental resources or threats—
presented overall approaches that recognized the interconnectedness between
environmental issues, their effects on broader ecosystems, and their positive and negative
effects on sustainable development (Redgwell, 2014). Two other conventions were
negotiated towards the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new century to expand
the scope of global regulations of the management of chemicals and wastes: the
Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent (1998), and the Stockholm Convention
on POPs (2001).
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Recently, environmental conventions have not only increased in complexity but
have also established multiple connections with other areas of international law such as
trade, human rights, intellectual property, and maritime law. Agreements have also
established stronger and more open mechanisms to promote the participation of civil
society and non-governmental stakeholders in the processes of treaty-making,
implementation, review, and monitoring (UNEP et al., 2007), and UN Environment and
their executive bodies are developing new mechanisms to link their mandates with other
global agendas and strategies, particularly those to do with sustainable development
(UNEP, 2016b).
Conceptually, environmental conventions can be classified according to multiple
characteristics. The type and number of parties, level of legality, and instruments used to
achieve goals result in different categories of agreements (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011;
Bodansky, 2010). However, the most common classifications are based on the
geographical range of the environmental problems they address: global, regional,
subregional, or bilateral (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011); the nature of the obligations they
enact, including regulations, procedures, or programs (Mitchell, 2008a); and the
environmental issues they address (UNEP, 2012d). This last category refers to the
process of clustering that was part of the discussions around the strengthening of the
system of international environmental governance that UN Environment started in 2001
(Oberthür, 2002). Agreements can be clustered around atmosphere, biodiversity,
chemicals and waste, land, or water (see Table 1). This is a useful policy and
methodological instrument to understand the agreements’ objectives and their possible
linkages. I use this classification to separate the agreements into the chemicals and waste
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cluster (Basel and Stockholm) and the biodiversity cluster (Ramsar and CITES) and to
present comparative analysis among and within clusters.

Scope and functions of global environmental conventions
Global environment conventions serve multiple functions depending on the issues
they address and the characteristics of the countries involved (Brown-Weiss & Jacobson,
1998; DeSombre, 2004; Simmons, 2009). As institutional frameworks to address
transboundary environmental problems, they set agendas, raise awareness, gather
information, regulate actions, improve knowledge about the state of the environment and
the extent of environmental deterioration, reduce uncertainty, and promote consolidated
actions and policy responses toward effective solutions by centralizing commitments and
innovations (Brown-Weiss & Jacobson, 1998; Brunée, 2006; DeSombre, 2004; Haas et
al., 1993; Mitchell, 2003, 2010; Steiner et al., 2003). Ultimately, these functions point
toward “the control and prevention of environmental harm and the conservation and
sustainable use of natural resources and ecosystems” (Birnie et al., 2009, p. 212). They
also contribute to policy specialization, opening spaces for the participation of civil
society and the use of innovative instruments to solve environmental challenges.
As part of their functioning, the conventions develop mechanisms for
governments to use in addressing environmental challenges (Mäler, 1990). Policy
coordination requires complex design in order to develop policy options that work better
for a group than those that countries would have implemented individually (Hoel, 1997;
Simmons, 2009). These mechanisms are based partly on the institutional arrangements
that each convention establishes. Conventions create executive and subsidiary bodies that
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work on issues such as decision-making, the provision of scientific recommendations, the
review and verification of the agreement’s application, and its implementation and
compliance at the national level (Birnie et al., 2009). Therefore, the conventions’ very
purpose is to facilitate a response to common concerns, to build mechanisms for norm
creation and adaptation, and to promote compliance “in the context of polycentric
problems where states are likely to be both perpetrator and victim” (Brunée, 2006, p. 14).
Agreements “are rarely the end product, but instead create the framework and the
process that guide responses to the environmental problem in question” (DeSombre,
2004, p. 84). Beyond their policy roles, they also have additional functions. First and
foremost, environmental treaties express collective intentionality (Simmons, 2009),
bringing governments and actors together under a series of principles and obligations that
enhance their capacity to respond to environmental problems (Bodansky, 2010;
Simmons, 2009). They transform “intergovernmental bargaining into deliberative
transnational problem-solving” (Gehring, 2007, p. 496). From the perspective of
international organizations, conventions support, manage operations, jointly elaborate
and produce norms, and coordinate the efforts of countries that agree to work together to
address a common issue (Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Choucri, 1995). By opening spaces for
interactions among countries, agreements also promote reciprocity, define specific norms,
and require countries to establish the national policies necessary to address environmental
problems. All these functions, outcomes, and substantive measures would ultimately
improve the state of the environment.
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The process of treaty formation
The study of environmental diplomacy and of the negotiation of an environmental
treaty covers numerous aspects, from the actual motivations for joining an agreement, to
the process of reaching it, the relevance of different issues in the negotiation process, and
the treaty’s design. In addition, the study of environmental conventions also includes
aspects such as the role of science in the definition of international policies and
commitments, the establishment of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and the
influence of power and interests behind these decisions.
A core debate within international relations theory regards ways in which states
can work together on common problems. States are motivated by the classical concept of
maximization of their own results (Krasner, 1982; Stein, 1982). In an anarchic world,
states operate as unitary, single actors depending on self-help to achieve their objectives
(Morgenthau, 1960; Waltz, 1979). Specific interests determine different forms of
interaction between countries (Frieden, 1999; Stein, 1982; Waltz, 1979). However, the
evolution of international affairs opened the door for states to build mechanisms to join
efforts in solving common problems under other expectations. Different perspectives of
liberal institutionalism recognize the relevance of non-state actors, the existence of
multiple channels of access, the reduced salience of power, and the increasing relevance
of international institutions in the provision of common goods (Hasenclever et al., 1997;
Keohane & Nye, 1972; Krasner, 1983; Mitrany, 1975). Neoliberal institutionalism tries to
bridge the gap using realist arguments that share the underlying principle that states are
rational actors. It also recognizes motivations for cooperation that emerge from the
anarchic nature of the international system (Grieco, 1993; Stein, 1982). Under this
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framework, institutions serve as catalyzers of states’ efforts to define conformity to
specific values and mechanisms for policy coordination in which actors adjust their
behaviors to the preferences of others (Hasenclever et al., 1997; Keohane, 1984; Krasner,
1983; Mitrany, 1975). States cooperate with institutions according to specific conditions,
countries’ mutual choice and the possibility for permanent interactions that highlight the
need for cooperation (Grieco, 1993; K. Raustiala, 1997).
Even though both the above-stated theoretical strands recognize the role of
international cooperation, their perspectives on states’ motivations and interests differ
significantly. While rational choice is exclusively limited to the maximization of specific
interest in each situation, neoliberal institutionalism assumes that states follow strategies
that will offer them the best possible results according to their interests and long-term
evolution. Cooperation maintains its relevance, since agreements and institutions support
joint efforts to achieve policy benefits. However, neoliberal institutionalism fails to
address major constraints on states’ decision to cooperation, including the ones defined
by realism, based on anarchy and the primacy of security (Grieco, 1993).
Overall, developing an international environmental agreement is not an easy
endeavor. It involves achieving a voluntary commitment among many nations with
various levels of development, technical capabilities, resources, and concern about the
specific environmental problems (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1992). Therefore, a
finalized agreement results from a multilateral process that connects elements of
environmental policy, international law, and governance (UNEP, 2016b). Its formation
covers multiple stages, from the recognition of a specific need to the adoption and
ratification of the treaty and its entering into force (Gehring, 2007; UNEP et al., 2007;
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Oran R. Young, 1989). Negotiations take place within international organizations or
through independent or new diplomatic conferences, and are always influenced by the
institutional cultures of the organizations conducting the negotiations (Gehring, 2007).
Before moving forward with the negotiation of the agreements, however, governments
need to establish a series of decision-making procedures, and to declare the values that
are to be part of the foundation of the treaty-formation process (Bodansky, 2010). In
some cases, states also to work to reduce informational, political, and institutional
constraints that would prevent them from obtaining optimal benefits once they start
participating in a given agreement (Brandt, 2002). Table 3 lists the steps in the process of
treaty formation.
Table 3 Steps in the treaty-making process
Pre-negotiation
Initiation of
negotiation
Negotiation

Adoption and entry
into force

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Framing of the issue
Formulation of national positions
Choice of negotiating forum
Adoption of negotiating mandate
Structural issues: committees, coalitions
Procedures: decision-making rules, transparency, access
Formulation of initial draft
Adoption
National consent: signature and ratification, or accession
Entry into force

Source: (Bodansky, 2010)

For the formulation of the initial draft of an agreement, no specific template
exists, but common components of treaties have been identified (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 1992). In defining components, parties operate under consensus
principles that require negotiations before making decisions. Departing from a statement
of common interests, environmental conventions establish specific definitions for the
specialized terms that are used through their legal texts, as a way to clarify contents and
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obligations. Furthermore, agreements define a series of requirements for parties to
institute regulatory mechanisms, report information, establish legislation, and define
national institutional mechanisms to work on issues related to the convention. But
conventions do not only set rules. They also put in place mechanisms to monitor and
verify compliance, collect information about national policies established by state parties,
and settle disputes regarding environmental resources (Palmer, 1992).
Treaties also include definitions on the institutional framework for
implementation at the national and at the global levels, defining the foundation for state
parties to fulfill the obligations they acquire when joining an agreement (Gehring, 2007;
Redgwell, 2014). These instruments make the conventions forums for further negotiation
and discussion, which will lead to administrative decision-making and additional lawmaking. In this sense, treaties should be seen not as discrete events but as a process, as
flexible components of the system of international environmental law (Brandt, 2002;
Choucri, 1995; Gehring, 2007; Mäler, 1990; Miles et al., 2002). Table 4 lists the sections
commonly included in the legal text of global environmental conventions.
Table 4 Key elements of global environmental conventions
• Preamble
• Definition and use of terms
• Objective and principles
• General provisions and scope
• Substantive commitments
• Financial and technical assistance
• Education, training, and awareness / Research and monitoring
• Conference of the Parties (COP) / Meeting of the Parties (MOP)
• Subsidiary bodies / Secretariat, focal points, and authorities
• Compliance, communication, and reporting
• Review of effectiveness
• Dispute settlement
• Treaty mechanisms
Source: (UNEP et al., 2007)
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A critical issue in the negotiation and drafting process is the clarity of obligations,
which determine the level of engagement that countries will have with the agreement
(Brown-Weiss & Jacobson, 1998; Simmons, 2009). Countries are subject to all the
obligations in the treaties they join, unless they express a reservation (UNEP et al., 2007).
Therefore, it is critical that obligations—especially those substantive ones—are as
detailed as possible to reduce the room for additional regulations, and the possibility of
misinterpretation. However, in some cases parties use vague obligations to hide the lack
of political consensus or to evade concrete commitments (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011).
Since the agreements materialize cooperation to solve specific environmental problems, it
is clear that “environmental protection is an appropriate ream of international law” (Tolba
& Rummel-Bulska, 1998, p. 20).

Institutional arrangements
International treaties include a series of institutional arrangements put into place
to support state parties in the fulfillment of their obligations (Gehring, 2007). The
complexity of environmental problems demands different structures at the institutional
level (Choucri, 1995). Normally, a convention establishes two executive bodies—a
secretariat and a conference or meeting of the parties—which are the main decisionmaking and mandated executive bodies for the administration and operation of the
agreement. The study of these organizational structures addresses two different topics:
the role of these executive bodies in the implementation of the associated treaty,
discussing their levels of influence and the conditions they need to advance the
implementation of their mandate (Bauer, 2006; Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009, 2013);
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and their actual structures, using the perspective of organizational behavior theories, and
evaluating the role of the members of the secretariats’ staff as individual and multilateral
diplomats, considering variables such as their professional backgrounds and personality
traits (Egeberg, 2003; Häfliger & Hug, 2012; Reinalda, 2011; Spies, 2013; Trondal,
2013). Both strands of the literature are important for understanding the structure of
executive bodies and how they affect the outcomes and impact of the conventions.
The executive bodies and the international bureaucracies that represent them are
generally considered independent actors in world politics (Biermann & Siebenhüner,
2013; Churchill & Ulfstein, 2000), fulfilling both political and technical functions
(Urquhart, 1995). They serve as agents of the decisions reached by state parties to the
different organizations and treaties. The mandates assigned by countries shape the
activities and performance of the secretariats and the behavior of their staff (Trondal,
2013). Mandates include multiple functions not limited to the implementation of a
convention (Ege & Bauer, 2013). Functions range from the creation and dissemination of
knowledge to the shaping of the discourse associated to the treaty, the influence on the
negotiation, the coordination and monitoring of the process of implementation, the
institutionalization of the convention, and the definition of standards (Biermann &
Siebenhüner, 2013).
COPs and secretariats are important for different reasons. At the global level they
act as agents in the international system, dealing with specific international issues and
proposing and coordinating problem-solving strategies (Bauer, 2006). At the national
level, their relevance lies in how they influence policy outputs, generating change,
affecting the distribution of power and transforming the structure and processes of
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domestic governance (Trondal, 2013). Discussions about how COPs outcomes expand
the obligations and legal scope of treaties evidence the importance of these meetings
(Wiersema, 2009). In executing these mandates, executive leadership appears to be a
central determinant of authority, capacity, autonomy, visibility, and legitimacy of
secretariats (Bauer, 2006; Cox, 1969; Grigorescu, 2013).
A more detailed approach to international bureaucracies incorporates their
dimension as international civil servants. In this role, secretariats also perform functions
of representation, protection of state interests, negotiation, information gathering and
reporting, and promotion of friendly interstate relations (Spies, 2013), making the
individual and personal characteristics of the employees of the secretariat particularly
relevant, since they bring their positions, values, and political views with them to their
jobs (Reinalda, 2011). These characteristics, at the structural and individual levels, result
in different typologies of organization, specialization, and leadership that determine the
level of engagement of specific secretariats and their capacities to execute the mandate
they receive from member states (Bauer, 2006; Trondal, 2013).
Different studies have addressed the role of environmental secretariats in global
environmental governance and politics. Issues such as their institutional status and
structure are important to establish the capacity of action of international bureaucracies
(Bauer, 2006). Biermann and Siebenhüner (2013) and Andresen and Skjærseth (1999)
offer different typologies of the determinants of the ability of international bureaucracies
to exercise influence. Their characterizations include the nature of the problem; its
international salience and level of autonomy; institutional and capacity frameworks at
legal, institutional and financial levels; and expertise, culture, and leadership. At the same
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time, some challenges that secretariats face—political problems, resource availability,
lack of autonomy, and socio-cultural considerations—negatively affect their capacity to
exercise influence and execute their mandates (Bauer, 2006; Biermann & Bauer, 2004;
Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009; Sandford, 1994). Analyses have also focused on the
specific influence that secretariats have on the implementation of global environmental
obligations. Brown-Weiss and Jacobson (1998) identify the structure of the secretariat as
“a crucial factor” of implementation, compliance, and effectiveness of an agreement.
They highlight a series of functions and institutional arrangements that will facilitate
countries’ engagement to advance implementation and the solution of environmental
problems, including convening meetings, monitoring, scientific assessment, assistance
and capacity-building, connection to stakeholders, standardized data collection, and
providing information to parties and the public.
Another key aspect of conventions’ institutional arrangements is the secretariats’
legal status. Each convention establishes specific regulations about the functions of its
secretariat, operations, and administration. While some agreements have a more
independent structure, in most cases the convention establishes a hosting agreement,
locating the secretariat within an already existing international institution (Desai, 2010).
In the case of CITES and the Basel and Stockholm conventions, the secretariat is housed
at UN Environment. The Ramsar Convention’s secretariat is hosted by IUCN. Different
analyses have addressed these administrative arrangements, and programmatic
cooperation between the hosting organizations and the environmental conventions they
administer (Ramsar Convention, 2005b; UNEP, 2016c). How and where the secretariat is
established is fundamental to the convention’s organizational structure and will therefore
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influence its role in the implementation process. Furthermore, secretariats’ institutional
structure will raise questions about the nature and quality of their services, their
autonomy and the organizational linkages they establish with other conventions and
international organizations.

Institutional performance
Environmental conventions operate in a system with no hierarchical authority to
coordinate or enforce them. That is why questions about their institutional performance
and their contribution to the solution of environmental problems are particularly relevant.
While some analyses consider international agreements as useful instruments, others
recognize that their benefits are limited by the circumstances in which they operate
(Krasner, 1983). These debates revolve around three core concepts: compliance,
implementation, and effectiveness. Compliance refers to conformance to expectations,
the adherence of state parties to the obligations the agreement represents (Chayes &
Chayes, 1993; Faure & Lefevere, 2015; Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1996;
Hasenclever et al., 1997; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1997; Simmons, 2000; Oran R.
Young, 1979). Implementation refers to the adoption of domestic regulations to facilitate
compliance (Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995; Mitchell, 2001; Simmons, 1998; Oran R.
Young, 1979). Effectiveness is the fulfillment of the goals of the agreement and the
resolution of the environmental problem in question (Bernstein & Cashore, 2012;
Simmons, 1998). A review of the literature shows that the three concepts have received
different levels of attention as to their theoretical treatment and conceptualization,
measurement, and analysis of the factors that motivate and ensure implementation. This
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dissertation uses the concept of implementation to address the existing gap in the
literature and to evaluate, under standardized parameters, the extent to which state parties
put in place the necessary conditions and measures to fulfill the goals established by the
conventions.
As part of the implementation process, international agreements influence states’
behavior (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Mitchell, 2001; Oran R. Young, 1979, 1994).
Initially, states’ compliance is based on the legal principle of pacta sunt servanda—
treaties are to be obeyed—as recognized by the Vienna Convention on the Law of the
Treaties (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; United Nations, 1969). Implementation and
compliance are, however, more complex. While some scholars limit these aspects to the
adherence of state parties to the obligations of an agreement (Chayes & Chayes, 1993;
Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995; Simmons, 2000), it is necessary to consider the
adoption and implementation of measures that change states’ behavior. While Downs et
al. (1996) argue that compliance is not evidenced in state behavior, other authors such as
Young (1979, 1994), Chayes and Chayes (1993), and Mitchell (2001) analyze the effects
of compliance in states’ behavior in terms of both their foreign and domestic policies and
their role in solving global problems. Jacobson and Weiss (1995) define compliance not
only around adherence to specific provisions, but also in terms of implementing those
measures that treaties institute. Implementation, according to them, refers to the measures
that states take to make international accords effective in their domestic law. Victor,
Raustiala, and Skolnikoff (1998) are even more specific, referring to national
implementation as the creation of new programs and the promulgation and enforcement
of laws and standards. What all these approaches have in common is a strong behavioral
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component that goes beyond actual conformance with specific legal obligations (Haas et
al., 1993; Oran R. Young, 1979). In some cases, however, states do not carry out these
changes and behave contrary to expectations (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1995; Downs et
al., 1996; Simmons, 1998). Additionally, as most agreements offer no standard to
measure implementation, studies conducted on global environmental goals established by
these conventions evidence a persistent failure to achieve many of their goals.
In the case of environmental law, conventions are often used as examples of
positive results in compliance and implementation. However, even though some authors
have evaluated these processes (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss,
1995), their results do not share a common definition for measurement standards and do
not offer a systematic empirical assessment demonstrating results. Even within the same
environmental issues, treaties have different conceptions of what is acceptable behavior
by state parties (Beyerlin, Stoll, & Wolfrum, 2006; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995).
Difficulties with the vagueness of legal obligations and with countries’ reporting reduce
the ability to determine the extent to which countries are fulfilling their obligations and
translating them into national policies. Common understanding of terminology simply
does not exist, and key concepts for assessing the state of the environment and the
effectiveness of measures taken are missing (Helm & Sprinz, 2000; M.A. Levy, 1995;
Marc A Levy, Young, & Zürn, 1995). In addition, different reports, including the flagship
international environmental assessment—the Global Environment Outlook (GEO-5)—
show a high level of failure in attaining global environmental goals (UNEP, 2012a,
2012b; UNEP et al., 2007). This raises questions about the extent to which countries
comply with international environmental treaties and implement their provisions, as well
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as about the effectiveness of international treaties in general, and the factors that
determine countries’ and conventions achievement of their goals. There is also an
important gap in the literature around empirical assessment of the implementation of
international environmental conventions.

Theoretical treatment
Compliance and implementation are major topics in the international relations and
international law literature (Abbott & Snidal, 2013; K. Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002;
Simmons, 2000; Slaughter, 1993). Some analyses of these issues explain how each
discipline perceives them. Guzman (2002), for example, combines approaches from
international relations and international law, to construct what he calls a ‘compliancebased’ theory of international law. Other authors assume a more interrelated approach,
seeing compliance in the intersection between international relations and international
law. Beth A. Simmons (1998) analyzes three perspectives: realism, rational
functionalism, and the normative approach, while Anne-Marie Slaughter (1993)
compares liberalism and institutionalism, and Jeffrey T. Checkel (2001) adds
constructivism. These approaches explain how different international relations theories
perceive compliance and the role of legal instruments in international politics:
•

Realism: International law is perceived as an ‘epiphenomenon of interests’
(Simmons, 1998) which maintains the polarity between law and power (Slaughter,
1993). States operate according to their national interests, which motivate their
willingness to comply (Downs et al., 1996; Steinberg, 2013; Von Stein, 2005).
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•

Liberalism/Institutionalism: Regimes are constructed to affect states’ behavior
and designed to maximize their effectiveness (Slaughter, 1993). International
institutions serve as fora to solve contentious issues and exercise pressure to solve
disagreements peacefully (McLaughlin Mitchell & Hensel, 2007; Moravcsik,
2013).

•

Rational Functionalism: States participate in international regimes because of
their need to solve common problems, and this works as an incentive to
compliance (Hasenclever et al., 1996; Simmons, 1998; Slaughter, 1993).
International law thus has intrinsic value for national-level politics and objectives.

•

Normative Approaches: States base their interests in compliance on the role of
ideas, beliefs, and standards in promoting appropriate behavior, thus constituting
a major influence in governments’ willingness to implement international
agreements (Brunée & Toope, 2013). This approach is connected to both
constructivism (Checkel, 2001) and to Hedley Bull’s International Society (Bull,
1977). At this level, the legitimacy of the law also plays a key role in defining
compliance and how to achieve it (Hasenclever et al., 1996; Simmons, 2000;
Slaughter, 1993).
Of these multiple approaches, most of the literature has focused on the realist

perspective (Downs et al., 1996). Theoretical and practical difficulties persist in
establishing connections with other theories of international relations. However, the
growing role of international law in international politics has raised the relevance of other
theoretical approaches and opened debate about the motivations of states to comply and
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develop specific behaviors and policies that reflect their international commitments. This
approach will be discussed in the next section.

Measuring and motivating implementation
Even though most of the scholarship about implementation stems from the
perspective that there is a general propensity of states to comply with international
obligations (Choucri, 1995), and although international legal scholars see compliance and
implementation as the norm, in practice measuring implementation is a difficult task.
There is no specific standard for “good implementation.” In environmental governance,
as in other issue areas in which research has assed compliance, studies do not share a
common definition of measurement standards (Chayes & Chayes, 1995; Jacobson &
Brown-Weiss, 1995). Treaties have different conceptions of what is an acceptable
behavior from state parties (Beyerlin et al., 2006; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995).
Furthermore, implementation is perceived as the result of a subjective evaluation, in
which measurement will depend on expectations. Levels are determined according to
what parties count as acceptable performance (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). However, some
variables have been established by the literature as useful metrics of compliance.
According to Raustiala and Slaughter (2002), legitimacy is not only a way to guarantee
compliance but also a mechanism to measure it. Legitimacy constitutes a central ‘pulling’
factor that allows for the assessment of implementation as well as incorporating other
dimensions such as ideas and beliefs (Hasenclever et al., 1996; Simmons, 1998;
Slaughter, 1993). Proxies such as perception, membership, and the speed of entering into
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force have also been considered as indicators of implementation and effectiveness
(Choucri, 1995)
Based on these concepts, studies have presented various analyses and measures of
compliance, implementation, and effectiveness (see

Table 5). As Young explained in his 1999 book on the effectiveness of environmental
regimes, during the 1990s, scholarship focused on the question of why some regimes
were more successful than others. Under different definitions and methodological
approaches, scholars agreed on the need for specific assessments of the level of
compliance with and implementation of international environmental agreements.
However, the question of what to measure and how seemed to be an issue in some of the
analyses. Some studies used proxies to implementation, limiting their analysis to specific
agreements within single environmental clusters (Choucri, 1995) or presented
multidimensional approaches to measure progress, including factors such as change in
policy outputs, scientific understanding of environmental problems, and overall
improvement in economic growth, social justice, and national governance performance
(Mitchell, 2008b). Other research focused on the sources of non-compliance, as well as
the role of international organizations and NGOs in enforcing the obligations of different
accords (Cameron et al., 1996).
Other analyses focus on positive and negative drivers of implementation (Fearon,
1998). Beyond the legally binding nature of the obligations and the design of treaties—
including the clarity of the obligations and incentives they establish—states are also
motivated by their desire to improve standards or reputation in terms of agenda-setting or
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problem-solving (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Checkel, 2001; Downs & Jones, 2002;
Simmons, 1998; Simmons & Hopkins, 2005; Underdal, 1998; Von Stein, 2013; Oran R.
Young, 1994). Furthermore, foreign policy considerations and concerns about their
sovereignty also motivate countries to develop the necessary conditions defined by
environmental conventions (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Downs & Jones, 2002; Hoel, 1997;
McLaughlin Mitchell & Hensel, 2007; Simmons & Hopkins, 2005).
However, states’ interactions and the practical role of international law bring other
variables into consideration. Implementation should not be considered a unidimensional
variable (Simmons, 1998). In their 1995 study, Jacobson and Weiss offer four categories
of determinant factors: (a) the nature of the activity associated with each treaty, (b) the
structure of the agreement, (c) the characteristics of the country, and (d) the
characteristics of the international environment. A similar categorization is presented by
Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff (1998), who include the nature of the problem and the
commitments, the power configurations, the linkage with other issues and objectives, the
level of public concern, and other exogenous factors as determinants of implementation
and effectiveness.
In terms of the nature of the activity in each agreement, clearly some issues are
less contentious than others and promote cooperation. Some global problems also
facilitate nations’ objectives of deploying political power and contribute to the process of
regime preservation (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995). The
structural design of agreements also plays a key role. “If the agreement is well
designed—sensible, comprehensible, and with a practical eye to probable patterns of
conduct and interaction—compliance problems and enforcement issues are likely to be
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manageable” (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, p. 183). Characteristics of the international
system also influence the behavior of states and their adherence to international
agreements. Among these, the political space for international organizations and NGOs to
exercise pressure facilitates and promotes compliance. In particular, civil society
influence and pressure on states to commit to international agreements also shape
implementation and accountability.
The category in Jacobson and Brown-Weiss’s conceptualization that probably
receives more attention in the literature is country characteristics. Here different variables
are at play. First, compliance is motivated by the conditions that lead to an agreement
(Von Stein, 2005). Under the framework of rational functionalism, states are more
motivated to comply when they have a clear understanding of the reasons that support
their participation in the regime and the benefits they receive (Simmons, 1998; Underdal,
1998). States may also be interested in improving standards (Chayes & Chayes, 1993) or
their reputation (Fearon, 1998) in terms of agenda-setting or actual effectiveness in
problem-solving (Downs & Jones, 2002; Simmons & Hopkins, 2005; Oran R. Young,
1994). This raises awareness about how agreements are constructed. In some cases states
only commit to the obligations they can actually fulfill, so that their reputation is not
negatively affected by non-compliance allegations (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Checkel,
2001). Second, authors see compliance as dependent on the capacity of states. Technical,
political, and financial resources shape capacity, as do information availability and
leadership (Haas et al., 1993). A state’s policy history—commitment to international law
and the priority given to it in foreign policy traditions—is also relevant to capacity. Third,
domestic regimes also a determining factor. Simmons (1998) argues, for example, that a
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state’s domestic regime influences its perception of the role of law in its foreign policy.
Democracies, she contends, are more likely to comply with international legal
obligations, since they have standardized processes to adopt domestic legislation and
since they depend on honoring commitments to maintain the support of the electorate.
In another theoretical strand, the literature discusses how compliance depends on
the mechanisms that each agreement or regime establishes to encourage or discourage it.
Agreements should be designed to ensure clarity about the operations, performance, and
responses required from state parties (Mitchell, 2001). This design includes mechanisms
that work both ways: as strong incentives to comply and as weak incentives to go against
agreements (Oran R. Young, 1979). Regimes should establish a persuasive discourse,
through monitoring, verification, and enforcement mechanisms, that motivate compliance
and promote national implementation (Simmons, 1998). Compliance and implementation
therefore comprise a multilevel, multi-actor process that extends beyond governments’
preferences, and thus analysis of compliance and implementation requires extensive and
systematic empirical evidence.
What is clear from the multiple analyses that try to measure and explain
implementation is that questions about this process continue to be as relevant as they are
complex. When determining the role of conventions and their effectiveness in solving
global environmental problems, clearly there is a long list of determinant variables.
However, implementation is definitively “the central process to turn commitments into
actions” (Victor et al., 1998) and deserves special attention. International law,
international relations, and political science have strongly focused on the legal concept of
compliance without taking into consideration its effects on states’ policies (L. L. Martin,
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2013). Previous scholarship has conceptualized the conflict of implementation and
assessed its levels, but “very little empirical research (had tried) to answer these questions
in a systematic way” (Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995). Furthermore, some analyses
assumed that developing countries did not need to make substantial behavioral changes
for the environmental agreements they joined either because their limited resources or
because they were not responsible of environmental damage. This lack of empirical
evidence constitutes a key gap in both the literature and the practical evolution of the
concept. As the research agenda about environmental governance moves forward,
agreements should be seen as scenarios for learning. For implementation to lead to more
effective international environmental agreements, a better understanding of the extent to
which countries implement conventions is fundamental, not only to measure progress but
also to adjust the mechanisms to are being established to ensure implementation and to
achieve the goals of the conventions in the protection of the environment and sustainable
development.

Ensuring implementation
Other strand of the literature on international environmental law and conventions
addresses the mechanisms required to facilitate and enforce implementation and
compliance. In the system of global environmental governance, a core challenge is to
ensure compliance, implementation, and effectiveness. Countries and agencies have
acknowledged the importance of implementation and discussed strategies to promote the
domestication of international environmental obligations. In 1992, the UN Conference on
Environment and Development asked that parties to international agreements develop
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“procedures and mechanisms to promote and review their effective, full and prompt
implementation” (UNCED, 1992 para. 39.8), including capacity building, information,
science, technology, institutional arrangements, and finances, among others. This
approach was reinforced by the 2002 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on
Sustainable Development, referring not only to the implementation of environmental
conventions but also to the development agenda (WSSD, 2002). More recently, the 2012
UN Conference on Sustainable Development Rio+20 reaffirmed the previous discussion,
and invited countries to improve the implementation of their policy commitments, to
advance in providing means of implementation, and recognized finance, technology,
capacity building, trade and information as decisive factors to achieve the proposed
agenda (United Nations, 2012a).
Environmental conventions have also addressed the ensuring of implementation
(Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011; Sands, 2003). “Once an agreement has come into force,
compliance by the Parties with their commitments may be controlled by a variety of
techniques developed under different environmental regimes” (Sand, 1992, p. 13).
However, the process faces multiple challenges, including inadequate means, the
existence of multiple environmental commitments at the country level, the collision of
those commitments with countries' political and economic interests, and the
multidimensional nature of some environmental threats. These factors raise concerns
about non-compliance, implementation gaps, and ineffectiveness in the solution of global
environmental problems (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011; Kurukulasuriya & Robinson,
2006). That is why countries, as part of the development of international environmental
law, put into place mechanisms and techniques to guarantee compliance and
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implementation, guaranteeing that countries adhere to the provisions of each convention
through the definition of domestic policies and measures (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011;
Sands, 2003).
In the literature, the debate has centered on ways to induce change in behavior by
states to address their international obligations. In addition to the realist perspective on
enforcement and sanctions (Guzman, 2002), authors have developed a range of models to
ensure compliance and implementation. Downs et al. (1996) argue that there is no
problem with compliance, since it does not expect any behavioral changes. Other
academics recognize a problem but argue that it is mostly managerial (Chayes & Chayes,
1993). Enforcement is also seen as a way to promote compliance and implementation
(Avdeyeva, 2007; Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Checkel, 2001). Finally, some writers
highlight yet other mechanisms, such as coercion, persuasion, acculturation, and social
learning (Avdeyeva, 2007; Underdal, 1998).
These models span two schools of thought about ensuring compliance and
implementation (Fearon, 1998). According to the managerial perspective of Chayes and
Chayes (1993), compliance should be motivated by strategies of persuasion and
assistance that are “less costly and intrusive and certainly less dramatic than coercive
sanctions” (p. 205). They argue that non-compliance emerges from problems with
agreements that affect parties’ capacity to comply. Issues such as ambiguity and
indeterminacy in the treaties’ language, obligations and objectives, and structure prevent
countries from complying with the legal obligations they establish. Nonetheless, some
agreements tolerate a certain extent of non-compliance, being highly permissive with
violations and extenuating circumstances for domestic policies, as long as their
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implementation does not threaten the survival of the regime. Mitchell (2001) presents a
similar argument about the importance of clarity for compliance. Managerial limitations
are also associated with the capacity of states to carry out their commitments (Chayes &
Chayes, 1993; Jacobson & Brown-Weiss, 1995). Additionally, each treaty incorporates a
vision of the international system and a specific temporal dimension of the social and
economic changes envisioned in treaties that affect compliance and implementation; that
is, adherence to obligations and making behavioral change takes time, especially when
not all parties start from the same point. As Chayes and Chayes (1993) put it, “drive to
universality requires accommodation.”
More recently, the managerial approach has evolved into strategic treaty
management (McInerney, 2015)., which suggests that to ensure implementation, treaties
should follow a strategy formulation process and develop other managerial tools such as
performance evaluations, strategic assessments, and initiatives for stakeholder
engagement. Then it would be possible to identify strategic priorities in areas such as
national implementation, finance, synergies and collaboration with other treaties, data
collection and scientific assessment, performance management, and the expansion of
membership.
The enforcement school of thought addresses the use of incentives, sanctions, and
persuasion to promote compliance (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011). Positive incentives
establish standards of behavior for states to facilitate and monitor the process of national
implementation. Negative incentives reduce the benefits of cheating and promote the
value of a good reputation (Avdeyeva, 2007; Guzman, 2002; Underdal, 1998).
Additionally, decentralized mechanisms of compliance are created on the principle of
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Table 5 Selected studies to assess compliance, implementation, and effectiveness
Study
author(s)

Core
variable

Empirical
approach

Determining
factors

Oran R.
Young
(1979,
1994)

• Effectiveness
understood as
problemsolving

• No specific
metric is
developed
• Study
recognizes
challenges in
measuring
effectiveness
• Highlights
the
importance
of
generalizability

• Treaty design
• State
capacity
• National
circumstances

Edith
BrownWeiss and
Harold K.
Jacobson
(1998;
1995)

• Implementation referrers
to measures
states take to
make
international
accords
effective in
domestic law.
• Compliance
is the
observance to
both
obligations
and
implementing
measures
• Effectiveness
is the result
of both in
relation to the
objectives of
each
agreement
and the
solution of
the problem

• Study
conducted
for five
agreements
in nine
countries
• Departs from
the
assumption
that “national
implementation of and
compliance
with
international
accords is not
only
imperfect but
often
inadequate”
(1998, p. 2)
• Multifaceted
view of
performance

• Characteristics of the
activity
• Characteristics of the
accord
• International
environment
• Factors
involving the
country
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Key findings
and
Key issues
relevance
• Regimes
serve
multiple
purposes in
terms of
cooperation,
authority,
learning, and
internal
realignments
• Analysis is
required to
move
forward in
designing
effective
institutions
• Development
of a model of
determinants
of
implementation, to make
agreements
effective
• Improving
countries’
engagement
will improve
the environment, lives,
institutions,
and add to
the academic
literature.
• Acknowledges the
difficulty in
collecting
data

• Definition of
implementation is not
standardized
across
treaties
• Not all
treaties are
evaluated in
all countries
• Need to
identify
cross
national
differences
in policy
implementation
• Comparisons
do not
consider
timeline
• Compliance
and
implementation should
not be
classified
equally

Study
author(s)

Core
variable

Empirical
approach

Determining
factors

David G.
Victor, Kal
Raustiala,
and Eugene
B.
Skolnikoff
(1998)

• Implementation is
understood as
the
translation of
intent into
action

• Case studies
to assess systems of
implementation review
• Case studies
in selected
countries to
assess
national
implementation

• Nature of the
problem
• Power
configuration
• Nature of the
commitments
• Linkages
with other
issues and
objectives
• Exogenous
factors
• Public
concern

Edward L.
Miles, Arild
Underdal,
Steinar
Andresen,
Jørgen
Wettestad,
Jon Birger
Skjærseth,
and
Elaine M.
Carlin
(2002)

• Effectiveness
compared
against a specific standard
of success
• Implementation is an
outcome that
ultimately
will have an
impact on
nature

• Two
measures:
distance to a
collective
optimum and
relative
improvement

• Character of
the problem
• Problem
solving
capacity
• Institutional
capacity
• Entrepreneurial leadership
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Key findings
and
Key issues
relevance
• There is no
single way
for a country
to put its
international
commitments into
practice
• Monitoring
and systems
of
implementation review
are critical
for
implementation
• Failure to
implement is
in some
cases
intentional
• Commitments have
“induced
substantial
implementation
activities
within nations” but
there is still
progress to
be made
• Environmental regimes
succeed in
changing actors’
behavior
• There are
different patterns on
regime
effectiveness
• Regimes fall
short in
providing
functionally

• Historical
case studies
• Descriptive
and
theoretical
approach
• Focus on
formulation
and content
of the
agreements
and their
systems of
implementation review
• Limited
scale of the
study

• The study
has a
methodological challenge
in the definition of a
point of
reference
• Analysis is
different in
periods of
time
• Exclusive
factors list
effectiveness

Study
author(s)

Helmut
Breitmeier,
Oran R.
Young, and
Michael
Zürn (2006)

Core
variable

• Regime
attributes and
their design

Empirical
approach

• Inclusion of
quantitative
methods
• Focus on
regime attributes to determine the
extent to
which regime
designs
matters

Determining
factors

• Sources of
compliance
• Compliance
mechanisms
and goal
attainment

Key findings
and
Key issues
relevance
optimal solutions
• Construction
of a database
system to
move away
from case
study
approaches

•

•

•
•

Kate
O’Neill
(2009,
2017)

• Regime
effectiveness

• Conceptual
approach to
effectiveness,
its definition,
measures,
and methods
• Specific case
study to
exemplify
arguments
about
compliance
and
effectiveness

• Treaty
characteristics
• Enforcement
mechanisms
• Transparency
and
reputation
• Capacitybuilding
mechanisms

• Importance
of drafting,
enforcing,
eliciting, and
creating
compliance.
• Regime impacts as
measures of
effectiveness

•

as a determinant
Assessments
are of an
interpretative
nature
Limited
number of
case studies
and no clear
record
Definition of
measurement
units
No specific
reference to
countries
No
systematic /
empirical
analysis for a
single
regime

bilateral or multilateral reciprocity. Even though all mechanisms share the goal of
fulfilling the obligations of an agreement, conditions such as existing relationships among
the parties and the level of pressure to be exercised towards the observance of the treaty
are some factors to consider when deciding which approach to use.
Implementation mechanisms deserve special attention. Environmental
conventions use them as instruments for promotion and prevention. Control is not
enough, and countries face multiple challenges that require support not only to fulfill
their environmental obligations but also for general economic, developmental, and
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geopolitical conditions (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011; Birnie et al., 2009). This situation
was acknowledged by the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development,
which, in its Rio Declaration, stated that “in view of the different contributions to global
environmental degradation, states have common but differentiated responsibilities”
(United Nations, 1992a', Principle 7) considering the consequences that environmental
problems have in developing countries, and the accountability of developed countries
(Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011). The establishment of implementation mechanisms points
out the “growing internationalization of the domestic implementation and legal process,
and an awareness that international law will not achieve its objectives if it does not also
take account of the need, and techniques available for improving domestic
implementation of international environmental obligations” (Sands, 2003, p. 227)
Various authors have developed typologies of implementation mechanisms, that
are also used to categorize these instruments in the policy world. The categorization
presented below groups these mechanisms based on the kind of support they provide to
countries in the implementation of international environmental law.
•

National reports: Reporting is the most basic mechanism used by conventions to
support implementation. National reports provide critical information on a
country’s progress in achieving its global environmental commitments (Kiss,
2006). However, national reporting faces multiple challenges. First, in some cases
reporting systems are not comprehensive enough to address the multidimensional
nature of conventions. Second, reports are not analyzed or included in the scope
of compliance and implementation systems (Kiss, 2006), so state parties rarely
obtain feedback on the information they provide. And third, questions persist
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about the extent to which countries are actually fulfilling their reporting
requirements (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011).
•

Institutional arrangements: As indicated in UN Environment’s Training Manual
on International Environmental Law, "for the purpose of facilitating
implementation, most MEAs establish institutions such as Secretariats, COPs, and
other technical bodies to oversee the implementation of the Convention, and to
provide policy guidance" (Kurukulasuriya & Robinson, 2006, p. 41). These
institutional bodies are crucial to the process of implementation, fulfilling both
political and technical functions (Brown-Weiss & Jacobson, 1998; Sands, 2003;
Urquhart, 1995). As international bodies advance toward the fulfillment of their
mandates, they facilitate implementation and coordinate other mechanisms with
the same purpose (Bauer, 2006; Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2013; Ege & Bauer,
2013), strongly influencing institutional performance and policy outputs (Ivanova,
2010; Trondal, 2013). Institutional bodies serve as agents to state parties, by
convening meetings, monitoring, providing scientific
assessments/assistance/capacity building, connecting with stakeholders, and
collecting information and data (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2013; Ege & Bauer,
2013). Institutional capacity, autonomy, visibility, organizational structure,
legitimacy, people, and procedures are central to their capacity to facilitate
implementation (Andresen & Skjærseth, 1999; Bauer, 2006; Biermann &
Siebenhüner, 2013; Cox, 1969; Grigorescu, 2013).

•

Capacity building and technology transfer: Discussions about means of
implementation in the system of global environmental governance have usually
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focused on capacity building and access to technology for developing countries
and economies in transition. Principle 9 of the Rio Declaration mentioned the
need to “strengthen endogenous capacity-building” including “the development,
adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies” (United Nations, 1992a
Principle 9). Outcomes from key conferences reinforced this need and established
additional mechanisms to provide such support (United Nations, 2012a; WSSD,
2002). Furthermore, in 2002, UN Environment’s Governing Council recognized
the urgent need to develop a strategic plan to provide instruments, which led to
the development of the Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity.
Capacity-building aims to enhance the human, scientific, technological,
organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities of state parties to address
obligations of conventions, including the development of legal and institutional
frameworks. (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011). Technology transfer strategies support
the development and enhancement of state-level technical capacities to conduct
scientific assessment, monitoring, data processing, and analysis (Beyerlin &
Marauhn, 2011).
•

Finance: Financial resources are central to multilateral diplomacy, not only to
support countries in developing national policies, but also to provide resources for
conventions to execute broader projects (Kurukulasuriya & Robinson, 2006).
Conventions establish financial mechanisms, funded by contributions—
mandatory and voluntary—of state parties and other channels, to transfer the cost
of implementation in developing countries to other state parties or international
actors (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011). Such mechanisms take multiple forms,
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including loans, credits, grants, and funds, and they may operate not only as
means to induce and restore compliance and implementation but also to deal with
emergencies (Boisson de Chazournes, 2006). In some cases, financial
mechanisms are administered by third parties. In 1992 the Earth Summit
established the Global Environment Facility to bring together the resources of
various international organizations working on environmental issues and to serve
as the funding mechanism for environmental conventions providing grants to
developing countries and countries with economies in transition, for projects that
generate global environmental benefits within the context of sustainable
development (Kurukulasuriya & Robinson, 2006). Some conventions also
establish positive or negative economic incentives to promote implementation
(Matz, 2006).
Countries are expected to make use of the mechanisms offered by the conventions
to facilitate implementation (Kurukulasuriya & Robinson, 2006). However, it is not clear
how effective these mechanisms are. Despite some analyses (Sand, 1992, pp. 14-15),
establishing a causal connection between the use of these mechanisms and the successful
national implementation of a convention is a complex task, especially when no standards
exist to measure progress. Additionally, implementation mechanisms face fundamental
challenges to exercise positive influence on countries compliance and domestic policies,
including:
•

Lack of information for determining the best policy approaches and the kinds of
assistance each country requires, and for establishing priorities (Stahl, 2011).
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•

Interlinkages and synergies are required to improve efficiency in facilitating
implementation, and to reduce the overlapping in these mechanisms across the
different conventions (Beyerlin & Marauhn, 2011).

•

Lack of participation from civil society, as the public is excluded from most
compliance and implementation mechanisms, which reduces possibilities to raise
awareness and identify non-compliance situations and assistance needs (Paddock
et al., 2011).

•

Often-subjective decisions about the application of specific facilitation
implementation mechanisms (Paddock et al., 2011) are conditioned to other
policy processes.
In general, facilitation implementation mechanisms of environmental conventions

“have been innovative and have posed a variety of challenges” (Beyerlin & Marauhn,
2011, p. 357). Member countries, however, still need to determine the roles and
responsibilities of their actors to guarantee effective coordination and action
(Kurukulasuriya & Robinson, 2006). Furthermore, policy decisions need to use evidence
that connects mechanisms to the conventions and that determines effectiveness over time.
Connecting mechanisms to specific types of obligations that countries are expected to
adhere to, and reflecting on the main challenges that these mechanisms confront, is
essential to supporting conventions’ “effective, full and prompt implementation” (Sand,
1992).
Agreements are of little significance if not translated into national politics. The
study of implementation also offers substantial insights about the connection between
international law and international relations, and how these fields influence international
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politics. The literature on compliance sets out definitions, discusses the implications for
state behavior, and explains the factors that affect compliance and implementation at
different levels. However, measurement implementation calls for deeper empirical
analysis to improve results in the adoption of measures and their effectiveness. Such
analysis will offer countries and conventions additional information to balance their
national policies with the fulfillment of their international obligations, to obtain the
health, economic resources, and ecosystem services benefits promised by implementation
of international conventions.

Moving forward in the study of global environmental conventions
As global international conventions have evolved, different issues have emerged
as concerns and trends, highlighting the critical role of conventions both conceptually and
in practice. One aspect has to do with the increasing number and scope of agreements and
international organizations, which brings complexity to the international system (Alter &
Meunier, 2009). Because each agreement represents a set of countries, interests, and
goals, the creation of multiple agreements raises many questions. On one hand, the
literature discusses the problems of duplication, fragmentation, and overlap, and their
effects on governance architectures and performance (Biermann, Pattberg, Van Asselt, &
Zelli, 2009). The possibility exists for “regulatory congestion” at national and
international levels caused by the co-existence of international environmental agreements
(UNEP et al., 2007). On the other hand, some scholars focus on how institutions and
agreements interact with each other, the possibilities of synergies and collaboration
among the conventions, and the effects of these connections on states’ behavior and the
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effectiveness of the conventions (McInerney, 2015; Orsini, Morin, & Young, 2013; K.
Raustiala, 2013; Kal Raustiala & Victor, 2004; Oran R Young, 1996). Furthermore, there
are cross-cutting issues that have to do with governance mechanisms. The coexistence of
multilateral agreements is opening the space for regime complexity that can be both an
advantage and an opportunity (Gehring & Faude, 2013). The extent to which the
mechanisms established by the conventions can generate spaces for capacity
development, technology transfer, and financing is critical to ensuring that state parties
support each other in achieving the conventions’ goals, contributing to the solution of
environmental problems and advancement in sustainable development.
In addition, UN Environment identified various factors affecting the substance
and functioning of global environmental conventions (Kanie, 2007; UNEP et al., 2007).
Multiple national institutions manage this process, which raises the challenge of further
fragmentation and demands stronger coordination skills to present a unified position on
each agreement. At the international level, overlap in the issues addressed by conventions
is both a challenge and an opportunity. Overlap transforms how agreements are
negotiated and how their institutional arrangements operate, and calls for conventions to
rethink their focus, strategic visions, and interaction with other global governance
mechanisms. At the procedural level, countries are required to participate in numerous
post-agreement negotiations. These negotiations also take place at a very fast pace,
supported by communications technologies, under the premise of more available
information, and more spaces for countries to provide input and present their concerns.
How the focal points—the institutions that implement the agreements at the national
level—balance their multiple commitments and timelines is a critical challenge,
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especially for countries with limited institutional and financial resources. Negotiations
themselves are also being transformed, as new formats and coalitions—based not on
countries’ capacities or location but on like-mindedness—are emerging. There is also
increasing rapport among individual negotiators, as well as increasing influence and
engagement from stakeholders and civil society representatives (UNEP et al., 2007).
At the substantive level, several trends are critical. One overall trend is the
evolution of the common concern of humankind for the environment and the increasing
challenges that it presents. Numerous approaches refer to the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, which acknowledges disparities in economic development
among countries and therefore on responsibility for solving environmental problems
(Cullet, 2010; United Nations, 1992a). In some cases, conventions—such as the
UNFCCC—ended up establishing different types of obligations for different countries
(Redgwell, 2014). While all countries need to contribute to the solution of planetary
environmental problems, each convention should differentiate the kinds of support that
developing countries require (financing, capacity development, technology, and
expertise) to put in place institutions and policies needed to achieve the objectives.
Conventions also need to make progress in the recognition of community
environmental interests and the integration of non-state actors. Engagement with NGOs,
work on education, awareness and communication, research initiatives, and action plans
through local actors are just some examples of how environmental agreements can
engage stakeholders. Conventions also need to define time-bound targets, flexible
regulations, and stronger compliance regimes to guarantee that they fulfill the monitoring
and review function that, by definition, they have. Through the specification of
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performance review and strategic assessment approaches, conventions need to identify
specific indicators to assess their progress (McInerney, 2015). Under the premise that you
cannot control what you do not measure, agreements need to design and execute
initiatives for data collection, measurement, assessment, and feedback to evaluate
progress in policy objectives, both nationally and globally (UNEP, 2012d).
Lastly, as the world moves forward on the implementation of the SDGs, the role
of global environmental conventions is indisputable. Different targets refer directly and
indirectly to the conventions and their implementation, including SDG12 Responsible
Consumption and Production, SDG13 Climate Action, SDG14 Life below Water, and
SDG15 Life on Land (UN General Assembly, 2015). Furthermore, the goals address the
importance of partnerships, access to technology, resource mobilization, and assistance,
factors that apply not only to environmental agreements but to international cooperation
in general. In this context, the conventions need to understand their role in the sustainable
development agenda, in order to put in place mechanisms to implement the goals (UNEP,
2016b). Conventions also have to integrate within their own institutional structures and
plans of action the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable
development. Furthermore, in the process of achieving the SDGs, countries need to draw
lessons from the conventions that have worked on implementing, monitoring, and
assessing similar global commitments. Global environmental goals are reflected in the
sustainable development agenda, and existing information from the conventions and their
implementation can certainly contribute to the monitoring and fulfillment of the SDGs.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONVENTIONS INDEX: DESIGN AND
METHODOLOGY

A key recent trend in the systems of global governance is the use of
quantification, assessment, the measurement of results, and governance indicators to
promote performance evaluation, accountability, and public regulation (Davis, Fisher,
Kingsbury, & Merry, 2012; de Siqueira, Leite, & Beerli, 2017). Using indicators to
inform decision-making processes changes the nature of that process and, if designed
correctly, can offer consistent, efficient, transparent, and impartial metrics to gather
information, summarize complex realities, exercise judgment, and support actors in
designing and executing policies and in justifying choices. Furthermore, scholarly
attempts to apply strategic management to international treaties highlight the need to
monitor compliance and evaluate treaty performance through the use of different
instruments, including reviews and assessment, evaluations, and the use of performance
metrics and indicators (McInerney, 2015). The central purpose behind these metrics is to
establish linkages between treaty objectives and outcomes (Alesani, 2014).
In the case of global environmental governance, different measures exist to study
the effectiveness and implementation of environmental agreements and regimes (O'Neill,
2009, 2017). Even though qualitative methods seem to dominate the field, there is a clear
need for a quantitative mechanism that provides description, assessment, and explanation
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(King et al., 1994). This type of social science approach will make possible to evaluate,
from a positivist perspective, the existing linkages between environmental conventions
and changes in policy behaviors, and the extent to which it contributes to improve
environmental quality. Empirical assessment can provide an accurate description of these
linkages and enhance explanatory power. An empirical approach to global environmental
governance would definitively improve the understanding of different international
instruments used to protect the environment. Indices such as the Environmental
Performance Index developed by Yale University (YCELP, Data-Drive Yale, & CIESIN,
2016), and the Environmental Democracy Index developed by the World Resources
Institute (Worker & De Silva, 2015), have addressed ecosystem health and environmental
vitality, and environmental rights, respectively. In the case of global environmental
conventions, although these international law instruments are broadly acknowledged to
be central to the environmental protection, sustainable development, and effective global
environmental governance, the extent to which countries have established the laws and
regulations to fulfill their obligations has yet to be systematically measured.
In seeking to assess the level of implementation of global environmental
conventions, I have used a mixed-methods approach based on both qualitative and
quantitative analysis, and that is part of the work I developed in the Environmental
Conventions Project, as member of the Center for Governance and Sustainability’s
research team.
After identifying the main units of analysis, I will describe the data sources,
methodology, and technical approach for the quantitative and the qualitative analyses. In
the case of the quantitative analysis, describing the steps taken to develop the ECI not
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only clarifies its structure but also presents the important information that the index
contains and how it can be useful for understanding specific aspects of implementation.
This chapter describes the qualitative methodology used in the elaboration of the country
profiles presented in Chapter 6. I describe the technical nature of the index’s
methodology and demonstrate its replicability and usefulness for assessing the
implementation of other international law instruments in different policy areas. In
addition, the use of specific sources of information such as national reports submitted to
the convention secretariats reflects on the nature of these information mechanisms. Using
these reports as part of the methodology for this study certainly informs analyses on
information requirements in global environmental conventions and international
agreements, and on how these requirements contribute to processes of compliance,
implementation and enforcement.
Measuring the extent to which the conventions have been implemented
determines the breadth of countries’ progress in putting in place regulations, institutions,
and strategies needed to achieve global environmental goals, and in addressing challenges
to fulfilling their obligations. This allows us to identify systematic patterns that reflect on
the current assumptions of theories and to call for alternative explanations of the
observed facts. This type of description serves as a foundation for solid social science
research on the implementation of international agreements and offers the necessary
elements to propose improvements to the policy process. Using an index constructed with
clear goals, audiences, and indicators is essential for measuring progress and change, and
can be an effective tool to mobilize action and resources from governments, academia,
civil society, and stakeholders. It provides a report card to countries and conventions to
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track progress and ensure accountability. Ultimately, it could improve strategic
governance processes to increase environmental protection and achieve sustainable
development.

Units of analysis
Two core units of analysis form the basis of this study: countries and conventions.
This section explains their characteristics and the criteria for their selection.

Countries
The master list of countries included in this study includes the 193 member states
of the UN (United Nations, 2015c), four other states with a different UN status (the Cook
Islands, Niue, Palestine, and the Holy See), and one regional organization: the European
Union. The Holy See, Palestine, and the EU have received a standing invitation to
participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the UN General Assembly, to
which they maintain permanent observer missions. The Cook Islands and Niue are states
in free association to New Zealand, but they behave as sovereign states in international
law.6 The total 198 units of analysis are distributed in different categories based on
regions and levels of development (see Table 6). Both classifications are based on those
established by the UN Statistical Division (UN DESA, 2016) (see Appendix H).7

6

Some countries have recognized the Cook Islands and Niue as sovereign states, and they maintain
diplomatic relations in their own name, including participation in international agreements.
7
Additional classifications can be made based on regional groupings established by the conventions, or by
other characteristics based on income, geography, development (i.e., Small Island Developing States /
SIDS or Least Developed Countries / LDCs), or membership in international groups such as the
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Table 6 Countries included in this study, by type of country and region

UN Membership
UN permanent Members
Observers
Regional Organization
Total
Level of development
Developed
Developing
Total
Regions
Africa
Americas
Asia
Europe
Oceania
Regional Organization
Total

Number. of
countries

Percentage

193
4
1
198

97%
2%
1%
100%

50
148
198

25%
75%
100%

54
35
48
44
16
1
198

27%
18%
24%
22%
8%
1%
100%

Agreements
Of the ten agreements considered by that research initiative (see Table 1), four are
considered in this study. They fall within two thematic clusters—chemicals and waste
and biodiversity—and include the Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste, the Stockholm
Convention on POPs, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, and the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (see Table 7). In developing the Index, the
Center for Governance and Sustainability collaborated with top leadership in the
secretariats of the Basel, Rotterdam, Stockholm, Ramsar, and CITES conventions, as well
as with officials from UN Environment. Collaboration included making site visits to
several convention secretariats and attending some COPs.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
Group of States (ACP).

75

Table 7 Global environmental conventions included in this study
Start
Year

No of
parties

Biodiversity

• Convention on International Wetlands (Ramsar Convention)
• Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)

1971
1973

169
183

Chemicals
and Waste

• Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes
• Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants

1989
2001

185
181

Quantitative analysis

Sources of data
The quantitative analysis of the ECI is grounded in the national reports submitted
by state parties to each convention. Environmental conventions introduce obligations for
parties to report on the implementation of and compliance with the provisions established
by each agreement (Kiss, 2006). Each treaty determines the type of information it wants
to collect through national reports, including the measures that the state parties have
taken, and establishes the office or executive body to which the reports are to be
submitted (see Table 8). Normally national reports contain two sorts of information. On
one side, they focus on the legal, administrative, and policy measures that state parties
adopt or intend to adopt to implement each agreement. They also collect scientific data
on the state of the environmental problem addressed by each convention at the national
level. For the four agreements included in this study, reporting requirements differ in
frequency and content as well as in the mechanisms for submission and the use of
information included in the reports.
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Table 8 Reporting requirements for the conventions included in this study
Convention

Reporting requirements
According to Article 13 of the convention, reports should include:
• Information on focal points
• Information on transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and other wastes
Basel
• Measures adopted to implement the convention
Convention
• Statistics on the effects of hazardous waste generation, transportation, and disposal
• Information on accidents, disposal options, and technologies to manage hazardous
wastes.
• Information on other agreements for hazardous waste management
According to Article 15 of the convention, reports should include:
Stockholm
• Measures adopted to implement the convention, and their effectiveness
Convention
• Statistical data on the production, import, and export of the chemicals included in the
annexes to the convention.
After the convention entered into force, the second meeting of the COP recommended
the submission of national reports and requested the Bureau of the Convention (then
Ramsar
equivalent to the secretariat) to establish the requirements for this process. Reports are
Convention
submitted for each COP based on a format established by the standing committee.
Questions are based on the convention’s strategic plan and are designed to measure
progress on key indicators and considering continuity to permit time-series analyses.
Article VIII para (7) establishes two types of reports for the convention that should be
transmitted to the Secretariat:
• An annual report containing a summary of the records of trade in the specimens
CITES
regulated by the convention, including detailed information as indicated in Art. VIII
para (6).
• A biennial report on legislative, regulatory, and administrative measures taken to
enforce the provisions of the present convention.
Source: (Basel Convention, 2016a; IUCN, 1973 Art. VIII; Ramsar Convention, 1984, 2013; Stockholm
Convention, 2016a; UNEP, 1989 Art. 13; United Nations, 2001 Art. 15)

Based on these reporting requirements, the conventions established specific
questionnaires and the frequency with which reports—responding to these
questionnaires—were to be submitted Cycles (see Appendix A for the questionnaires for
each reporting cycle included in this study). For the purposes of this study, those have
been designated Reporting Cycles (see Table 9). Reports are collected by the convention
secretariats, except for the Ramsar Convention, for which reports are officially submitted
to the COP. Only the Basel Convention (since 2012) and the Stockholm Convention have
electronic reporting systems. Once the reports have been collected, they are intended to
be publicly available. Convention secretariats have made reports submitted in 2001 or
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later available online. This study, therefore, uses the online reports, the structure of which
is comparable and standardized through the different reporting cycles between 2001 and
2015. That information forms the basis for creating the dataset for the ECI.
Table 9 Reporting cycles structure and availability
Structure of reporting cycles
Reporting cycles are annual. An
electronic reporting system was
implemented in 2012.

Reporting cycles available

Stockholm
Convention

Reporting cycles are defined by the
COP. So far it has established three.

Three reporting cycles: 2002-2006,
2006-2010, and 2010-2014

Ramsar Convention

Reports are submitted for each
COP, which takes place every three
to four years.

2005, 2008, 2012, and 2015

CITES

Reports are biennial

Six reporting periods: 2003-2004,
2005-2006, 2007-2008, 2009-2010,
2011-2012, and 2013-2014.

Basel Convention

2001-2015

Index design
In the empirical analysis part of this study I will discuss the design and
implementation of a measurement instrument to obtain data about national
implementation that, evaluating the process under the same parameters, allows for
analysis and comparison across conventions, within conventions but across countries, and
for the identification of trends along the different reporting cycles. As the main outcome
of the Environmental Conventions Project, designing and defining the index involved a
multi-stage process to obtain the required information to assess implementation and
developing a methodology that includes all the aspects of this process in a way that
assures replicability across environmental conventions, as well as for other mechanisms
of international law. The steps in constructing the index are described in the next
sections.
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Analysis of the structure of global environmental conventions
This stage includes the analysis of the legal text of the conventions to
identify the hard legal obligations defined by them. Obligations constitute binding
rules that determine the actions and commitments to be undertaken by the
conventions target subjects, in this case their member states (Bodansky, 2010).
National Reports compilation
This step includes the collection of the national reports submitted by state
parties to the conventions. As mentioned above, these reports are the main sources
of information to evaluate implementation and construct the index. However, the
delayed submission or lack of submission of some reports posed challenges to the
data analysis. A review of the reporting cycles resulted in the availability of 2,754
reports distributed among the four agreements, as indicated in Table 10.8 This
introduces a bias, since results and analysis were only possible for those countries
that submitted at least one report between 2001 and 2015. However, the number
of reports for each convention does not affect the distribution of the data, since
they maintain the same unit of analysis—reporting cycle—and eventual
comparisons across conventions are only done using the latest available report for
each country. Historical trends are presented with the purpose of assessing the
evolution of the index. However, references to individual countries are based on
the last available report. Table 11 presents the number of countries for which data
was available and distribution of type of country and region. For each convention,
8

Chapters 4 and 5 present detailed information on the national reporting trends for each of the conventions
included.
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the analysis evaluates the information for all parties available through December
31, 2016.9
Table 10 Number of national reports analyzed by convention

National reports
available

Basel
Convention

Stockholm
Convention

Ramsar
Convention

CITES

1,355

226

768

405

Table 11 Number of countries that have submitted at least one report
Basel Convention

Stockholm
Convention
Countries
%

Ramsar
Convention
Countries
%

CITES

Countries
%
Countries
%
By type of country
Developed
46
29%
39
33%
46
28%
44
40%
Developing
115
71%
81
67%
120
72%
66
60%
By region
Africa
41
25%
30
25%
50
30%
17
15%
Americas
31
19%
25
21%
30
18%
24
22%
Asia
38
24%
28
23%
37
22%
27
25%
Europe
42
26%
35
29%
41
25%
39
35%
Oceania
9
6%
2
2%
8
5%
3
3%
European Union
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
TOTAL
161
100% 120
100% 166
100% 110
100%
Reporting
compliance (1)
Total
161
87%
120
66%
166
98%
110
60%
Developed (2)
46
100% 39
89%
46
98%
44
94%
Developing (2)
115
86%
81
60%
120
98%
66
50%
(1) Percentage of countries, of those obliged to report, that have submitted at least one report during the
period of analysis.
(2) Percentage of countries, of those in each specific category obliged to report, that have submitted at
least one report during the period of analysis.

National Reports analysis
The analysis of national reports aims to determine the structure of the
questionnaires—number and nature of the questions, the type of indicators they

9

The ECI includes also the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, the
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species, and the World Heritage Convention. These
agreements, however are not part of this study.
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measure, and how they are related to the process of implementation. The
methodology chose indicators for the index that connect to the actual process of
implementation and are suitable for coding. Indicators reflect countries’
commitments to provision of information, creation of the necessary institutions,
and the technical capacity to comply with obligations. The indicators fall into five
categories: information, regulation, management, technical, and financial
obligations (see Box 1). These categories reflect the types of obligations and
create the same structure of the components of the index for all conventions,
independently of the number and type of indicators. Table 12 presents the number
of questions in each reporting cycle for each convention, the total number of
indicators, and their category classification.
Box 1 Definition of categories of indicators
•

•

•
•
•

Information: Obligations to conduct scientific assessment, measurement, and evaluations associated
with the activities connected to each convention; submission of reports to the conventions’ executive
bodies; and the establishment and maintenance of databases and records required for the
implementation and operation of each convention.
Management: Designation or creation of administrative bodies and focal points to manage the
implementation and general functioning of each convention, the linkages with the conventions’
executive bodies, and the definition of strategic frameworks for the operation of each convention at the
national level.
Regulation: Legislative and policy measures that each state party has to implement according to the
framework of each convention.
Technical: Technical measures and procedures to address or manage the environmental problems
associated with each environmental convention.
Financial: Payment of dues and assistance, and other financial responsibilities by state parties.

Table 12 Number of questions and indicators by reporting cycle
Category (number and percentage)
Questions
Basel Convention
200130
2011
201230
2015

Indicators
for ECI
15
15

Information

Management

Regulation

Technical

2
(13%)
2
(13%)

2
(13%)
2
(13%)

11
(74%)
11
(74%)

-
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Financial

-

Category (number and percentage)
Questions
Stockholm Convention
200267
2006
200665
2010
201072
2014
Ramsar Convention
581
2005
2008

2012
2015
CITES
20032014

Indicators
for ECI
48
59
56

45

69

36

83

48

67

45

120

46

Information

Management

Regulation

Technical

Financial

4
(8%)
4
(7%)
4
(7%)

15
(31%)
26
(44%)
20
(20%)

14
(29%)
8
(14%)
9
(16%)

12
(25%)
18
(31%)
20
(20%)

3
(6%)
3
(5%)
3
(5%)

8
(18%)
8
(22%)

24
(53%)
16
(44%)

1
(2%)
1
(3%)

11
(24%)
10
(28%)

1
(2%)
1
(3%)

14
(29%)
13
(29%)

20
(42%)
20
(44%)

2
(4%)
2
(4%)

11
(23%)
9
(20%)

1
(2%)
1
(2%)

11
(24%)

14
(30%)

10
(22%)

10
(22%)

1
(2%)

Examples of indicators from the various categories are presented in Table
13. For each indicator, the analysis establishes the available data options that
countries can use to report their progress (see Appendices B and C for a complete
list of indicators by convention and reporting cycle and their scoring scales).
Table 13 Sample indicators across conventions
Category
Information10

•
•
•
•
•

Management
•
•

10

Indicator
Provision of information on CITES relevant legislation
Maintenance of wetland inventory data and accessibility for
stakeholders
Transmission of the National Implementation Plan to the COP
Existence of a national definition of waste and hazardous
waste
Trade/taking /possession/transport conditions included by
domestic measures adopted for CITES-listed species
Existence of a national wetland policy
Existence of measures to manage stockpiles in a safe,
efficient, and environmentally sound manner

The Basel Convention does not include information obligations.
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Convention
CITES
Ramsar Convention
Stockholm Convention
Basel Convention
CITES
Ramsar Convention
Stockholm Convention

Category
•
•
Regulation

•
•
•
•

Technical
•
•

Financial

11

•
•
•

Indicator
Existence of border control for transboundary movement of
waste
Review of legislation regarding access to or ownership of
natural resources/harvesting/transport of live specimens
National arrangements established for the custodianship,
storage, and maintenance of wetland inventory data
Development of strategies to identify products and articles in
uses and wastes consisting of, containing or contaminated
with chemicals listed in Annex A, B or C
Existence of measures for reduction and/or elimination of the
generation of hazardous and other wastes
Development of written permit procedures for permit
issuance/acceptance, registration of traders, and registration of
producers
Implementation of measures to protect wetlands of special
importance
Inventory of
PCDD/PCDF/PCB/pentachlorobenzene/hexachlorobenzene
Use of CITES fees for wildlife conservation
Payment of Ramsar dues
Existence of measures to provide financial support and
incentives to achieve the objectives of the convention

Convention
Basel Convention
CITES
Ramsar Convention
Stockholm Convention
Basel Convention
CITES

Ramsar Convention
Stockholm Convention
CITES
Ramsar Convention
Stockholm Convention

Creation of scoring scales
The scoring scales are based on the options for reported data available for
each indicator. Each indicator is accompanied by a guidance note that includes the
question to which it corresponds, and its correspondence in previous reporting
cycles if available. Scoring scales are in place for each score to be logical and
justifiable. The scales rank reported data options from 0 to 5, with 1 meaning
activities not being implemented and 5 meaning fully implemented. Using scoring
scales is essential for the empirical assessment behind the index and allows for
comparability across indicators and conventions, which otherwise would not be
possible, since indicators have different reporting options for data. Table 14
provides a sample of response options and the coding scheme. A missing value

11

Only some of the conventions include financial obligations.

83

(no response) is indicated by NR and scored with a zero. When the option for
reported data is not applicable, indicators are not scored and are not considered in
the index. When data is not provided, this are indicated by N/A and scored with
the most negative possible score (normally one) and considered in the index.
Table 14 Sample responses and coding scheme
Scoring for Index

Convention
Basel
Convention
Stockholm
Convention

5

3

• Implemented
• Exists
• Used

• In
preparation

• Yes

• In progress

• Yes

• Partly
• In some
cases
• In progress
• In some
sites
• Partly

Ramsar
Convention

CITES

2

1

• Being
planned
• Being
planned

• Not
implemented
• Does not
exist
• Not used
• No
• No

No
information
available

0

Blank

No
response

Not
applicable

• No

Data coding
The next step in the construction of the ECI is the coding of the national
reports to build a database that includes the reported data submitted by each
country to each convention through the different reporting cycles, for all selected
indicators. The coding process was done by myself and one other research
associate from the Center for Governance and Sustainability, in a rotation set up
to ensure intercoder reliability (see Table 15). Both sets of coding results then
were compared to ensure that differences did not exceed 5 percent. When
required, the two independent coders reviewed one more time the national reports
for which the first coding registered discrepancies, and adjusted the code. The
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information resulting from the coding process shows to what extent countries
have fulfilled the obligations defined by each convention, according to their own
national policies and objectives. National reports also provide insight about which
factors determine the overall success of the convention and help us to understand
why countries perform differently.
Table 15 Intercoder reliability by reporting cycle
Basel Convention
Intercoder reliability

98.0%

Stockholm
Convention
97.8%

Ramsar
Convention
99.7%

CITES
98.5%

This coding process was done using Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. Based
on the number of reports and the number of indicators used for the index, over
100,000 data points were coded independently by two researchers to build a
reliable dataset that includes the reported data submitted by each country to each
convention for all selected indicators over the fifteen years of the reporting
period. Each reporting cycle was coded in a separate table, including all the
indicators and countries and their reported data. Additional spreadsheet
summarized membership, national reporting rates, and compliance with national
reporting.
Data scoring
This step includes scoring the reporting data, ranking individual countries’
responses according to the previously defined scales. This resulted in a score for
each indicator as reported by each country. Scores were assigned automatically
using specific logic functions in Microsoft Excel. Using the logical formula IF,
the Excel spreadsheets are designed, based on the options for reported data and
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the scoring scales presented in Table 14, for the coders to enter just the reported
data. Once the data is entered, the spreadsheet automatically calculates the score
corresponding to that response (see Box 2). When a country failed to report data
for a particular indicator (but otherwise reported), it received a score of zero for
that specific metric. Indicators that were not applicable to a country or for which
countries reported that the information was not available are not included in the
index.
Box 2 Example of Microsoft Excel formulas for data scoring
Basel Convention
• Reporting cycle
• Question
• Indicator
• Options for reported data:

2009
2B
No. 2 Existence of a national definition of hazardous waste
Exist
Does not exist
In preparation
No information available (N/A)
No response (NR)

Excel formula:
IF (CELL= “Exist”, 5, IF(CELL= “Does not exist”, 1, IF(CELL= “In preparation”, 3, IF(CELL=
“NR”, 0, “”))))
Ramsar Convention
Reporting cycle
Question
Indicator
Options for reported data:

2012 (COP11)
4.1.1 A
No. 33 Development of a National Action Plan for Wetland CEPA
A. Yes
B. No
C. In progress
D. Planned
No information available (N/A)
No response (NR)

Excel formula:
IF (CELL=“A”,5,IF(CELL=“B”,1,IF(CELL=“C”,3,IF(CELL=“D”,2,IF(CELL=“NR”, 0, “”)))))
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Index computation
The process of calculating the index uses the scores given to each
indicator. The overall index score is the arithmetic average of the scores obtained
by each country in each category of indicators. This protocol resulted in an
empirical measurement that assesses implementation progress by country and by
convention and ensures comparability of results by country and convention. Using
this method implies that all the categories have the same weight. (Further progress
in the construction of the index might, however, change this approach, depending
on the process of validating the methodology that the Center for Governance and
Sustainability will conduct with a group of experts in the field. If changed,
weights for the different types of indicators will be determined based on expert
consensus.) This core step of the research process ultimately results in an
empirical measurement that assesses the progress of each country in the
implementation of global environmental conventions. This database includes
trends analysis for the index, overall ranking, and analyses by type of countries
and regions. Countries’ rankings by index scores are provided both at the global
and the regional level, but they could also be provided for specific indicators’
categories. These data constitute the main input to explain implementation and
determine the causes for countries’ performance.

Qualitative analysis
The quantitative methods are supplemented by a qualitative analysis of ten
country profiles (presented in Chapter 6). The selected countries include Algeria,
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Box 3 Summary of research protocol for the ECI
A seven-step protocol for the construction of the index ensures analytical rigor.
(1) Identify obligations and commitments by member states.
(2) Collect reports submitted by member states to the conventions as the main formal source of
information to evaluate implementation and construct the index.
(3) Use national reports to identify implementation indicators for each convention (see Tables 1 and
2).
(4) Create and apply scoring scales for each indicator. To this end, each answer to each question
under a specific convention is evaluated using an ordinal scale from 0 to 5, with 5 being the
highest level of implementation. A score of 0 is given when no information is provided.
(5) Code data from national reports to build a dataset that includes the reported data submitted by
each country to each convention for all selected indicators. Two researchers conduct the coding
process to ensure inter-coder reliability.
(6) Score reported data and rank countries both on whether they have submitted reports according to
their obligations and whether their reports demonstrate progress toward the aims of the
conventions.
(7) Construct the index using the scores for each indicator. The indicators are not weighted. A
weighting could take place at a later stage or users could do it once the database is available
online in an interactive format.

Argentina, Australia, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Germany, Mozambique, South
Korea, and Thailand. Countries were chosen as part of an analysis conducted in
partnership with the Law Division of UN Environment. The selection process was based
on criteria of membership in the conventions, availability of information (see Table 16),
equitable representation of developed and developing countries, and distribution among
the five UN geographic regions (see Figure 3).
Figure 3 Countries selected for qualitative analysis in Chapter 6

Selected countries for national implementation profiles
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Table 16 National reporting rates for countries in selected implementation profiles,
by convention12
DZA

ARG

AUS

CAN

COL

CZE

DEU

MOZ

KOR

THA

Basel
Stockholm
CITES
Ramsar
No reports

1% - 50%

51% - 80%

81% - 100%

These country profiles seek to illustrate the range of factors that shape
implementation, and connect the actions that countries implement at the national level
with the quantitative assessment resulting from the ECI. They include information from
the national reports submitted by state parties to the conventions, and use the index
results. They also use additional primary and secondary sources of data including COP
decisions and other relevant documents of the conventions as well as country reports,
legislation, and various action and implementation plans as well as various newspaper
and scholarly articles and reports from NGOs.
The analysis is based on rigorous research of national measures to implement the
international agreements. It identifies best practices that facilitate implementation and
challenges that hinder implementation for each convention in the two clusters—
chemicals and waste and biodiversity. To ensure consistency and comparability, a set of
common concepts across the countries were identified and discussed in each case. As the

12

The country codes listed here include: Algeria (DZA), Argentina (ARG), Australia (AUS), Canada
(CAN), Colombia (COL), Czech Republic (CZE), Germany (DEU), Mozambique (MOZ), South Korea
(KOR), and Thailand (THA). See Appendix H for a complete list of country codes.
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countries were selected from a pool of both developed and developing countries and from
different geographic regions, the findings provide valuable insights on the overall
implementation of the four conventions.
This study’s methodology provides key empirical tools for both quantitative and
qualitative assessment of the level of implementation of the four conventions included in
this study. By evaluating implementation under the same parameters, using a set of
indicators based on the national reports signatory countries submit to the convention
secretariats, the index allows for multifaceted analysis and comparison. It also identifies
trends over time for individual countries, groups of countries, and the conventions.
Complementing this analysis with the qualitative national implementation profiles
validates the index results and connects it with the regulation and policy instruments
established at the national level as part of the obligations under each agreement. The ECI
database, its methodology, and the national implementation profiles contribute to the
understanding of how countries are translating their obligations into national
environmental policies, offering policy inputs to improve the performance of countries
and conventions.
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CHAPTER 4
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN HEALTH: IMPLEMENTING
THE CHEMICALS AND WASTE CONVENTIONS

Chemicals are critical to all aspects of modern life. They play an important role in
agriculture, industry, energy, and medicine. Through the different stages of their life
cycle, from extraction to disposal, chemicals might pose various threats to human health
and the environment (Selin, 2010). As the Global Chemicals Outlook notes, “exposure to
toxic chemicals can cause or contribute to a broad range of health outcomes. These
include eye, skin, and respiratory irritation; damage to organs such as the brain, lungs,
liver or kidneys; damage to the immune, respiratory, cardiovascular, nervous,
reproductive or endocrine systems; and birth defects and chronic diseases, such as cancer,
asthma, or diabetes” (UNEP, 2013a, p. 50). Every year the number of chemicals available
on the market increases, and as consumption rises across countries, the international
chemicals industry is growing dramatically. Just in the European Union it is expected that
30,000 new chemicals will be registered by 2018. Furthermore, the global chemical
industry output, which was valued at US$ 171 billion in 1970, had by 2010 increased
more than twentyfold to US$ 4.12 trillion (UNEP, 2013a, p. 50). By 2020, chemicals are
expected to represent a third of overall global consumption (UNEP, 2012a).
Chemical pollution has become a transboundary issue as many hazardous
substances are transported through air and water across the globe. The disposal of
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hazardous wastes has also become an international concern. National regulatory systems
are critical to the safe management of chemical substances but are often insufficient as
trade volumes increase, opportunities for illegal dumping appear in places around the
globe with weak regulatory systems, and the cost of chemical management in
industrialized countries increases. As governments have noted, “the challenges posed by
chemicals and wastes are global, enduring and constantly evolving and (...) are
interrelated with crucial environmental issues such as environment-dependent human
health, the health of ecosystems and better ecosystem management, the preservation of
biodiversity, and the link between poverty and environment, environmental disasters,
climate change and sustainable consumption” (UNEP, 2013a, 2013c).
For decades, global environmental governance has been concerned with
hazardous chemicals, pollutants, their management, and their effects on health and the
environment. Through various international agreements, countries have consistently
articulated a clear commitment to reduce the generation of toxic substances, improve
their management, and reduce the environmental and health risks associated with them
(UNCED, 1992; United Nations, 1972, 2002). To address these issues, a global
regulatory system for chemicals and waste has emerged, developed around specific
mechanisms to regulate the production, use, and trade of chemical substances worldwide.
Most recently, the SDGs connected the issue of chemicals and waste to various goals in
terms of human health, water management, and sustainable consumption and production
(UN General Assembly, 2015).
Scholarship in global environmental governance has addressed multiple
dimensions of this regime complex. Factors such as its creation, effectiveness, and future
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challenges have been studied and evaluated by scholars, experts, and policy-makers.
Debates have also included the obstacles to managing the threats of hazardous waste and
pollution. Issues such as the lack of information regarding the uses and effects of
chemicals, the low degree of implementation of the conventions, and the lack of capacity
of developing countries and economies in transition to design and implement crosscutting policies for chemicals and waste management (UNEP, 2012a), have raised
questions about the role and relevance of the chemicals and waste regime. However, as it
is also the case with the general literature about the implementation of global
environmental conventions, most of these studies lack the empirical evidence and
scientific rigor required to demonstrate an apparent failure of the regime to achieve
global environmental goals.
Using two of the multilateral agreements at the core of the chemicals and waste
regime—the Basel Convention (UNEP, 1989), and the Stockholm Convention on POPs
(United Nations, 2001), this chapter demonstrates that even when challenged by
implementation, capacity, and institutional arrangements, the conventions perform an
important role in protecting the environment and human health. In particular, this chapter
discusses how factors such as countries’ level of development, technical capacities,
access to technology, data collection, and monitoring mechanisms are needed to
implement the obligations to these agreements. Even though some exceptions can be
highlighted, and demonstrate that developing countries can in fact achieve the goals
established by the conventions, there is a clear correlation between the level of
development of countries and their progress in implementing their obligations with the
chemicals and waste conventions, particularly the Stockholm Convention.
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This chapter characterizes the chemicals and waste conventions, discussing first
the nature of the problem of wastes and pollution, and then the context in which they
were negotiated and drafted, their objectives, and institutional characteristics. Departing
from these two points, the chapter assesses the level of implementation of the Basel and
Stockholm conventions, analyzing the membership and level of national reporting to
these to agreements, and presenting the results for implementation as measured by the
ECI across type of countries and regions, the historical evolution of implementation since
2001, and the top and bottom performers. Existing disparities in implementation call for
targeted policy instruments in capacity building and technical assistance, particularly
regarding information collection mechanisms. Furthermore, the results demonstrate the
need for solid empirical indicators that support countries’ progress towards achieving the
targets defined by the SDGs that are connected to the chemicals and waste regime. In
particular, Target 4 in Goal 12 aims to "ensure sustainable consumption and production
patterns" and achieve "the environmentally sound management of chemicals and all
wastes throughout their life cycle, in accordance with agreed international frameworks,
and significantly reduce their release to air, water and soil in order to minimize their
adverse impacts on human health and the environment" (UN General Assembly, 2015).

The chemicals and waste regime: Origins, characteristics, goals, and challenges
Chemicals play an important role in agriculture, industry, energy and medicine.
However, they pose, through the different stages of their life cycles, threats to both
human health and the environment (Selin, 2010). Some chemicals become hazardous
wastes, a condition that completely eliminates their economic benefits and development
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advantages. A small minority of chemical substances—the Persistent Organic Pollutants
(POPs)—remain in the environment for long periods of time, bio-accumulating in
different ecosystems and resulting in numerous harmful effects for people and the
environment. These effects vary across geographies and social groups. As disposal places
in industrialized countries are scarce, developing countries become extremely vulnerable
to hazardous substances and lack proper disposal procedures (Critharis, 1990; Krueger,
2001; Lucier & Gareau, 2014). All these dimensions of the problem of chemical pollution
often lead to intentional violations of the regulations for the transportation of hazardous
wastes. Such violations generate health and environmental consequences, incur important
economic costs, and affect the existing international mechanisms designed to regulate
these procedures (Krueger, 1999; Waugh, 1999).
At the same time, the quantity of hazardous substances in the environment
continues to increase. According to the Chemicals Abstract Service, more than 345,000
chemical products are now inventoried or regulated (American Chemical Society, 2016).
Consumption of chemical products in both developed and developing countries is
growing fast, and could account for a third of global consumption by 2020 (UNEP,
2012a). This leads to the production of all kinds of wastes that are often poorly managed
through precarious practices affecting communities and ecosystems. In 2004, the World
Health Organization (WHO) estimated that 4.9 million deaths—8.3 percent of total
deaths that year—were due to environmental exposures to selected chemicals (PrüssUstün, Vickers, Haefliger, & Bertollini, 2011). This is the context in which the movement
of hazardous waste and the control of pollutant substances became one of the most
contentious issues in global environmental governance (Krueger, 1998).
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Global cooperation is essential to address the wide range of issues related to
hazardous chemicals, and efforts have been made to establish international obligations
and standards (DeSombre, 2017; Kummer, 1992; Selin, 2010). In 1972, at the UNCHE,
governments committed to preventing pollution and to collaborating with other states to
address common challenges (United Nations, 1972 Principle 7). Twenty years later, at the
Earth Summit, states agreed to “effectively cooperate to discourage or prevent the
relocation and transfer to other States of any activities and substances that cause severe
environmental degradation or are found to be harmful to human health” (United Nations,
1992a Principle 14). Specifically, Agenda 21, the plan of action established at the Earth
Summit, acknowledged two major problems regarding chemicals and wastes, particularly
in developing countries: lack of sufficient scientific information to assess the risks
entailed by the use of chemicals, and lack of resources to evaluate the chemicals for
which data is available (UNCED, 1992). The 2002 Plan for Implementation of the WSSD
followed up on previous decisions and established as one of its objectives the
minimization, by 2020, of the adverse effects of chemicals (WSSD, 2002). These
decisions resulted in two international treaties: the Basel Convention and the Stockholm
Convention. The SDGs maintain this intent and define patterns for sustainable
consumption and production that call for the reduction and elimination of wastes and the
control of hazardous substances.
Thus, for about four decades the international community has been actively
working towards bridging the science-policy gap, promoting international cooperation,
and increasing awareness about environmental issues related to hazardous chemicals and
waste. In addition to the broader political efforts to include chemicals on the international
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agenda, countries have also created specific policy instruments to address the challenges
of hazardous substance management in an environmentally sound manner. Sands and
Peel identify four approaches by which international agreements define hazardous
substances and activities (Sands & Peel, 2012, p. 516):
•

by reference to their inherent characteristics, including their toxicity,
flammability, explosiveness, and oxidization,

•

by reference to a listing system which identifies certain activities or projects on
the basis that they are, per se, likely to have significant effects on the
environment,

•

by reference to national laws, and

•

by regulating specific substances instead of establishing definitions.
The next section describes four international treaties that regulate chemicals and

waste (see Table 17). Even though two of them are not part of this study, the four treaties
regulate multiple aspects of the use, management, and disposal of hazardous substances
through their life cycle. The Basel, Stockholm, and Rotterdam Conventions regulate
hazardous wastes and POPs, and the Minamata Convention regulates mercury. Following
a brief overview of each convention, I will discuss implementation and the role of the
agreements in the policies established at the national level to protect human health and
the environment.

Chemicals and Hazardous Waste Regulation
In the 1970s and 1980s, the number of sites available for disposal of hazardous
substances in industrialized countries was inadequate for the storage and safe treatment of
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the chemicals to be disposed. Sites in developing countries therefore became more
appealing, as there were no domestic regulations in those countries to hinder acceptance
of hazardous chemicals and no international regulations to prevent their transboundary
movement. However, developing countries lacked proper disposal procedures and
therefore became extremely vulnerable to the hazards of these substances (Critharis,
1990; Krueger, 2001; Lucier & Gareau, 2014). Chemical pollution and other misuses of
hazardous substances generated environmental harms, health consequences, and
economic costs that called for the design of international mechanisms to regulate these
procedures (Krueger, 1999; Waugh, 1999). The movement of hazardous waste and the
control of pollutant substances became among the most contentious issues in global
environmental governance (Krueger, 1998) and brought momentum for the negotiation of
multiple multilateral agreements to address the challenge of managing, reducing, and
eliminating chemicals and waste.
Initially, UN Environment decided to tackle the issue with regulations to stabilize
the transportation and disposal of toxic wastes, leading to the establishment in 1985 of
the Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of
Hazardous Wastes (UNEP, 1987). A joint proposal by the governments of Switzerland
and Hungary mandated the Executive Director to convene a working group for the
elaboration of a global convention to control the transboundary movements of hazardous
wastes (UNEP, 1987). The Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Waste was signed in March 1989 with 53 original state parties, and entered
into force in 1992 (UNEP, 1989). The Convention “discourages exports of hazardous and
other wastes, which should only be allowed if the exporting state does not have the
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capacity, facilities or suitable sites to dispose of them in an environmentally sound or
efficient manner, or if the wastes are required as a raw material for recycling or recovery
in the importing state, or in accordance with other criteria decided by the parties.
Moreover, parties may not transfer to importing or transit states their obligation under the
Convention to carry out environmentally sound management, and can impose additional
requirements consistent with the Convention to better protect human health and the
environment” (Sands, 2003, p. 693). It also provides specific rules for the international
movement and transport of waste, including packaging and labeling guidelines. Once
negotiated, the convention was perceived as the most comprehensive solution so far to
the problem of hazardous wastes at different levels. It was also expected that the
convention would shed light on UN Environment’s ability to implement multilateral
environmental agreements, since it was the first agreement administered by this
organization in which so many nations were likely to participate (Hackett, 1989).
An additional key step in the regulation of the movement of hazardous wastes had
to do with information and notification processes among exporters and recipients of these
substances. The 1998 Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure for
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (FAO/UNEP, 1998)
regulates this matter. Specifically, it creates legally binding obligations to ensure that
governments respect certain rules in the distribution of chemicals, particularly having all
the information required to assess and take informed decisions on export and import
transactions. The overall objective of the convention is to facilitate information exchange
and to promote shared responsibility and cooperation among parties in the international
trade of hazardous chemicals (Rotterdam Convention, 2010).
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Responding to increasing international concern about pollution and hazardous
substances, in 1995 UN Environment developed an international assessment of the effects
of POPs. Based on the alarming results, in 1997 the organization received a mandate to
negotiate a binding international agreement to identify, regulate, and control the effects of
POPs (Hagen & Walls, 2005; Stockholm Convention, 2008; UNEP, 1997). In 2001, after
five negotiation rounds, 92 countries signed the Stockholm Convention on POPs, which
entered into force in 2004 (United Nations, 2001). The Stockholm Convention includes
detailed provisions to eliminate releases of POPs and their associated risks. The
convention also obliges countries to submit a national implementation plan, which is
designed to establish a clear route for countries to advance implementation of their
commitments under the convention (Lu, Giesy, & Holliday, 2007). Nonetheless, the
agreement recognizes the need to work with developing countries to strengthen their
capacities to achieve this objective.
More recently, regulation of the anthropogenic emissions and releases of mercury
and mercury-containing compounds became another focus of the chemicals and waste
regime. Since the 1950s, the environmental effects of and diseases caused by mercury
poison called for voluntary commitments to decrease emissions. But only in 2009 did UN
Environment adopt the decision “to initiate action to manage mercury in an efficient,
effective and coherent manner” (UNEP, 2009). Through five intergovernmental
negotiation committees, the chemicals branch of UN Environment’s Division of
Technology, Industry and Economics led countries in negotiations. The resulting
Minamata Convention on Mercury, finalized in 2013, also aims to protect human health
and the environment. It draws global attention to a substance which is broadly used, and
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which releases hazardous components in the atmosphere, soil, and water. The main
objective of the convention is to control the anthropogenic releases of mercury
throughout its life cycle. As of December 2016, the convention had 128 signatories, and
35 countries had ratified it. It will enter into force after ratification from 50 countries
(UNEP, 2013b).
Since the chemicals and waste regime does not have a framework convention,
each agreement addresses a specific dimension of this environmental cluster under the
common goal of protecting human health and the environment, and each has specific
legal, political, and practical implications (Krueger & Selin, 2002; Selin, 2010). Table 17
summarizes the main objectives of each convention. As some of their objectives may
differ, the four agreements also complement each other. Under that premise, the Basel,
Rotterdam, and Stockholm conventions started a process to enhance cooperation and
coordination among them. At the 2008/2009 COPs of each convention, parties adopted
what have been called "synergies decisions" to coordinate organizational, administrative,
technical, informational, and decision-making practices and improve efficiency and
implementation through joint activities (Basel Convention, 2006; Rotterdam Convention,
2008; Stockholm Convention, 2006). A fundamental consequence of this process was the
establishment of a joint executive secretariat to oversee the three agreements.
Most academics and policy analysts recognize the importance of the chemicals
and waste regime and its contribution to environmental protection. However, there is an
increasing concern about the level of implementation and the availability of data on how
countries are translating global commitments into national policies (Stockholm
Convention, 2016d). In the case of the Basel and Stockholm conventions, policy-makers
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Table 17 Environmental agreements in the chemicals and waste regime
Year

Basel
Convention

1989

Parties13

Main objectives

185

• Protect human health and the environment against the adverse
effects of hazardous waste
• Control of the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes as well
as responsible trade in hazardous chemicals
• Support for countries to strengthen their capacity for the sound
management of chemicals and waste
• Promote safe radioactive and nuclear waste management
• Reduce the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes
• Restrict those movements of hazardous wastes that are perceived in
discordance with the principles of environmental sound
management
• Regulate the transboundary movements when they are permissible
• Promote the environmentally sound management of hazardous
wastes and adequate disposal activities

Rotterdam
Convention

1998

156

• Promote shared responsibility and cooperative efforts among Parties
in the international trade of certain hazardous chemicals in order to
protect human health and the environment from potential harm
• Contribute to the environmentally sound use of those hazardous
chemicals

Stockholm
Convention

2001

180

• Regulate the sound management of chemicals throughout their life
cycle, including POPs and heavy metals, as well as wastes

35

• Protect human health and the environment from anthropogenic
emissions and releases of mercury and mercury-containing
compounds
• Ban new mercury mines and phase out existing ones
• Phase out and phase down mercury use in several products and
processes
• Develop control measures for emissions to air as well as releases to
land and water
• Regulate the informal sector of artisanal and small-scale mining
• Ensure the environmentally sound interim storage of mercury, and
of its disposal once it becomes waste

Minamata
Convention

2013

Sources: (Basel Convention, 1987; Kummer, 1998; Porta & Zumeta, 2002; Rotterdam Convention, 2010;
Stockholm Convention, 2008; UNEP, 2013b)

13

The data presented in this study is updated to December 31, 2016. However, it is important to clarify the
evolution in the membership up to April 30, 2017:
- Angola joined the Basel Convention on February 6, 2017, and the agreement will enter into force
in the country on May 7, 2017.
- Malta joined the Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions on January 17, 2017, and the agreements
will enter into force in the country on April 17, 2017.
- Five additional countries ratified the Minamata Convention: Costa Rica, Ghana, Honduras,
Liechtenstein, and Togo.
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and scholars argue that although progress has been achieved in the effective management
and minimization of chemicals, “lack of data, information, and knowledge on waste
scenarios, lack of comprehensive regulations and weak enforcement of existing
legislation, weak technical and organizational capacities, poor public awareness and
cooperation, and lack of funds” remain (Fiedler, 2008; Selin, 2010; UNCSD, 2011;
UNEP, 2012a).
Three specific propositions emerge from this assessment. First, global policy
objectives in the area of chemicals and waste have not been achieved, which questions
the implementation of the conventions and their role in protecting the environment
(UNEP, 2012a). Second, developing countries and economies in transition need to
strengthen their national capacities, including by establishing institutional frameworks for
the “coherent implementation of the agreements” (Perrez, 2015; UNEP, 2012a) to achieve
the objectives of the convention. This assumes a causal inference between countries’ level
of development and the implementation of global environmental commitments. And
third, there is not enough information regarding the uses, emissions, and effects of
chemicals, which brings scientific uncertainty to monitoring and implementation
(Krueger, 2001; Lallas, 2001; UNEP, 2012a).
Scientific data is at the core of the chemicals regime. Science-based evaluations
and management procedures are essential for identifying substances and for managing,
reducing, and eliminating them. This directly reflects on the science-policy interface and
the role of scientific information in the assessment and monitoring mechanisms that
support the conventions' efforts for the sound management of chemicals and hazardous
waste, particularly when designing technical assistance programs for developing
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countries (Selin, 2010; WSSD, 2002 para. 23). Lack of data has persistently hindered the
evaluation of chemicals and wastes globally and the effectiveness of the conventions.
Also, the information submitted by state parties is often incomplete and unverified,
specifically in regards to the assessment of inventories, stockpiles, and generation and
movement of hazardous wastes and POPs (Basel Convention, 2011e; Stockholm
Convention, 2011).

Implementing the Basel and Stockholm conventions
As the global chemistry business keeps growing, particularly in developing
countries, regulation and legislation need to keep pace in order to develop national and
local standards. These standards are expected to reflect the reality of national chemical
industries, and to establish monitoring, inspection, reporting, and enforcement
mechanisms, and institutional and strategic arrangements to comply with international
requirements (American Chemistry Council, 2014; UNEP, 2012a). Scholars argue that
the challenges of the conventions are based on both ratification and implementation
(Selin, 2009). Even though the number of ratifications is high, the chemicals and waste
agreements have not “always transposed into national legislation in a comprehensive
manner,” and countries still “face considerable difficulties establishing effective policies
and administrative structures for managing hazardous chemicals" (Selin, 2010, p. 1;
UNEP, 2012a). Factors affecting the implementation of the agreements include the level
of development, the level of technical capacity, the debate between sovereignty and
cooperation, and the fact that the policies seem not adaptable to the different national
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characteristics of state parties (DeSombre, 2017; Krueger, 1998, 1999; Schneider, 1996;
Selin, 2009; Walsh, 1992).
The next two sections provide empirical evidence from the ECI to demonstrate
how the implementation of the Basel and Stockholm conventions at the national level
frequently differs from the premises of the traditional environmental governance
literature. Three findings support this argument. First, the implementation of the
conventions is progressing in both developed and developing countries, which evidences
that in fact they are making progress regarding the definition of strategies, policies, and
legislation for the management of hazardous wastes and POPs. Second, developing
countries and economies in transition have strongly engaged in both conventions, not
only in terms of membership but also in terms of national reporting and policy
development, with some countries performing better than expected. However, factors
such as national capacity, levels of development, and availability of scientific data are
critical to fulfilling the obligations established by the Basel and Stockholm Conventions.
As international cooperation is vital to the sound management of chemicals and waste,
implementation of policy instruments such as the Basel and Stockholm conventions
creates momentum and contributes to understanding and action. However, many
countries still need more capacity and more solid implementation (Karlaganis, Marioni,
Sieber, & Weber, 2001; Okaru, 1992). Bringing empirical evidence to the analysis of
these agreements will certainly serve as a foundation to understand, explain, and improve
countries’ performance in translating global commitments into national policies.
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Membership
To understand implementation, it is important first to define the signatory parties
for each convention. Membership is a point of departure in the evaluation of countries’
performance in achieving the obligations they acquired when signing and ratifying the
convention. Legislation, strategies, institutional arrangements, and monitoring efforts
differ among developed and developing countries. Furthermore, the nature of the problem
of chemical production and pollution also varies across different countries and regions.
According to the UN Environment flagship environmental assessment GEO-5, the
production of chemicals has shifted in the last decade, moving from developed countries
to the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and other developing countries,
which are also increasing sales and generation of new chemicals (Ghosh et al., 2016;
UNEP, 2012a).
Figure 4 Historical evolution of the membership in the Basel and Stockholm
conventions
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Membership in the Basel Convention reached 185 countries in 2016 (see Figure
4). Twenty-five percent of the members are developed countries and 75 percent are
developing countries. In a similar pattern, 24 percent of the 180 parties to the Stockholm
Convention are developed countries and 76 percent developing countries. The Stockholm
Convention had approximately three times more original signatories than the Basel
Convention, and twice as many as the Rotterdam Convention, illustrating the evolution of
the regime from the 1990s when the Basel and Rotterdam conventions entered into force
and increased the awareness of the international community about the importance of
international cooperation to address chemical pollution and wastes. Expanding
membership also confirms the success of the 2001 Johannesburg Plan of Action (WSSD,
2002) in its objective to increase the ratification and implementation of the conventions.
Since 2001, 38 countries have joined the Basel Convention, which represents 21 percent
of its current membership. 95 percent of those new members are developing countries.
Sierra Leone was the last country to join the convention in 2016 (Basel Convention,
2016b). Membership in the Stockholm Convention has also increased. 156 countries
ratified the convention after 2002, 79 percent of those countries (123) are developing
while 21 percent (33) are developed. Iraq was the last country to join the convention in
March 2016 (Stockholm Convention, 2017)14.
All the conventions, however, have notable gaps in membership. Seven countries
are not members in either convention: Grenada, Haiti, San Marino, South Sudan, TimorLeste, the United States, and the Vatican City. Other non-members include Angola for the
14

Malta joined the Stockholm Convention in January 2017 and the agreement entered into force in April
17th of that year.
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Basel Convention15, and Israel, Italy, Malaysia, and Uzbekistan for the Stockholm
Convention. The absence of some countries then leads to lower levels of implementation.
Italy, for example, shows lower implementation of the Stockholm Convention when
compared to other European countries (Miniero, De Felip, Magliuolo, Ferri, & Di
Domenico, 2005), and ratifying the convention will be critical to improving national
chemicals regulations. Other countries, such as Malaysia, have designed and executed
policies consistent with the issues addressed by the conventions, but have not ratified the
agreements yet, which leads to illegal use of some substances listed as POPs and their
detection in the environment (IPEN, 2005). Israel—for the Basel Convention—and
Angola—for the Stockholm Convention—have expressed their adherence to the
conventions, and their preparations for ratification, but they have yet to go through the
process (Angola Press, 2013; SCP/RAC, 2011). Yet others, such as the United States,
possess advanced cradle-to-grave hazardous waste management systems and have signed
both conventions but have not ratified, largely due to domestic political gridlock.
Appendix D presents a summary of the membership for the conventions included in this
study.
The importance of the conventions’ membership trends is twofold. On the one
hand, it evidences the increasing participation of developing countries in the system of
global chemicals governance in particular, and global environmental governance in
general. Given the transboundary nature of the threat of wastes and pollution, it is critical
that all countries engage in their regulation to control harmful events for the environment

15

Angola joined the Basel Convention on February 6, 2017 and the agreement will enter into force in the
country in May 7, 2017.
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and human health. Furthermore, the historical membership gap between the different
conventions, which has been seen as a factor affecting the process of implementation
(Krueger & Selin, 2002), has declined. Membership is now almost the same for the two
agreements, and, as explained above, only 16 countries are members of only one of the
conventions: 10 for Basel16 and 6 for Stockholm.

National Reporting
As I explained in Chapter 3, the fundamental measure of implementation is
reporting. Each convention secretariat requires parties to submit national reports on the
fulfillment of their obligations under the agreement. Both the Basel and Stockholm
conventions have specific reporting systems, requesting annual and periodic (every four
years) reports, respectively, on detailed information about the measures established by
each country to implement the conventions (see Table 18).
Table 18 National reporting mechanisms for the Basel and Stockholm conventions

Reporting
requirements

16

Basel Convention (Art. 13)
• Information on focal points
• Information on transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes and
other wastes
• Measures adopted to implement the
convention
• Statistics on the effect of hazardous
waste generation, transportation and
disposal
• Information on accidents, disposal
options and technologies for the
management of hazardous wastes.
• Information on other agreements for
hazardous wastes management

With Angola’s ratification, this number is now 9.
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Stockholm Convention (Art. 15)
• Measures adopted to implement the
convention, and their effectiveness
• Statistical data on the production,
import, and export of the chemicals
included in the annexes to the
convention.

Reporting
cycles

Basel Convention (Art. 13)
Reporting cycles are annual. An
electronic reporting system was
implemented in 2012.

Stockholm Convention (Art. 15)
Reporting cycles are defined by the
COP. So far it has established three.

Reports
Three reporting cycles: 2002-2006,
2001-2015
available
2006-2010 and 2010-2014
Source: (Basel Convention, 2016a; Stockholm Convention, 2016a; UNEP, 1989 Art. 13; United Nations,
2001 Art. 15)

Even though reporting obligations have been part of the agreements since their
beginning, reporting rates for the conventions are relatively low. A detailed diagnosis of
the process of national reporting requires an analysis of three aspects: how the overall
group of state parties complies with reporting obligations, how the process of national
reporting has evolved over time, and how compliance with national reporting differs
among different groups of countries or regions. For the chemicals and waste conventions,
these factors reflect different trends that should be considered to understand countries’
implementation and the relevance of information exchange to achieve the conventions'
objectives and improve their effectiveness.
A key initial finding is that not all countries submit the national reports they are
required to submit, and, of the ones that do, some delay submission, inhibiting the prompt
availability of data to assess performance. Also, not all reports are available online, and
only in recent reporting cycles—particularly in the case of the Basel Convention—data
has been collected through electronic reporting systems. In the Basel Convention,
countries have reported on average 52 percent of the time they were required to report
since 2001, while for the Stockholm Convention they have only fulfilled this obligation
44 percent of the time since 2002 (Basel Convention, 2016a; Stockholm Convention,
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2016a)17. Only 19 countries have a 100-percent reporting rate for the Basel Convention.
Most of them (15) are developed countries, but Bahrain, Madagascar, Malaysia, and
Thailand are also part of this group. However, 20 countries—all of them developing—
have never submitted a report. For the Stockholm Convention, only 40 countries (22
percent of the members) have submitted all the reports they were required to submit,
including the Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Mali, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, while 59
countries (33 percent of the parties) have never submitted a report. Figure 5 presents the
compliance with national reporting obligations in the two agreements.18
Figure 5 Compliance with national reporting obligations in the Basel and Stockholm
conventions
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17

See Appendix E for detailed analysis on each country’s national reporting rates to each of the
conventions included in this study.
18
See Appendix F for detailed data on the reporting compliance rates – by each reporting cycle – for the
conventions included in this study.
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Historical analysis of reporting behavior illustrates a key challenge in the process
of implementation, as the conventions follow different trends in terms of national
reporting (see Figure 6). For the Basel Convention, the number of countries submitting a
report each year has decreased from 74 percent in 2001 to 30 percent in 2015. The
Stockholm Convention exhibits a more positive trend, with countries’ reporting
increasing from 39 percent in 2002-2006 to 56 percent in 2006-2010 and 49 percent in
2010-2014. However, there is still a significant group of countries for which data is not
available, and it includes both developed and developing countries.
Figure 6 Historical evolution of general compliance to national reporting obligations
in the Basel and Stockholm conventions
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Furthermore, different types of countries or regions perform differently, attesting
to some extent to the conventional wisdom about implementation of international
obligations. For the Basel Convention, the average national reporting rate for developed
countries (82%) is almost twice as high as that for developing countries (42%). In terms
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of regions, Europe obtains the best results, submitting reports on average 80 percent of
the times. Oceania, on the other hand, registers the lowest average national reporting rate
(24%) (see Figure 7). Out of all the countries in that region that are state parties, only
Australia and New Zealand have submitted their reports since 2007. The Cook Islands,
Papua New Guinea, and Samoa have reported less than 10 percent of the time, and Tonga
and Palau have never submitted the reports they were obliged to since they joined the
convention in 2010 and 2011 respectively. For the Stockholm Convention, the average
national reporting rate also differs between developed and developing countries. While
for developed countries it is 73 percent, for developing countries it is only 35 percent (see
Figure 7). Small islands in the Pacific and African countries fall short on this obligation.
Out of 52 countries in Africa that are state parties to the Stockholm Convention, 22 have
never submitted a report. Europe is the region with the best average national reporting
rate—73 percent.19
The historical evolution of the compliance with the reporting obligations is also
different across different types of countries and regions. For the Basel Convention, the
number of developed countries that submit reports has declined from 41 in 2001 to 22 in
2015, while for developing countries it has decreased from 62 in 2001 to 32 in 2015 (see
Figure 8). Factors such as the lack of capacity at the national level and the frequency of
the reporting cycles may explain this situation. In the case of the Stockholm Convention,
trends differ. Both developed and developing countries have managed to increase the
submission of national reports (see Figure 9).20 However, there are still important gaps. In

19
20

See Appendix E
See Appendix F
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Figure 7 Average national reporting rate by category of country and regions for the
Basel and Stockholm conventions
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the last reporting cycle (2010-2014), 20 percent of developed countries and 60
percent of developing countries parties to the convention have not submitted their reports
as of December 31, 2016. Issues with the scientific information associated to the
management of POPs and the technical capacity of some countries may cause noncompliance with this obligation. Furthermore, the historical trend of late submission for
the reports to this agreement indicates that there is still a possibility for more countries to
submit their reports, even two years after its original deadline (December 31, 2014).
Interestingly, for both Basel and Stockholm, the number of countries submitting the
reports has not changed drastically since 2009 and 2010 respectively, both in total and in
the distribution among types of countries. That explains why patterns for both regions
and the average follow similar trends.
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Figure 8 Evolution of national reporting compliance indicators for the Basel
Convention
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Comparing individual countries’ reporting compliance for the two conventions
also offers important observations. On average, there is a 25-percent difference between
the national reporting rates of the Basel and the Stockholm Convention, with the latter
being lower. Individual countries also differ in their reporting patterns across the
conventions. While Hungary, for example, has submitted every report it was obliged to
submit to the Basel Convention, the country has never reported to the Stockholm
Convention. And, on the other hand, five countries that are fully compliant with the
Stockholm Convention’s reporting obligations—Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Mali, Nepal, and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—have only complied
with the obligations to the Basel Convention one third of the times or less.21

21

See Appendix E
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Figure 9 Evolution of national reporting compliance indicators for the Stockholm
Convention
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Reporting is a prerequisite to monitor and evaluate implementation. National
reporting indicators as the ones presented above illustrate the characteristics of the
reporting process, the challenges countries face in collecting the information and
completing the reports, and the extent to which these impact the process of
implementation. Analyzing and processing the information contained in national reports
is essential to determine if countries have established the institutional, technical, and
regulatory frameworks that will consequently contribute to the solution of environmental
problems. If this information is not analyzed and processed, it will not be possible to
determine the extent to which conventions are being translated into national policies. The
next section addresses these issues.
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Implementation
In the case of the Basel Convention, 161 countries submitted at least one report in
the period 2001-2015. They register an implementation score ranging from 0.87 (Burkina
Faso) to 4.93 (Portugal and Spain). While this may initially reinforce the argument about
developed countries obtaining better results in the implementation of their international
environmental obligations, a detailed analysis of individual country results evidences that
out of the 57 countries ranked in the top ten scores on the index (from 4.20 to 4.93), 27
(47%) are developing countries, including Colombia, Madagascar, Algeria, Ecuador,
Indonesia, Rwanda and Nigeria (see Figure 10).
Figure 10 Environmental Conventions Index—Top performers for the Basel
Convention
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Portugal and Spain
Argentina, Bulgaria, Colombia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Serbia, and Slovakia
Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, and Madagascar
Algeria, Belgium, Burundi, Canada, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Greece, Indonesia, Latvia, and Rwanda
Malta and Sweden
Denmark and Hungary
Albania and Tunisia
Finland, Iran, Norway, Qatar, South Korea, and Slovenia
Iceland, Nigeria, Paraguay, Poland, South Africa, and Zambia
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, Panama, Russian Federation, Switzerland,
Thailand, and the United Kingdom
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As explained in Chapter 3, index scores are based on the latest available report for
each country, but even though for some cases—30 percent of the countries—scores date
back to reports submitted in 2010 or before, the rest of the 161 state parties analyzed
submitted at least one report after that year. Of the 57 countries ranked in the top ten
performers, only five countries did not report after 2010—Burundi, Ecuador, Iceland,
South Korea, and Zambia. Countries such as Colombia, Madagascar, and Rwanda
register reporting rates higher than 80 percent, and submitted at least one report since
2013.22
At the bottom level, ten countries register low implementation index scores.
Two—Monaco and the Republic of Macedonia—are classified as developed countries.
Other bottom performers include Burkina Faso, Nauru, the Central African Republic,
Turkmenistan, Equatorial Guinea, and Barbados (see Figure 11). The fact that most of the
bottom-ranked countries are developing emphasizes the influence of state capacities and
resources in the process of implementing global environmental conventions.
Furthermore, it appears that this influence starts by the obligation to submit national
reports. Of the countries that perform poorly, only two—Barbados and Monaco—have
submitted their reports more than half of the times that they were obliged to. Poor
implementation results in developing countries also raise questions about the nature of
the movement of hazardous waste threat (Kummer, 1992) and the process of
implementation, and about the extent to which storing these materials is a source of

22

See Appendix G for detailed data on the ECI for the conventions included in this study.
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income for some developing countries, which prevents them from fully implementing the
obligations established by the Basel Convention.
For the Stockholm Convention, the index has results for 120 countries in the
period covered by the convention's three reporting cycles (2002-2014). Index scores for
these countries range from 1.52 (Myanmar) to 4.67 (Switzerland), results that are more
closely connected to development / capacity argument than in the case of the Basel
Figure 11 Environmental Conventions Index—Bottom performers for the Basel
Convention23
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Convention. This last finding is reinforced by the fact that all the countries with the top
scores are considered developed (see Figure 12). On the contrary, all the bottom
performers are developing countries, except for the Russian Federation, which ranks
113th. Index scores for this group range from 1.52 for Myanmar to 2.00 for the United
Arab Emirates. Almost all the countries with an index below 2.50 are classified as

23

See Appendix H for a complete list of country codes
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Figure 12 Environmental Conventions Index—Top performers for the Stockholm
Convention
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Figure 13 Environmental Conventions Index—Bottom performers for the
Stockholm Convention
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developing nations. The apparent correlation between countries’ level of development
and implementation reflects the importance of science and technology for the sound
management of POPs. Collection and access to detailed scientific information are
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required to identify, regulate and eliminate POPs (Selin, 2010), and as countries and
international organizations have recognized, there is an important gap at that level that
definitely undermines developing countries’ potential to fully implement their obligations
under the Stockholm Convention (see Figure 13).
Comparing national report and implementation patterns provides additional
insights for both conventions on the linkages between the two processes. Interestingly,
countries report not only when they are complying with all their technical obligations, but
also when they are failing to do so. For instance, Barbados has submitted almost every
report to the Basel Convention (for a total of 14) but indicates a very low level of
implementation (ECI score of 1.80). This case is particularly relevant because of the
impact of the transboundary movement of hazardous waste on small island developing
states (SIDS) and the existence of specific national projects to advance in the
implementation of the Basel Convention. Detailed analysis of the national reports
evidences that Barbados provides information about its progress on obligations regarding
legislation, information and regulations for transactions in hazardous wastes, but it does
not submit information on the generation, export, and import of these substances, which
reflects on the need for systematic and scientific monitoring mechanisms to support
developing countries in fulfilling all the obligations under the convention.
In the case of the Stockholm Convention, there are also similar cases of countries
that have full compliance with the reporting obligations, but register low scores.
Specifically, Indonesia and the Central African Republic rank 95th and 110th in the overall
convention’s results with index scores of 2.55 and 2.02 respectively. Furthermore, none
of the countries that ranked as bottom performers have fully complied with their
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reporting obligations. Switzerland, on the other hand, illustrates the government’s full
engagement in the chemicals and waste cluster conventions, and the fact that the country
hosts the conventions' secretariats. Switzerland is the top performer (with a score of 4.67
for 2014) among the countries that fully comply with their reporting obligations.
Figure 14 Evolution of implementation index for Basel Convention
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To finalize, the analysis of the historical trends of the process of implementation
also reveals important patterns. In the Basel Convention, the average index has increased
at an annual equivalence rate of 15 percent, going from 3.56 in 2001 to 4.08 in 2015. This
trend is similar for developed and developing countries, with variation rates of 14 and 15
percent respectively (see Figure 14). The region that has progressed the most is the
Americas. In the case of the Stockholm Convention, the average implementation index
has maintained the same level from the first reporting cycle (2002-2006), which had an
average score of 3.44, to the third reporting cycle (2010-2014), in which the average
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index score was 3.42. This apparent stagnation is caused by the lack of progress among
developing countries, where the average index score has only improved from 3.09 to 3.10
across the three reporting cycles (see Figure 15). Even some state parties in regions such
as Africa, the Americas, and SIDS have registered declines in their level of
implementation. As more countries submit their reports for the third reporting cycle, the
real trends of these indicators would be confirmed.
Figure 15 Evolution of implementation index for Stockholm Convention
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The evolution of the process of implementation for both the Basel and the
Stockholm conventions reflects multiple realities not only for specific countries but also
for the conventions’ institutional structures and leadership. First, it is evident that
additional efforts are required to improve compliance with national reporting. Second,
contrary to arguments presented by the literature, and by some analyses developed by
policy-makers and NGOs (Selin, 2009, 2010; UNEP, 2012a), which argue that the
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chemicals and waste agreements are not being implemented, evidence from the ECI
shows a wide spectrum of results that confirm the engagement of developing countries
and economies in transition in the chemicals regime and reflect the importance of factors
such as the availability of data, comprehensive regulations, national capacities,
cooperation, and funding in the process of implementation (Fiedler, 2008; Selin, 2010;
UNCSD, 2011; UNEP, 2012a). These results call for analysis to determine which
factors—besides the level of development—act as the main obstacles to progress, so that
both conventions and countries can address them. Data are also required to connect the
definition of national policies with the effectiveness of the conventions. According to the
Global Chemicals Outlook, for example, more than 70 percent of the countries that have
submitted information on hazardous waste generation to the Basel Convention reported
an increase of 12 percent in average in these substances (UNEP, 2013a). Furthermore,
even though developing countries and economies in transition are decreasing the amount
of hazardous waste they import, the amount exported has increased considerably. In the
case of POPs, positive results have been achieved for some compounds, but some new
substances still need to be phased out (Stockholm Convention, 2016d). However, since
data are incomplete, additional information is necessary to evaluate the extent to which
the conventions are effectively addressing the threat of chemical pollution and its effects
on human health and the environment.
Environmental conventions have defined “high priority substances” for countries
to establish national policies and baselines (UNEP, 2013a). However, existing disparities
in the implementation across types of countries and across regions call for “chemicals
policy instruments and approaches that are appropriate to the economic conditions and
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strategies” of specific countries (UNEP, 2013a). The use of the ECI allows for a clear
assessment of the disparity in the process of implementation across types of countries and
across regions, which should be a factor in the design and execution of capacity building
and technical assistance programs coordinated by the conventions, other international
organizations and donor countries. Additional research will help determine best practices
that can be replicated and the type of information collection mechanisms and integrated
approaches at the national level to implement the required chemicals policies.
As the chemicals and waste conventions advance in the process to develop joint,
synergistic operations at the global and national levels, it is important to determine the
extent to which countries are following the guidance and objectives established by the
conventions. Greater cooperation and coordination between the chemicals and waste
conventions provide an opportunity for capacity building, knowledge transfer, enhanced
awareness, and efficiency as well as for improved implementation. Furthermore, the
chemicals and waste regime is being integrated with other global agendas. The SDGs—
specifically Goal 12 “Responsible Production and Consumption”—aim to achieve the
environmentally sound management of chemicals and all wastes throughout their life
cycle, a goal that goes hand in hand with the framework of the conventions. Attaining this
target will require the full implementation of the conventions, which now have both the
opportunity and the responsibility to coordinate their efforts and integrate chemical
management strategies in ways that contribute to the ultimate objective of sustainable
development at the global, national, and local levels.
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CHAPTER 5
THE BIODIVERSITY CONVENTIONS: HOW INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES INFLUENCE IMPLEMENTATION

Biological resources, and the services they provide, are essential for human well-being.
They provide food security, human health, clean air and water, livelihoods, and economic
development, factors all that are critical to poverty reduction and sustainability (CBD,
2009; MEA, 2005). Despite their value and relevance, the interaction of population
growth, socio-economic development, and scientific and technological progress increases
the pressure on these resources, causing their decline (UNEP, 2012a). Specific threats to
biodiversity resources include extinction, degradation, overexploitation, pollution,
climate change, and the presence of alien invasive species (Secretariat of the Convention
On Biological Diversity, 2014). The extinction risk of species, the loss of natural habitats,
the presence of invasive alien species, the indiscriminate and unregulated access to
genetic resources, and the degradation of protected areas are some of the indicators that
raise concerns. In 2016, the IUCN published an updated assessment of its Red List. Of
the more than 85,000 species evaluated, 24,300 (28 percent) are threatened with
extinction (IUCN, 2016). Furthermore, relevant studies suggest high rates of decline for
global wetland area, both in area and in quality (Ramsar Secretariat, 2015e; Secretariat of
the Convention On Biological Diversity, 2014).
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Biodiversity is defined as the “variability among living organisms from all
sources, including the diversity of genes, people, species, communities and ecosystems”
(United Nations, 1992b Art. 2). As natural resources bring different perspectives into
their management and conservation, their diversity should be maintained and protected.
Therefore, both the resources—organisms and ecosystems—and their contribution to life
on Earth should be protected (Rayfuse, 2007). This contribution or value is categorized as
instrumental, inherent, and intrinsic (Bowman & Redgwell, 1996). Instrumental value
refers to the use of the resources, not only in terms of production and consumption, but in
issues such as education and recreation. Inherent, refers to the non-use values based on
aesthetic, spiritual, or religious considerations, and intrinsic refers to their value as
entities, independently of economic or external considerations. Under these definitions,
the protection of these resources is critical.
Approaches to the management of biological resources has evolved over time,
following changes in the balance between environmental considerations and economic
activities. Starting from a very basic consideration of resources allocation among states,
management of biological resources has evolved into approaches such as protection,
preservation, conservation and sustainable use (Rayfuse, 2007). These concepts have
been used in international regulations. The evolution of the system of global
environmental governance offered various perspectives to address the different
components of biodiversity (UNCED, 1992; United Nations, 1972, 2002). For the past
five decades, the international system has adopted regulations to address the challenges
of species extinction, biodiversity conservation and sustainable use, wetlands
conservation and sustainable use, among other issues, and to protect the benefits these
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resources provide for people. Most recently, the SDGs specifically established two goals
to protect Life below Water (SDG14) and Life on Land (SDG15) to protect marine,
coastal, and terrestrial biodiversity.
As part of the study of global environmental conventions, scholars have discussed
the creation, evolution, and effectiveness of the different agreements that protect
biodiversity. Debates have also addressed the relationship between nature and economics
(Clapp & Dauvergne, 2011; Nunes, Van Den Bergh, & Nijkamp, 2003; Perrings &
Gadgil, 2003; WCED, 1987). Furthermore, issues such as the lack of resources
mobilization, effective biodiversity strategies and plans at the national level, and
knowledge and monitoring (UNEP, 2012a), have raised questions about the role and
relevance of the biodiversity conventions, and about how the different dimensions of
resources management they address may influence global progress in the protection of
these resources. However, as in the case of the chemicals and waste regime, empirical
evidence and systematic analysis are required to assess how the conventions are being
implemented and contribute to the overall strategies for biodiversity protection,
conservation, and sustainable use.
This chapter demonstrates the degree to which the Ramsar Convention and
CITES are being implemented and contribute to addressing the challenges of wetlands
degradation and loss as well as illegal wildlife trade. It discusses how factors such as the
nature of these problems, and the institutional arrangements established by the
conventions determine the degree to which countries fulfill their different obligations.
Specifically, it shows how developing countries are making substantive progress in
wetlands conservation, and how the decisions and procedures established by the Ramsar
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Convention’s executive bodies are a factor for successful implementation. On the other, it
highlights how the complexity of environmental problems such as illegal wildlife trade
may affect the process of implementation, and the importance of reporting and
enforcement mechanisms.
This chapter uses a similar structure than Chapter 4 to characterize the
biodiversity conventions, discussing first the nature of the specific problems they address,
the context in which they were negotiated and drafted, and their objectives and
institutional characteristics. From there, it presents an assessment of the implementation
of the Ramsar Convention and CITES, analyzing membership, level of national reporting,
and results for the Environmental Conventions Index (ECI) across type of countries and
regions, the historical evolution of implementation since 2001, and the top and bottom
performers. Comparing the implementation results from these two strands of the global
efforts for biodiversity conservation is fundamental to determining three things: first, the
extent to which biodiversity conventions can work together, developing synergies that
facilitate their operations and their contribution to sustainable development (UNEP,
2016b); second, how the institutional arrangements and strategies that the conventions
define influence the process of implementation; and third, which are the existing gaps in
the implementation of the legal regime for biological resources. Only by understanding
these three issues would it be possible to continue advancing the global agenda for the
conservation, restoration, wise use and sustainability of biodiversity and its benefits for
people and a healthy planet (Secretariat of the Convention On Biological Diversity,
2014).
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The legal regime for biodiversity: Species, ecosystems, their use and benefits
Biodiversity provides important benefits for the humans and the planet. Biological
resources, their benefits, and diversity, represent “capital asset(s) with great potential for
yielding sustainable benefits” (UNCED, 1992 para. 15.3). Each resource or ecosystem
faces different challenges, but overall the pressure of human activities, development, and
growth leads to their degradation and loss (Brooks et al., 2006). Nonetheless, the
consequences of habitats and species loss are increasingly economic in nature. The
increasing connection between biodiversity, poverty reduction, climate change, food
security, and sustainable livelihoods puts biological resources at the core of the
sustainable development agenda. Reducing the negative impacts on biodiversity is thus
critical to advance towards sustainable development (Secretariat of the Convention On
Biological Diversity, 2014).
As the Millennium Development Goals concluded in 2015, it was clear that by
2010 the world had failed to achieve the target of reducing the rate of biodiversity loss
(UNEP, 2012b; United Nations, 2015a). Multiple variables exemplify the seriousness of
the threats and challenges in biodiversity conservation, and continued decline in
populations, species, and habitats. Even though the net loss of forest slowed, 5.2 million
hectares of forest were lost each year between 2000 and 2010 (UNEP, 2012a). This is
particularly concerning, considering that 1.6 billion people still depend on forests for
their livelihood (United Nations, 2015b). Threatened species have increased from 10,500
in 1996/1998 to 24,300 in 2016 (see Figure 16) (IUCN, 2016). And fisheries captures
more than quadrupled from the early 1950s to the 1990s, as fish provide 20 percent of
animal protein to about 3 billion people (United Nations, 2012b). Furthermore, habitats’
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conditions have declined more than 20 percent since the 1980, wetlands and coasts being
the most affected ecosystems (UNEP, 2012b). The Wetland Extent Index estimates a 40percent global decline in the extent of both marine/coastal and inland wetlands between
1970 and 2008 (Ramsar Secretariat, 2015e; Secretariat of the Convention On Biological
Diversity, 2014).
Figure 16 Number of species included in the IUCN Red List
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In the past five decades, cooperation to protect biodiversity has evolved. Different
approaches to managing biological resources (Bowman & Redgwell, 1996) have been
part of the discussions and decisions at the environmental governance summits. In 1972,
at the Stockholm Conference, concerns about the “ecological balance of the biosphere”
and the “destruction and depletion of replaceable resources” were some of the
motivations for placing environment at the center of the international agenda (United
Nations, 1972). Twenty years later, the concept of biodiversity was fundamental in the
agenda of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, and governments reaffirmed the need to balance
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environment and development policies, guaranteeing the protection of national resources,
and their sovereign exploitation within countries (United Nations, 1992a). Agenda 21
focused its approach to biodiversity on its conservation and sustainable use, recognizing
that it was not limited to species or resources, but include the variability of genes,
species, populations and ecosystems (UNCED, 1992). Four fundamental threats to
biodiversity were identified at the Earth Summit: habitat destruction, over-harvesting,
pollution, and the inappropriate introduction of foreign plants and animals. In addition,
Agenda 21 recognized the value and sustainable benefits that biodiversity would have for
present and future generations. In the next twenty years, commitments to the protection
of biodiversity were reaffirmed (United Nations, 2002). In 2012, the Rio+20 summit
offered a comprehensive approach to biodiversity conservation, including specific
references in its declaration to terrestrial and marine biodiversity, and connecting these
resources to economic activities such as agriculture and tourism (United Nations, 2012a).
In addition, the Rio+20 declaration reinforce the importance of area-based conservation
measures (para. 177).
In a parallel but interconnected process, since the 1970s the international
community also worked on the definition of international agreements for biodiversity.
The 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of international importance, the 1973
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), the 1979 Convention
on Migratory Species (CMS), and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
were at the core of international cooperation and law for biodiversity conservation. These
instruments established specific measures to regulate conservation, define sustainable
use, reduce the threat of extinction, and guarantee the benefits that biodiversity provide
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for humankind. The SDGs maintained this approach, and through the SDG14 and
SDG15, incorporated specific targets to sustainable manage marine and coastal
ecosystems; regulate harvesting and overfishing; conserve coastal and marine areas;
ensure the conservation, restoration, and sustainable use of ecosystems; and take action to
end poaching and the traffic of protected species, among many other targets (UN General
Assembly, 2015).
The next section describes the main international law instruments for biodiversity
conservation through a more detailed historical analysis of the Ramsar Convention and
CITES, the two biodiversity agreements included in this study.

Biodiversity Regulation
Towards the mid-twentieth century, discussions in the international community
made clear that natural resources required protection and conservation efforts against
over-exploitation. Back then, countries were mainly concerned with their distribution and
their sovereign exploitation. However, around the discussions that led to the creation of
UN Environment in 1972, new visions about the urgency and relevance of protecting
biodiversity resulted in more structural approaches and institutional frameworks
(Baakman, 2011). The Ramsar Convention and CITES were some outcomes from this
period.
In 1962, different NGOs called attention to the importance of wetland
ecosystems. The IUCN established the MAR project for the conservation and
management of wetlands. This led to an international conference organized by the
International Waterfowl & Wetlands Research Bureau, whose main outcome was an
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agreement on the need for an international wetlands conservation treaty (Matthews,
1993). After years of negotiations, a draft was presented for approval at the Ramsar
Conference, organized by the government of Iran in the city that gives its name to the
convention. The text of the convention was approved by representatives of 18 nations in
1971 and entered into force in 1975 (Ramsar Secretariat, 2015b). The Ramsar
Convention’s main mission is the conservation and wise use of all wetlands (Ramsar
Convention, 2014; UNESCO, 1971). To achieve this goal, the convention established
specific criteria for its list of wetlands for a list of Wetlands of International
Importance—“the Ramsar List”—that are subject to specific conservation strategies.
Currently, there are 2,264 Ramsar Sites that cover more than 2.1 million square
kilometers (Ramsar Secretariat, 2017b).
In the 1980s, the COP started discussions to create a permanent secretariat
(Ramsar Convention, 1980). The Ramsar Convention first established the Ramsar
Bureau, which duties were to be performed by IUCN. Functions of the bureau included
the organization of the meetings of the COP, the maintenance of the Ramsar List,
tracking—in coordination with the parties—the changes in the ecological character of the
listed wetlands, and making recommendations on wetlands management (UNESCO,
1971 Art. 8). After different discussions about the legal status of the secretariat and which
organization should host it, IUCN was selected and in 2012, the COP meeting renewed
the hosting arrangements with this organization (Ramsar Convention, 2012b). The
Standing Committee meets once a year to oversee the convention matters and the
activities of the secretariat (Ramsar Convention, 1987). Two other bodies—the Scientific
and Technical Review Panel and the Communication, Education, Participation and
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Awareness Oversight Panel—provide technical guidance and collaborating in the
formulation of policies. The main activities of the convention are handled through a
strategic plan defined every eight years to establish priorities, goals, and indicators
(Ramsar Secretariat, 2015c). The convention also works closely with stakeholders, the
private sector, and other conventions (see Box 4).
Box 4 International Organization Partners in the Ramsar Convention
In 1999, the Ramsar COP established an innovative measure of institutional cooperation,
through the establishment of partnerships with “international organization partners” that
provide support, technical advice, implementation assistance, and financial resources.
IUCN, Birdlife International, Wetlands International, and the WWF have been partners to
the convention since its beginnings. Later, the International Water Management Institute
and the Wildfowl & Wetlands Trust were granted this status.
Source: (Ramsar Convention, 1999, 2005c; Ramsar Secretariat, 2015d)

Not long after the adoption of the Ramsar Convention was adopted, a similar
approach was taken for CITES. The origins of the convention go back to the 1960s, when
the general assembly of IUCN started a campaign to develop an international instrument
for species conservation (Epstein, 2006; Hill, 1990; Hutton & Dickson, 2000),
recognizing that commercial development, illegal trade, hunting, and trapping were
among the major threats that increase species vulnerability and risk of extinction (Hill,
1990; UNEP, 2012a). This coincided with the U.S. passage of regulation to prevent the
import of endangered species, and with the meeting of the Stockholm Conference and the
creation of UN Environment. These factors resulted in the drafting and signature of
CITES, also known as the Washington Convention, with nine original signatories: Chile,
Cyprus, Ecuador, Nigeria, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, the U.S. and Uruguay. Entering
into force in 1975, CITES now has 183 state parties.
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CITES has two key objectives: to reduce the effects of trade on threatened species
and to establish a system to ensure that trade in other species is sustainable (Hill, 1990;
Patel, 1995). To achieve these goals, three basic principles serve as the foundation of the
agreement: the recognition of biodiversity and its value, the role of people and states in the
protection of biological resources, and the need for international cooperation to prevent the
over-exploitation of nature through international trade (IUCN, 1973). The agreement’s
legal text identifies its key components:
•

Regulations for signatory parties to achieve CITES’ objectives, including the
system of permits and certificates and the procedures to manage the species lists
(Art. III to VIII, X and XIII)

•

National institutional arrangements and the convention’s organizational bodies
(Art. IX, XI and XII)

•

Legal matters of the convention as an international treaty, including ratification,
entry into force, amendments and dispute resolution (Art. XIV to XXV)
To support its regulations, the treaty established a detailed control system based

on three appendixes that include species under different levels of risk (Hill, 1990; IUCN,
1973). For each of the lists, CITES defines specific measures to guarantee that trade
operations (exports, imports and re-exports) are conducted under conditions that do not
generate or increase the risk of extinction. Therefore, the focus of the convention is
highly operational. Additional, the convention counts on an institutional structure to
support its activities and establishes connections with other environmental organizations.
The most important body is the COP, which according to Martin (2000) conducts
probably the best organized meetings of the environmental conventions. Decisions at

136

COPs are based on specific rules of procedure that include different voting mechanisms
for each issue. The COP meets every two or three years to consider amendments to the
list of species protected by the convention, analyze reports, recommend measures to
improve the effectiveness of the convention, and make the necessary institutional and
financial provisions for the normal functioning of the secretariat (CITES, 2013c).
Observers, including non-state parties, UN agencies, representatives from other
conventions and NGOs can participate in the COP in addition to state parties.
Three committees carry out the key functions in the inter-sessional periods
between COPs (CITES, 2000a, 2013c). The standing committee provides policy guidance
to the secretariat on the implementation of the convention. It also oversees the
management of the secretariat’s budget and carries out other tasks assigned by the COP.
Membership in the standing committee includes regional representation, the agreement’s
depository government (Switzerland) and the host countries for the previous and next
COP meetings. The standing committee usually means once a year. The animals and
plants Committee establishes connections between the convention and the scientific
specialized knowledge about species of animals or plants that are or might be part of
CITES appendices. This committee also provides technical support for decision-making
at COP meetings, and recommends action to the parties regarding the regulation of
unsustainable trade. Finally, the CITES executive secretariat is administered by UN
Environment. Its functions include coordination, advice, communications, monitoring,
assistance, recommendations, and information provision (IUCN, 1973 Art. XII). The
secretariat is also responsible of arranging meetings of COPs and permanent committees,
and servicing those meetings.
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Two other conventions complement the biodiversity legal regime. Following the
recommendations of the UN Conference on the Human Environment regarding species
inhabiting international waters or migrating from one country to the other (United
Nations, 1972), Germany led the work to draft a convention to grant protection to
migratory wildlife. The Convention on Migratory Species (CMS), also known as the
Bonn Convention, was adopted in 1979 and entered into force in 1983. The CMS brings
together states to develop internationally coordinated conservation measures throughout a
species’ migratory range (Baakman, 2011; CMS, 1979). It establishes a series of general
standards, and facilitates the conclusion of regional agreements to address threats to
specific species based on their taxonomy or geographical location (Baldwin, 2011;
Caddell, 2005). Currently the convention has 124 parties.
In 1988, concerned about the increasing threats to ecosystems and species and
about the recognition of the value of biological diversity, UN Environment convened an
Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity to explore the need for an
international convention on this topic. In 1991, an intergovernmental committee started
the negotiation process that lead to the adoption in 1992 of the text of the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD). The agreement was opened for signature at that year’s Earth
Summit, and entered into force in 1993, 90 days after the thirtieth country ratified it
(McConnell, 1996; Secretariat of the Convention On Biological Diversity, 2004). The
CBD is a comprehensive and holistic agreement that covers ecosystems, species, and
genetic resources.
To achieve its objectives, the CBD established various instruments (Le Prestre,
2002). In addition to the 1992 convention, it has approved two protocols: the Cartagena

138

Protocol on Biosafety to regulate the handling, transport and use of living modified
organisms, and the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, approved in the tenth
meeting of the COP (Secretariat of the Convention On Biological Diversity, 2000, 2010).
In that same session, parties adopted the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and
the Aichi Biodiversity Targets. The plan was conceived as an overarching framework for
the conservation and use of biodiversity to be used by the entire UN system and other
partners engaged in biodiversity policy and management (CBD, 2010; Mace et al., 2010).
In this context, the other biodiversity conventions are working to establish strategies and
targets that converge with the Aichi targets and correspond to specific environmental
issues. Furthermore, each country is required “to prepare a national biodiversity strategy
(or equivalent instrument) and to ensure that this strategy is mainstreamed into the
planning and activities of all those sectors whose activities can have an impact (positive
and negative) on biodiversity” (United Nations, 1992b Art. 6).
Even though the CBD can definitively be considered a framework convention,
each of the agreements listed above addresses an important component of the protection
of biodiversity under the common goal of conservation and sustainable use. Each
agreement also has its own legal, political, and practical implications. Table 19
summarizes the objectives of each of the main conventions in the regime. In 2012 the
then governing council of UN Environment recognized the need to enhance cooperation
and synergies nationally and regionally (UNEP, 2012c). Since then, UN Environment has
carried out various activities to discuss and elaborate options for possible ways of
“enhancing synergies in the implementation of biodiversity-related conventions” (UNEP,
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2016a, 2016b). However, these arrangements have not led yet to any legal or
administrative changes in the nature of the conventions and their executive bodies.
Table 19 Environmental agreements for biodiversity conservation
Year

Ramsar
Convention

CITES

Convention
on
Migratory
Species

Convention
on
Biological
Diversity

1971

1973

1979

1992

Parties24

Main objectives

169

• The conservation and wise use of wetlands through actions at the
international, national, and local levels, as a contribution to
achieving sustainable development. The parties commit to:
o Work towards the wise use of wetlands
o Designate suitable wetlands for a list of Wetlands of
International Importance (Ramsar sites) and ensure their
effective management
o Cooperate internationally on transboundary wetlands, shared
wetlands systems, and shared species

183

• Ensures that the international trade in specimens of wild animals
and plants in risk of extinction does not threaten their survival.
• Establishes certain controls for the export, import, and re-export of
species that identified as threatened. Controls are based on three lists
(appendices) with different trade regulations:
o Appendix I includes species threatened with extinction, for
which trade is permitted only in exceptional circumstances.
o Appendix II includes species not necessarily threatened with
extinction but in which trade must be controlled.
o Appendix III contains species that are protected in at least one
country, which has asked other CITES Parties for assistance in
controlling trade.

124

• Provides of a global platform for the conservation and sustainable
use of migratory species and their habitats.
• Brings together the states through which migratory animals pass and
establishes international mechanisms for coordinated conservation
measures throughout this range. Parties are expected to:
o provide immediate protection to all endangered migratory
species (Appendix I), and
o work on the adoption of agreements for the conservation
and management of migratory species which an
unfavorable conservation status (Appendix II)
• Promotes, cooperates in, and supports research relating to migratory
species.

196

• Conservation of biological diversity.
• Sustainable use of the components of biodiversity.
• Fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the
utilization of genetic resources.

Source: (CMS, 1979; IUCN, 1973; UNESCO, 1971; United Nations, 1992b)
24

The data presented in this study are updated to December 31, 2016.
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As this comprehensive biodiversity regime evolved, concerns emerged about the
effective and coherent implementation of the corresponding conventions. The
environmental problems addressed by the Ramsar Convention and CITES persist
(DeSombre, 2017). With Ramsar, the conversion of wetlands, and the lack of data
collection are critical factors, affecting in particular the creation of wetlands inventories
and the monitoring of their ecological characteristics (Ramsar Secretariat, 2010; UNEP,
2012a). In the case of CITES, the management of wildlife trade and use requires the
strengthening of border controls, training, public campaigns to raise awareness, and
enforcement (UNEP, 2012a). Since the two conventions take different approaches to
implementation, two specific factors require further analysis. While both conventions aim
to protect natural resources, they are affected by different threats; for CITES the
complexity of illegal wildlife trade creates continual new challenges. In addition, the
institutional arrangements that countries set up for each convention, and the strategies
and procedures they define—such as national reporting, capacity building, and technical
assistance—influence their effective translation into national policies and the consequent
success of the conventions themselves.

Implementing the Ramsar Convention and CITES
Human activities, development, urbanization, and increasing economic expansion
continue pressing biological resources towards degradation and depletion. Regulations
need to be enforced to guarantee that the conventions that protect these resources are
being implemented, and that their implementation contributes to sustainable
development. In the case of the Ramsar Convention, data gathering and assessment, and
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targeted strategies are critical factors to stopping and reversing the loss and degradation
of wetlands and their services to people (Bowman, 2002; Bridgewater, 2008; Mauerhofer,
Kim, & Stevens, 2015). In the case of CITES, data on the number of transactions of
illegal trade of endangered species evidences that there is still much work to do. More
legislation, policies, strategies, and enforcement mechanisms are required to control trade
transactions under the convention (S. Young, 2003). In addition, CITES needs to engage
with different actors in the fight against the criminal activities behind illegal wildlife
trade (Curlier & Andresen, 2002).
Based on the ECI, the next two sections provide empirical evidence of how
implementation of the Ramsar Convention and CITES has differed over time. Three
findings emerge from this analysis. First, that the procedures established by each
convention for national reporting result in different outcomes in terms of compliance.
Second, developing countries are strongly engaged in both the Ramsar Convention and
CITES, their membership, national reporting, and policy development. In the case of
Ramsar, especially, developing countries are achieving remarkable results, and they can
use their experience and practices to participate more actively in global environmental
governance. Third, the nature of the environmental issues addressed by these agreements
influences the process of implementation. In some cases, the socio-economic and cultural
value of wetlands and their ecosystem services increases the interest of governments and
stakeholders to engage in their conservation. Similarly, the complexity of the criminal
networks behind the traffic of endangered species has created a definite obstacle in the
enforcement of CITES. For all these areas of concern, countries need additional
implementation and enforcement mechanisms to advance implementation (Bowman,
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2002; Dickson, 2009; Ferrajolo, 2011; Hepworth, 1998; Mauerhofer et al., 2015;
McOmber, 2001). Bringing empirical evidence to the analysis of the Ramsar Convention
and CITES explains countries’ progress to protection biological resources, and offers
insights about how the conventions can work together in addressing the protection and
sustainable use of these vital resources.

Membership
As mentioned in Chapter 4, membership analysis is the foundation for
determining performance by parties to specific environmental conventions. Since
developed and developing countries approach their obligations differently, a
characterization of membership is necessary to understand how the distinction between
developed and developing countries, and the differences in the availability of natural
resources among them, influence how each group of countries implement their
obligations.
Membership to CITES reached 183 countries in 2016. The Ramsar Convention
has 169 parties, fewer than the other conventions analyzed in this project, a distinction
that can be explained by the specific nature and geographical location of wetlands
ecosystems (see Figure 17). Out of total countries, 28 percent are developed countries
and 72 percent are developing. CITES similarly has 26 percent—48 countries—being
developed, and 74 percent—135 countries—being developing. Even though the two
conventions were adopted close in time and have increased their memberships since then,
more developing countries joined CITES sooner. By 1992, CITES had 115 parties, of
which 87 (76 percent) were developing countries, while the Ramsar Convention had 74
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parties, with 53 percent (39 countries) being developing. The 1992 Earth Summit
definitively contributed to the ratification of the agreements, particularly for Ramsar,
which more than half of the parties joined after 1993. In addition, nine countries joined
the Ramsar Convention and eight joined CITES joined the conventions after 2010. These
new parties for Ramsar came mostly from Africa, South East Asia, the Pacific and the
Middle East, whereas new members for CITES represented other parts of the world, as
well as the EU, which joined in 2015.25
Both conventions, however, also have gaps in membership. Notable absences in
CITES include mainly Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Nine of the fifteen
countries that have not joined CITES are SIDS, including Kiribati, the Marshall Islands,
the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, and Tuvalu. This can be partially explained by
these nations’ limited resources and the critical importance of climate change on their
environmental policies. In the case of Ramsar, the list of non-state parties is longer.
Twenty-four UN member countries are not parties to Ramsar, including Angola,
Ethiopia, Guyana, and Saudi Arabia. SIDS that are absent from the convention include
Dominica, Maldives, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore,
Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Some of these absences—such as the cases of Afghanistan
and Qatar—could be explained by geographic and biosphere characteristics such as the
absence of wetland ecosystems, and by their political challenges. Other cases—such
Ethiopia—are due to internal political dynamics. Only three African nations have not
ratified Ramsar: Angola, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Contrarily to the case of the chemicals
25

Andorra, Bhutan, Grenada, Kiribati, Kuwait, Oman, South Sudan, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe are the
countries that joined the Ramsar Convention, while Angola, Bahrain, the European Union, Iraq, Lebanon,
Maldives, Tajikistan, and Tonga are the countries the latest parties to CITES.
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conventions, the US is one of the original signatories of CITES and joined the Ramsar
Convention in 1987. Appendix D presents a summary of the membership for the
conventions included in this study.
Figure 17 Historical evolution of the membership in the Ramsar Convention and
CITES
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Membership in the biodiversity conventions brings up two issues. First,
developing countries engaged in both agreements from the start. Given the nature of
wetlands and biodiversity, and the value they represent for societies and economies—in
some countries the use of biological resources and ecosystems services are key to
economic output—it is critical that nations protect and guarantee the sustainability of
these resources.
Furthermore, the differences in membership between the Ramsar Convention and
CITES, and with the CBD and the CMS, even when due to geographic considerations—
such as absence of wetlands ecosystems or migratory species, may affect the
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implementation and the synergies in the biodiversity cluster. Nineteen countries are
members of CITES but not the Ramsar Convention, while five countries—Andorra,
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, South Sudan, and Turkmenistan, are parties to Ramsar only.
Ten countries are non-parties in both conventions.26

National Reporting
The Ramsar Convention and CITES have different approaches to the process of
national reporting (see Table 20). While Ramsar organizes its reporting obligations
around the meetings of its COP, CITES has a dual system.
Table 20 National reporting mechanisms for the Ramsar Convention and CITES

Reporting
requirements

Reporting
cycles

Ramsar Convention
Defined by the standing committee for
each COP. Reports should include:
• Data and information on how the
convention is being implemented,
including indicators on strategic plans,
the Scientific and Technical Review
Panel, and on the Communication,
Education, Participation, and
Awareness Strategies
• Lessons and experiences to help state
parties develop future action.
• Identification of emerging issues and
challenges that require attention
• National reports, which provide an
opportunity for countries to draw
attention to their achievements
Reporting cycles correspond to each
meeting of the COP (every three years in
average), and are submitted by the
countries to the secretariat. The
questionnaire was standardized to
multiple choice questions in 2005

26

CITES (Art. VIII para. 7)
CITES requires parties to submit two
reports to collect information on the
implementation of the convention:
• Annual trade report on the number and
type of permits and certificates granted
for trade operations in the species
listed on the convention appendices
• A biennial report on the measures
taken for implementation27

Biennial

This include Cook Islands, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Haiti, the Federated States of
Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palestine, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, and the Vatican City. However, these, except for
the Holy See, are parties to the CBD.
27
For the implementation analysis included in this study only the biennial reports are considered.
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Ramsar Convention
2005 (COP9), 2008 (COP10), 2012
(COP11), 2015 (COP12)

CITES (Art. VIII para. 7)
Biennia 2003-2004, 2005-2006, 2007Reports
2008, 2009-2010, 2011-2012, and 2013available
2014
Source: (CITES, 2000b; IUCN, 1973; Ramsar Convention, 2013)

According to Art. VIII para. 7 of the CITES convention countries shall prepare
and transmit to the secretariat an annual report containing a summary of the permits and
certificates granted for trade transactions, the states with which such trade has occurred,
and the quantities and types of specimens; and a biennial report on the legislative,
regulatory, and administrative measures taken to enforce the provisions of the convention
(IUCN, 1973). Both reports are considered central to the monitoring of the
implementation of the convention. Data from the annual reports goes into a database that
provides the basis for comparative trade analysis to verify the overall compliance and
effectiveness of the CITES. In addition, parties have agreed to specific measures to
address non-compliance with the annual reports. If a party fails to submit the annual
report for three consecutive years, the case should be presented to the standing
committee, and this instance decides on recommendations to the parties to not authorize
trade operations in CITES specimens with countries that are not fulfilling this obligation
(CITES, 2000b). Currently, 31 countries are subject to trade suspensions, three of them—
Afghanistan, Grenada, and Lesotho—because of their failure to submit annual reports
(CITES Secretariat, 2017).
Reporting rates for the two conventions differ dramatically. The analysis based on
the level of compliance with reporting obligations and the national reporting rates, shows
the outcomes and challenges of the different reporting systems established by the
biodiversity conventions. In the case of the Ramsar Convention, a key initial finding is
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the high rate of compliance with reporting obligation and submission of national reports.
An average of 137 reports are submitted to each meeting of the COP, which represents 88
percent of the countries that are parties to the convention (Ramsar Convention, 2005a,
2008, 2012a, 2015a). Sixty-eight percent of the countries have submitted all required
reports, and all state parties with reporting obligations have submitted at least one report
since 2005 (see Figure 18).
Figure 18 Compliance with national reporting obligations in the Ramsar
Convention and CITES
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Only six countries—Bahrain, Belize, Jordan, Luxembourg, Malta, and
Nicaragua—have struggled with the process of national reporting, submitting only half or
less of the reports.28 Compliance with reporting for CITES is considerably lower (CITES,
2016a). Only 28 countries—18 of them developed states—have submitted all required

28

See Appendix E
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reports. Interestingly, countries such as Barbados, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Malaysia, and
Thailand have fully complied with this obligation. Since these countries are some of
those with a larger number of species at risk under the IUCN Red List, this raises
questions about the influence that the nature of problem addressed by a convention has on
fulfilling the reporting obligations (IUCN, 2016).In addition, the evolution of the
reporting compliance rates also evidences important challenges for CITES. For Ramsar
countries report an average of 88 percent of the time, for CITES the average is only 39
percent, and it has systematically decreased from 52 percent for 2003-2004, to 32 percent
for 2013-2014 (see Figure 19). Thirty-nine percent of the countries have not submitted a
report since 2010, and 69 countries—equivalent to 38 percent of the parties—have never
submitted any of these biennial reports. Sixty-six of the countries in this group are
developing.
Figure 19 Historical evolution of general compliance to national reporting
obligations in the Ramsar Convention and CITES
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Interestingly, the submission of annual trade reports for CITES shows different
behavior. On average, 84 percent of the countries submit their annual reports every year,
as recent efforts from the secretariat and the COP have stressed the importance of this
fundamental obligation. Eighty-three countries have submitted reports for every year
since records have been available (2008-2015), 60 percent of them (50 countries)
developing nations. Sixteen countries, all of them developing and mostly from Africa and
Asia, have not reported since 2013. Furthermore, there is often a significant delay in the
submission of the reports. Annual reports for 2015 were due in October 2016, but only
100 of the 180 countries had submitted their data by February 2017. Figure 20 presents a
comparison between the compliance rate with each of the reports established for CITES.
Data for annual reports before 2008 is not available for analysis.
These differences in compliance with reporting requirements between the
biodiversity conventions emphasize the importance of the institutional arrangements that
the conventions prescribe for the process of data collection and reports submission. The
Ramsar Convention exemplifies that specific strategies and approaches to the national
reporting process result in better outcomes. Three factors make the national reporting
process for Ramsar different: the preparatory process, the submission of the reports, and
the use of the information in the reports (see Box 5). On the other hand, the format for the
biennial reports to CITES has not been adjusted since 2003, and even though the
secretariat follows up and urges parties to submit their reports at least one year before
each meeting of the COP, the submission rate has not improved (CITES, 2000b).
Analysis of the national reporting records of CITES also evidences critical delays in the
submission of reports. On average, reports are submitted a year after they were due.
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Morocco for example, only submitted its reports for 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 in 2014.
Panama submitted all the reports in 2010 for the three biennia between 2003 and 2008.
This delay seriously impacts the availability and use of the information, including
preventing the secretariat from having enough and timely information for decisionmaking processes.
Figure 20 Comparative compliance rate with reporting obligations for CITES
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Box 5 National reporting process in the Ramsar Convention
The Ramsar Convention’s standing committee defines specific procedures for the
convention’s national reports.
Preparatory process
• Approximately two years in advance the standing committee approves the national
report format (NRF) for the next COP. In the process of agreeing to these
questionnaires, the standing committee takes into consideration the previous formats;
the convention’s strategic plan; the need to reduce, if possible, the parties’ reporting
burden; and the simplification of the process for handling information and completion
of the reports.
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•

The NRF is also expected to permit continuity of the analyses of progress in
implementation, by ensuring that indicator questions are maintained through the
different reporting cycles.
• The NRF is distributed to the parties about one year prior to the COP.
• Once the parties are working on the completion of the reports, the secretariat closely
follows up the process, through the different focal points, and organizes regional
meetings.
Submission of the reports
• Reports are expected to be submitted at least nine months before each COP meeting.
• The convention counts on its regional senior advisors to coordinate with the parties
for the submission of the reports.
Use of the reported information
• National reports provide the basis for reporting by the secretariat to each meeting of
the COP on global and regional implementation and on progress in meeting the
conventions’ obligations.
• Provision of information on specific implementation issues supports the decisionmaking and recommendations at each COP.
• Assessment of time-series progress on specific aspects of the implementation of the
convention and its specific programs
• Submission of reports on collaboration with other conventions, particularly the CBD
Source: (Ramsar Convention, 2013)

Classification of regions and types of countries also confirms the different
reporting behaviors of the Ramsar Convention and CITES. For the former, both
developed and developing countries have shown similar behaviors in terms of national
reporting, with average reporting rates of 89 percent and 85 percent respectively (see
Figure 21). The same can be said about the regions, since all of them have similar
averages (above 80 percent), except for Oceania, where three of the eight countries that
are parties to the convention—the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Papua New Guinea
(Burundi, Cabo Verde, Guinea Bissau, Libya, Sao Tome and Principe, and Sierra
Leone)—have failed to submit all required reports. On a positive note, only 6 of the 50
African countries that are parties to the Ramsar Convention have submitted half or less of
the reports. For the rest, national reporting rates are 75 percent or higher, with 35
countries having submitted all reports.
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Figure 21 Average national reporting rate by category of countries and regions for
the Ramsar Convention and CITES
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The national reporting rates for CITES reveal a different pattern. First, there is a
critical difference between the averages for developed (75%) and developing (26%)
countries (see Figure 21). Out of the 135 developing countries that are members to
CITES, 66 have never delivered the biennial reports, and 39 have only do so half or less
of the times. Across regions, the level of development creates the disequilibrium between
Europe and the other regions. Fifty percent of the countries that have fully complied with
their reporting obligations are in Europe. The rest of the developed nations that have the
same behavior are Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States. Average reporting
rates for Africa and Oceania are considerably lower. Sixty percent of the countries (41)
that have never reported come from these two regions. Only five countries in Africa have
reported half or more of the times: Ethiopia, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, and
Swaziland.
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The historical evolution of compliance with reporting obligations is also different
across different types of countries and regions. For the Ramsar Convention, the number
of developing countries that submit their reports has been significant since the 2005
reporting cycle, when 80 percent of the developing state parties (77 countries) fulfilled
this obligation. In 2015, this increased to 104 countries (86 percent). For developed
countries, the number has slightly decreased, going from 42 to 40. However, changes in
membership cause a more relevant decrease in the compliance rate, going from 93
percent to 85 (see Figure 22). Factors such as the structure of the national reporting
process and the importance of wetlands ecosystems at the socio-economic level may
explain this situation. Also, the materiality of wetlands facilitates its monitoring and the
assessment of the changes in their ecological character.
Figure 22 Evolution of national reporting indicators for the Ramsar Convention
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For CITES, the number of countries submitting reports between 2003 and 2014
considerably decreased, from 86 to 57 (see Figure 23). However, developing countries
performed much more poorly than this. Submission of biennial reports declined from 50
countries for the 2003-2004 biennium, to 24 (18%) for 2013-2014.29 This is particularly
concerning considering that membership only increased by 11 states in the same period.
Factors such as challenges enacting legislation to protect endangered species, lack of
capacity, and lack of institutional resources should be considered.
Figure 23 Evolution of national reporting indicators for CITES
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Implementation
In the case of the Ramsar Convention, 166 countries have submitted at least one
report for the meetings of the COP between 2005 and 2015. They register an
implementation index spectrum in which developing countries are at the top of the

29

See Appendix F
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ranking. ECI scores range from 0.28 (Luxembourg) to 4.65 (Mali). This reflects the
importance of wetlands for developing countries. A detailed analysis of individual
country results shows that of the eleven countries ranked in the top ten for the ECI (from
4.33 to 4.65), ten are developing (see Figure 24). Only France, with an ECI of 4.36, ranks
at the top of the convention. Other developed countries follow closely—New Zealand,
Australia, Austria, and the United Kingdom—rank in the top twenty performers for this
agreement, but still most the countries with high implementation scores are developing.
This is even more significant when considering that 87 percent of the countries’ scores
correspond to recent assessments since they are based on reports submitted for COP12 in
2015.30
At the bottom level, eleven countries have low implementation ECI scores (see
Figure 25). Two of them—the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and
Luxembourg—are classified as developed countries. Seven of the other nine bottom
performers are in Africa, including Cote D’Ivoire, Chad, Swaziland, Sao Tome and
Principe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Djibouti. African
wetlands are considered some of the most productive and biologically diverse ecosystems
in the world. However, the ways that countries in the region are prioritizing their
development policies (land use, drainage, agriculture, and settlement) is increasing the
risk of overexploitation of natural resources and inadequate planning (Gardner, Connolly,
& Bamba, 2009). In this sense, the Ramsar secretariat has launched specific initiatives to
support African countries in their wetland conservation efforts. An example of this is the

30

See Appendix G
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Figure 25 Environmental Conventions Index - Bottom performers for the Ramsar
Convention
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Global Wetland Africa initiative, developed in partnership with non-governmental
organizations and the European Space Agency. The project provides technology and tools
to assess the condition of wetlands and better monitor their trends over time (Ramsar
Secretariat, 2015a).
For CITES, the ECI developed results for 110 countries over the six reporting
cycles analyzed (2003-2014). ECI scores for these countries range from 1.05 (Antigua
and Barbuda) to 4.61 (Philippines) (see Figure 26). A more detailed analysis of the ECI
scores reflects first that developing countries are obtaining positive results. Of the twelve
countries with the top ten scores for CITES, 75 percent (9 countries) are developing,
including Mozambique, Peru, and Nepal. Interestingly, seven of those countries are in
Asia, and five—Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam—are in the
southeast region of that continent. This deserves special attention, considering that
multiple studies have established that Southeast Asia is a wildlife trade hotspot, a region
that faces disproportional challenges in terms of wildlife trade management (Nijman,
2010; Rosen & Smith, 2010; Wilcove, Giam, Edwards, Fisher, & Koh, 2013). Despite
national and regional efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to
control this threat, pressures from economic growth, urbanization, expansion of
infrastructure, free trade promotion, and development, make this part of the world a
“supplier, consumer, and general import-export emporium” for wildlife (TRAFFIC,
2004).
On the other hand, bottom performers include countries from different regions
around the world. The bottom scores range from 2.07 (Serbia) to 1.05 (Antigua and
Barbuda) (see Figure 27). Countries are evenly distributed among developed and
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Figure 26 Environmental Conventions Index - Top performers for CITES
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Figure 27 Environmental Conventions Index - Bottom performers for CITES
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developing nations. Among developed countries, three of the countries were part of the
former Yugoslavia—Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to
TRAFFIC, the center of illegal hunting of birds in Europe shifted from countries such as
Bulgaria and Romania to the former Yugoslav republics (TRAFFIC, 2008), which may
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reflect these countries’ low degree of implementation. In the same way, three of the
developing countries are Caribbean states—Guyana, Barbados, and Antigua and
Barbuda—where illegal wildlife trade obeys regional traditional practices of harvesting
wild species for foot, pet trade, and ornamental and medicinal purposes (CARICOM,
2016). This also demonstrates the lack of an apparent connection between the level of
development and progress in implementation of CITES obligations.
A comprehensive analysis of the national reporting rates and the implementation
patterns also result in important findings. In the case of Ramsar, the high rates of
reporting include countries whose implementation has not been very positive. Five
countries with ECI scores of 2.00 or below—the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Djibouti, South Sudan, Swaziland, and Turkmenistan—have submitted 100 percent of the
reports that they were obliged to, although their achievements in terms of implementation
were not very significant. The first two cases—the DRC and Djibouti—deserve special
attention, since they were obliged to report in all the cycles included in this study, and
their ECI scores of 1.07 and 0.95 respectively are some of the lowest. Of the top 20 ECI
scores, only three countries—Bahamas, Turkey, and Uruguay—failed to submit any
reports to the convention.
The situation differs for CITES, given low compliance with the reporting
obligations. Out of the 28 countries that have fully complied with their reporting
obligations, only three register ECI scores below 2.50: Barbados, Georgia, and Qatar.
Barbados is the only country among the bottom performers that has 100 percent reporting
rates. Five of the countries ranking at the bottom ten—Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guyana, and the Russian Federation—have only reported one
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third or fewer of the times they were expected to. At the top of the ranking, ten of the
twelve countries with positive results have reported more than half of the times.
Interestingly, the country at the top of the board—the Philippines—systematically failed
to submit its reports until 2014, and it is this data on the 2013-2014 biennial report grants
the country the spot at the top of the ranking.
To finalize, analyzing historical trends of the implementation process also reveals
important patters. For the Ramsar Convention, the average ECI has increased 26 percent
in the period included in this study, going from 2.62 to 3.31, with the most significant
changes taking place between 2005 and 2008. This trend is more significant among
developing countries, since they have improved at a higher rate closing the
implementation gap with developed countries (see Figure 28). For the past two reporting
cycles, the ECI scores for developed countries have remained stable. Regionally, all
regions except Europe have significantly progressed in the implementation of Ramsar,
with ECI scores improving an average of 12 percent each reporting cycle for Africa, the
Americas, and Asia, and 20 percent for the case of Oceania.
In the case of CITES, ECI scores have increased from 2.83 in the first biennium
(2003-2004) to 3.18 in the last reporting cycle (2013-2014), which reflects a total change
of 12 percent and an average of 2-percent improvement each biennium. Differences
among developed and developed countries are not significant, as they have shown similar
behavior (see Figure 29). Regional comparisons, however, result in more relevant
findings. All regions except Oceania have managed to improve their degree of
implementation. Africa and the Americas improved the most, increasing their average
ECI scores by 29 and 16 percent respectively. Africa, however, registered an important
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Figure 28 Evolution of implementation index for Ramsar Convention
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Figure 29 Evolution of implementation index for CITES
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decline in their progress for the 2011-2012 biennium. These changes are partially
connected to the patterns of national reporting. Starting with the 2011-2012 biennium,
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four of the African countries that had traditionally submitted information—Benin, Eritrea,
Liberia, and Swaziland—stopped sending their reports. In the Americas, improvement
has been steady, but still the number of countries reporting significantly decreased; e.g.,
Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela did not submit reports after 2010.
Implementing global environmental commitments around the protection of
wetlands and the regulation of illegal wildlife trade reflects the diverse realities of
countries and conventions in their national policies, global strategies, and managerial
approaches. Evidently, CITES requires additional effort in terms of national reporting.
Strategies to update the national reports format and to improve compliance with
implementation would definitively contribute to better information for decision-making
on global efforts against illegal wildlife trade. Some of these measures have already been
established by the CITES COP and executive secretariat. The reporting cycle and
national report format have been adjusted, and the next reports are to be submitted in
2018 for the 2015-2017 period (CITES Secretariat, 2016). This will reflect the three-year
cycle between meetings of the COP. Reports are expected to measure progress on the
CITES Strategic Vision 2008-2020 and the contributions of the convention to the Aichi
Biodiversity Targets. On the other hand, the results of the Ramsar Convention exemplify
the importance of institutional arrangements for national reporting to obtain optimal
outcomes from the process.
Evidence from the ECI shows a wide spectrum of results across and within
conventions. Even when the ECI scores for CITES show a larger distance to target, the
progress achieved by developing countries deserves special attention. Developing
countries demonstrate how the nature of the biodiversity issues influences the process of
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implementation. States that are either better equipped or more concerned to address the
challenges of wetland degradation and illegal wildlife trade seem to reflect specific
implementation patterns. These two problems also register different levels of complexity
that may affect the process of implementation. The corporality of wetlands, and the
complexity of the criminal activities behind the non-compliance to CITES, are some of
the variables that could be analyzed when explaining why countries achieve different
results in implementation of the biodiversity conventions. Data is also required to connect
the definition of national policies with the effectiveness of the conventions. As habitat
losses persist, focused efforts to reduce biodiversity degradation and reduce the extinction
risk of threatened species is critical (Ramsar Secretariat, 2015e; Secretariat of the
Convention On Biological Diversity, 2014; UNEP, 2012a). Further research will include
this type of analysis. Using specific indicators that measure the changes in the ecological
character of wetlands, and in the unregulated trade transactions in endangered species,
data can be compared with the ECI to determine the extent to which countries that are
making progress in the implementation of the convention, are experiencing improvement
in the environmental issues that the Ramsar Convention and CITES address. This can
also raise awareness and identify the specific strategies that are improving results, and the
issues on which progress is still required, to guarantee that all the state parties obtain the
same outcomes.
As the fourth Global Biodiversity Outlook (GBO-4) explained, biodiversity
policies are motivated by multiple factors that are increasingly economic in nature, as
these resources are essential for livelihoods, ecosystem services, habitats, and food
security (Secretariat of the Convention On Biological Diversity, 2014). International
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goals and targets for the protection of biodiversity range from the conventions, to the
SDGs and the Aichi targets. However, adherence to regimes, low implementation, and
the lack of compliance mechanisms prevent countries from effectively conserving
biodiversity (Rayfuse, 2007). Data from the ECI provides the elements for a clear
assessment across countries and conventions, which inform decisions to improve the
impact and outcomes of the Ramsar Convention, CITES, and the other agreements in the
biodiversity regime. Data on best practices and challenges can support how countries
assist each other, and establish integrated approaches to biodiversity conservation.
Every day, additional pressures are placed on the life and Earth systems. Decisive
work of the parties to the conventions and their executive bodies will be needed to
overcome these. As the conventions explore the possibilities for collaboration, it is
necessary to determine the degree to which countries are fulfilling the objectives of each
agreement. This information will also provide opportunities for capacity building, and
technical assistance, to improve compliance, implementation, and effectiveness. Stronger
results and collaboration are central to bringing ecosystems back from degradations and
overexploitation, and to guarantee that the conventions contribute to the sustainable
development agenda. To achieve these results, biodiversity conservation approaches need
to be integrated into economic, social, and development policies. Only in this way it
would be possible to advance in the value, conservation, and sustainable use of
biodiversity in ways that prevent its loss and guarantee benefits for all sectors and all
people.
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CHAPTER 6
CONNECTING IMPLEMENTATION TO NATIONAL POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

Multiple drivers affect the implementation of global environmental conventions at
the national level (Fearon, 1998). As Chapter 2 illustrated, traditional approaches to the
implementation of environmental law assume that states comply with all their
international agreements. The evidence from the ECI, however, demonstrates that
countries make different amounts of progress on their international environmental
obligations, and that progress varies on a convention-by-convention basis. In addition to
factors such as the functional benefits of international cooperation on the environment
(Simmons, 1998; Underdal, 1998), states’ reputation (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Fearon,
1998), or effectiveness in problem-solving (Checkel, 2001; Downs & Jones, 2002;
Simmons & Hopkins, 2005; Oran R. Young, 1994), the implementation of global
environmental conventions depends on specific factors such as the nature of the
environmental problems, the characteristics of each country, the momentum of the
international system, and the initiatives developed by the agreements to promote and
enforce compliance (Brown-Weiss & Jacobson, 1998; O'Neill, 2009, 2017) (see Table
21). Ultimately, results depend on the specific measures that countries develop to
domesticate their international environmental commitments, and on the challenges—
internal and external—that they face in the execution of those measures.
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Table 21 Determinants for the implementation of environmental conventions
System

Issues

Strategies

• Structure of the
international system
• Governance and
leadership
• Existence of the
necessary
conditions for
implementation

• Nature of the
issues from which
international
agreements emerge
• Complexity
• Availability of
information

• Definition of the
objectives, targets,
obligations, and
mechanisms of
enforcement

Actors

• Capabilities of the
actors involved
• Existence of the
necessary
conditions for
implementation

To understand the process of implementation, it is necessary to connect the results
of the ECI with qualitative analysis at the national level that evaluate national legislation,
institutions, and other relevant measures. The national implementation profiles allow us
to assess with greater empirical evidence how countries define and implement policies to
fulfill the various obligations they acquire when joining the conventions. This chapter
presents such an analysis for ten countries—Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Canada,
Colombia, Czech Republic, Germany, Mozambique, South Korea, and Thailand (see
Figure 30)—to exemplify how specific best practices or challenges affect implementation
of their obligations. Countries were selected by the Center for Governance and
Sustainability at UMass Boston, as part of a research project developed in partnership
with the Law Division of UN Environment using three core criteria:
•

Membership: Only state parties to all the conventions included in this study were
considered.

•

Reporting: Only countries that submitted at least one report from 2010 to 2014 in
accordance with each agreement’s reporting cycles are included. An exception
was made for CITES, considering the convention’s low rates of compliance with
reporting.
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•

Representativeness: To ensure that all UN regions are represented in the study,
and that both developed and developing countries are included.
Table 22 shows how the selected countries represent different socioeconomic,

developmental, and environmental circumstances. Furthermore, the fact that these ten
countries register different national implementation results across and within clusters,
confirms that the process of implementation is not static and determined by a set of
constant variables, but is rather the dynamic result of the interaction of multiple factors.
Figure 30 Ten country profiled for national implementation

Selected countries for national implementation profiles

Table 22 Select countries for national implementation profiles
Algeria (DZA)
40.3 million
$15,000
0.745 (83rd)
0.8%
-1.6%
Australia (AUS)
23.0 million
$48,800
0.939 (2nd)
16.2%
0/2%

Population
GDP per capita (PPP 2016 est.)
HDI (2016)
Forest areas (% of total)
Deforestation (Average annual % 2000-2015)
Population
GDP per capita (PPP 2016 est.)
HDI (2016)
Forest areas (% of total)
Deforestation (Average annual % 2000-2015)
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Argentina (ARG)
43.0 million
$20,170
0.827 (45th)
9.9%
1.0%
Canada (CAN)
35.4 million
$46,200
0.920 (10th)
38.2%
0.0%

Colombia (COL)
Czech Republic (CZE)
47.2 million
10.6 million
$14,200
$33,200
0.727 (95th)
0.878 (28th)
52.7%
34.5%
0.4%
-0.1%
Germany (DEU)
Mozambique (MOZ)
Population
80.7 million
25.9 million
GDP per capita (PPP 2016 est.)
$48,200
$1,228
HDI (2016)
0.926 (4th)
0.418 (181st)
Forest areas (% of total)
38.2%
48.2%
Deforestation (Average annual % 2000-2015)
0.0%
0.5%
South Korea (KOR)
Thailand (THA)
Population
50.9 million
68.2 million
GDP per capita (PPP 2016 est.)
$37.900
$16,800
HDI (2016)
0.901 (18th)
0.740 (87th)
Forest areas (% of total)
63.4%
32.1%
Deforestation (Average annual % 2000-2015)
0.1%
0.2%
Sources: (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017; International Monetary Fund, 2016; UNDP, 2016;
World Bank, 2016)
Population
GDP per capita (PPP 2016 est.)
HDI (2016)
Forest areas (% of total)
Deforestation (Average annual % 2000-2015)

The qualitative analysis of the implementation profiles seeks to explain countries’
results in the ECI. To that end, together with the research team at the Center for
Governance and Sustainability, we analyzed primary and secondary sources such as
legislative and institutional documents, implementation plans, and NGOs reports to
identify the legislative and institutional arrangements for implementation, technical
capacity, data management, levels of public awareness, and cooperation. Rigorous
research on national measures led to the identification of best practices that facilitate
implementation and challenges that hinder it. These factors are then classified according
to the specific categories of obligations that are part of the ECI (see Chapter 3). This
analysis reflects on the specific interactions that governments develop with conventions,
with stakeholders, and between the different national agencies, to work together on
specific environmental obligations. These interactions also require capacity, openness,
and engagement. The analysis resulted in a typology of eight factors that operate as either
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best practices, challenges, or both (see Table 23). The examples characterized under each
type of obligation demonstrate how the assessment of implementation connects to the
policies, strategies, and measures developed at the national level.
Table 23 Best practices and challenges in implementing global environmental
conventions
Type of obligation

Factor

Regulation

1. Legislation

Management

2. Institutional arrangements, strategies, and policies
3. Cooperation and engagement

Informational
Technical
Financial

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Information, science, and monitoring
Public awareness
Technical measures
Exogenous factors
Availability of financial resources

Explanatory factors also provide insights for policy-makers at the national and
global levels that would enable improvement of performance and the creation of the
necessary conditions for the achievement of global environmental goals. Best practices
provide a source of information to improve the effectiveness of environmental
conventions, and to connect state parties through assistance and capacity-building
mechanisms. Furthermore, information on how specific challenges hinder the process of
implementation can serve as a foundation for the development of targeted strategies that
solve countries’ challenges and improve their performance. In this way, academic
analysis and policy mechanisms can help improve the process of implementation and the
effectiveness of multilateral environmental agreements. If these challenges are not
addressed, environmental treaties will be perceived as failed mechanisms, since they will
not be fulfilling their problem-solving and cooperation mission.
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Implementation Comparison across ten countries
National reports are the main source of information for analyzing the
implementation of global environmental conventions. All ten countries included in this
study register high rates of national reporting (see). However, there are exceptions. South
Korea has not submitted a report to the Basel Convention since 2008, and has, together
with Algeria and Mozambique, submitted only one of the three required reports for the
Stockholm Convention. Colombia has very low reporting rates for CITES, having
submitted only one of the six required reports. Algeria has never reported to CITES.
Interestingly, all countries have submitted all their reports to the Ramsar Convention,
except for the Czech Republic, which did not submit the latest report due in 2015.
Figure 31 National Reporting Rate by convention and country
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The implementation of the conventions varies across and within countries (see
Figure 32). While some countries perform similarly across all the conventions, others
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register different degrees of implementation among or within clusters. Germany, for
example, has very consistent performance. Even when the country has low scores in
some cases—as in CITES—it outperforms most other countries. Other countries, like the
Czech Republic, register important differences in performance for each of the clusters,
with outstanding results in the chemicals cluster for both the Basel and Stockholm
Conventions, and low scores in the biodiversity cluster for both Ramsar and CITES.
Mozambique, on the other hand, has better results in the biodiversity cluster. Its overall
results evidence mid-level performance globally, but this country has some important
challenges in the case of the chemicals conventions, particularly in technical management
of hazardous wastes and regulations for control of POPs. Mozambique shows important
positive results in the protection in endangered species and has considerably improved its
implementation for the Ramsar Convention, making it a model both regionally and
globally. Australia exemplifies a different trend, with relatively important differences in
the implementation within the clusters. Its scores for the ECI evidence important progress
in the Stockholm and Ramsar conventions because of the efforts to enable legislation that
translates commitments into national policies. However, the results also show the need
for additional efforts in the CITES and Basel Conventions, particularly regarding
technical obligations. Figure 33 and Figure 34 summarize the results of the ECI for the
countries in each of the clusters. The global and regional rankings of the ECI scores
contextualize the performance of the countries (see Table 24 – The number in
parentheses under each ranking corresponds to the number of countries for which there is
data at either the global or the regional level).
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Figure 32 Environmental Conventions Index for selected countries, by convention
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Figure 33 Environmental Conventions Index for selected countries, chemicals and
waste cluster
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Figure 34 Environmental Conventions Index for selected countries, biodiversity
cluster
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Table 24 Environmental Conventions Index ranking for selected countries, by
convention
DZA

ARG

Global

16
3
(161) (161)
Regional
3
1
(41) (31)
Global

97
50
(120) (120)
Regional
19
12
(30) (25)
Global

12
110
(166) (166)
Regional
4
22
(50) (30)
Global

N.A.

Regional

N.A.

13
(110)
3
(24)

AUS

CAN COL CZE
Basel Convention
76
16
3
11
(161) (161) (161) (161)
2
4
1
6
(9)
(31) (31) (42)
Stockholm Convention
5
8
35
3
(120) (120) (120) (120)
1
1
6
2
(2)
(25) (25) (35)
Ramsar Convention
8
68
22
114
(166) (166) (166) (166)
1
14
4
28
(8)
(30) (30) (41)
CITES
30
48
25
33
(110) (110) (110) (110)
1
14
8
12
(3)
(24) (24) (39)
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DEU

MOZ

KOR

THA

11
112
(161) (161)
6
24
(42) (41)

34
46
(161) (161)
5
8
(38) (38)

20
60
(120) (120)
14
9
(35) (30)

13
87
(120) (120)
2
19
(28) (28)

38
65
(166) (166)
7
19
(41) (50)

30
7
(166) (166)
10
3
(37) (37)

14
6
(110) (110)
3
1
(39) (17)

34
4
(110) (110)
9
3
(27) (27)

Regulation: Legislation enactment and enforcement
Enactment of national legislation for addressing the concerns subject to
international environmental agreements is the foundational element for successful
implementation of international environmental law. All ten countries have delivered in
this regard. This is true particularly for the Basel Convention and CITES, as the adoption
of domestic laws is critical to defining categories of hazardous wastes and their sound
management, and procedures for trade in endangered species must be defined at the
national level.
Countries approach regulatory frameworks in different ways. Some establish laws
for the respective components of each convention, while others define comprehensive
legislative frameworks to protect the environment. Algeria, for example, established a
specific law (Law No. 01-19 of 12/12/2001) to regulate the management, control, and
disposal of waste, and it also set up the National Special Waste Management Plan (Plan
national de gestion des déchets spéciaux or PNAGDES) (Basel Convention, 2008a;
REVADE, 2016). In addition, the government of Algeria enacted specific legislation to
establish transportation requirements and nomenclature for dangerous special wastes
(Basel Convention, 2008a; Ministry of Energie (Ministère de l'Energie), 2004, 2006).
Argentina took a similar approach. National Law 24.051 (approved in 1992) regulates the
generation, handling, transport, treatment, and final disposal of hazardous wastes. For the
Stockholm Convention, however, the legislative framework includes multiple laws that
address various types of pesticides. Argentina’s regulations cover nine of the sixteen
pesticides listed in the convention and possesses several draft laws to regulate some of
the rest of the substances (Government of Argentina, 2007). Germany has also enacted
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several pieces of legislation relating to hazardous waste management. Some of the
country’s federal states have also issued waste management plans, and ten of the sixteen
states have implemented an obligation for delivery of certain types of wastes to public
facilities (Basel Convention, 2011b).
In the chemicals and waste cluster, some countries treat the Basel and Stockholm
Conventions as a unified block when establishing regulations, while others create
separate regulations for each agreement. In the case of South Korea, for example, the
Basel Convention is regulated by the 1994 Act on the Control of Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. This act limits or bans the export
and import of specific wastes harmful to human health or the environment (Basel
Convention, 2008b). Korea also enacted additional regulations for the management of
waste, including the Waste Management Act in 1986 and the Act on the Promotion of
Saving and Recycling of Resources in 2008. For the Stockholm Convention, Korea’s
regulatory framework includes the 1990 Chemical Substance Control Act, which controls
the import, export, and usage of chemicals including POPs, and the POPs Control Act of
2007 (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2009).
By contrast, Colombia’s regulation for the conventions came down from the
country’s national constitution (O'Brien, 1995). The 1991 constitution set forth new laws
and principles for a balance between the environment and national development. This
serve as the foundation for several policies, including the Environmental Policy for the
Integrated Management of Hazardous Waste, Resolution 1045 of 2003 and Resolution
1390 of 2005 on the reformed disposal of waste, the 1997 Policy for Cleaner Production,
and the Policy for the Use and Handling of Pesticides. These policies were complemented
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by national health policies for the management of hazardous wastes and POPs, including
epidemiological surveillance, an agricultural policy, and monitoring of environmental
conditions by poisoning, accidents, or emergencies (Ministerio de Ambiente Vivienda y
Desarrollo Territorial, 2010).
Specific components of legislation are also important to achieving the objectives
of some of the conventions. In 2008, South Korea introduced specific legislation for
electrical and electronic equipment and automobiles. Thailand has also included explicit
regulations for special wastes such as packaging waste and electrical and electronic
equipment waste (the Integrated Strategy of the Management of Waste from Electrical
and Electronic Equipment or WEEE) (Basel Convention, 2008b, 2011d). Both countries
also have innovative measures for Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) systems, and
Thailand has included the “polluter pays” principle in its legislation. Furthermore, the
Thai cabinet adopted the National Master Plan on Waste Management (2016-2021)
aimed to encourage the 3Rs concept—reduce, reuse, recycle—and to establish proper
disposal methods.
In the biodiversity cluster, legislation treats the Ramsar Convention and CITES
separately, because of the differences in the nature of each agreement. In the case of
CITES, strong and comprehensive legislation is necessary to regulate the exports,
imports, and trade transactions in endangered species. That is why one of the
convention’s key facilitation mechanisms is the National Legislation Project (NLP),
created in 1992 to analyze parties’ enabling and implementing legislation. Under the
regulations of the convention, the project reviews each country’s legislation and classifies
it in one of three categories: Category 1 (requirements fully met), Category 2
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(requirements partly met), or Category 3 (requirements generally not met) (CITES,
1992). Eight out of the ten countries analyzed are classified under Category 1, which
means that the country’s legislation meets the requirements of CITES implementation
(see Table 25). The two African countries—Algeria and Mozambique—have yet to meet
the legislation requirements of CITES.
Table 25 2016 classification of selected countries under CITES National Legislation
Project
DZA
2

ARG
1

AUS
1

CAN
1

COL
1

CZE
1

DEU
1

MOZ
2

KOR
1

THA
1

Source: (CITES, 2016b)

In this context, countries have specific regulations for CITES. In the Czech
Republic, for example, the Act on Trade in Endangered Species No. 100/2004 is the main
piece of legislation to protect endangered species. Germany also has the Federal
Ordinance on the Conservation of Species, established in 2005. The two countries
however, are also subject to the EU Wildlife Protection Regulations. Additional national
regulations principally cover species that require protection based on specific directives.
In other countries, regulation of trade in endangered species is part of broader
biodiversity conservation laws. In Australia, the 1999 Environment Protection and
Conservation Act is the main legislative instrument to regulate compliance with CITES
requirements (Farrier & Tucker, 2000). It was amended in 2006 to specify that permits
for trade are required not only for CITES-listed species but also for species that appear in
the declared specimens list defined by the Ministry of Environment (Alacs & Georges,
2008). Thailand has comprehensive regulation for trade in endangered species. In 1992,
the country adopted the Wild Animal Preservation and Protection Act (B.E. 2535), and
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new measures for derivatives were defined in 2003 (B.E. 2546), and in the 2015
constitution (B.E. 2557) (Government of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1992). In addition to
limiting hunting and controlling the trade of wildlife, the act also made provisions for the
institutional arrangements for CITES implementation within the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environment (Oswell, 2010). South Korea’s regulations for CITES are
also part of a broader piece of legislation, the 1992 Natural Environment Preservation
Act, that contains, after being amended in 1994, basic provisions on the international
trade in CITES-listed species and their derivatives.
Legislation for the Ramsar Convention also tends to be part of general
environmental measures. In the case of Colombia, Law 357 (1997) was the main
instrument for the protection of wetlands. Furthermore, Law 99 of 1993—which
established general environmental policies for Colombia—explicitly listed paramo
ecosystems (in the Andean mountains) as needing special protection. In 2001, the
Constitutional Court acknowledged the constitutionality of these regulations and
recognized paramo ecosystems as areas of special ecological importance (Murillo
Chavarro, 2011). Other subsequent resolutions also connected wetlands to the Code of
Renewable Natural Resources providing measures for the protection of Ramsar sites and
other paramo ecosystems.
National regulation for the biodiversity conventions also includes innovative
measures to connect these global agreements to other policy areas. South Korea, for
example, recently amended its Pharmaceutical Affairs Act to include regulation of the
import and export of drugs made from processed goods of animals and plants as
prescribed by CITES (Ministry of Food and Drug Safety, 2016). In a similar approach,
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the Czech Republic has connected the protection of wetlands to its water management
policies. The government has undertaken significant water policy reform (including the
Water Act of 2008) to promote the wise use of water resources and return water to key
environmental assets (including Ramsar wetlands) (Ramsar, 2012). Equally important,
the mining code defined by the government of Colombia extended protection of natural
areas from mining activities to wetlands (Law 1382 of 2010) (Murillo Chavarro, 2011).
Enacting legislation also poses important challenges. Mozambique, for example,
has struggled with the need to continuously update or add elements to existing legislation
in order to regulate the Basel and Stockholm Conventions. Different pieces of legislation
regulate Mozambique’s production of waste (Article 9 Decree 13 of July 13, 2006), the
management of solid municipal waste (Decree no. 94/2014), the management of
hazardous waste, the management of POPs (Environmental Management Act, enacted in
2002), and the liability of those who damage the environment (Basel Convention, 2011c;
Cambule & Gouveia Pereira, 2015). This fragmentation affects the process of
implementation. Coordination among government agencies for planning, execution,
monitoring, and reporting on the multiple pieces of legislation requires additional time
and resources. In addition, adjusting the multiple laws to reflect decisions made at the
conventions’ COPs is also a complex process. These issues delay progress in
implementation. Furthermore, Mozambique has submitted its legislation to be evaluated
by the CITES National Legislation Project (NLP). While the existing regulation is
comprehensive, and the country has participated in workshops developed by the
secretariat to improve compliance with legislation, the legislation has not been published
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and no agreement exists with the secretariat for revised legislative analysis, including
possible Category 1 status (CITES, 2016b).
Algeria faces similar challenges. In the case of the chemicals conventions, there
are important legislation gaps. Algeria has not enacted legislation or regulations to
identify unregulated transboundary movement of waste, or to specify the responsibility
for illegal traffic, and therefore cannot ensure proper waste disposal in these cases
(Government of Algeria, 2015). In addition, the National Implementation Plan for the
Stockholm Convention acknowledges that “Algerian legislation in the case of polluted
sites has not taken into account and has not provided the necessary steps to rehabilitate
soils to be in line with the principle of polluter pays” (Ministère de l’Aménagement du
Territoire et de l’Environnement, 2006). For CITES, Algeria’s legislation is also
classified under Category 2. The country has submitted a draft of its legislation for the
secretariat’s review and has participated in the different workshops. However, the
finalization and submission of implementing legislation to Parliament for enactment
remains to be done (CITES, 2016b).
Other countries also face legislative challenges regarding aspects of some of the
agreements. A 2015 report commissioned by Australia’s Department of the Environment,
for example, recommended updating the 1989 Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports
and Imports) Act (O'Farrell & Marsden, 2015). In Canada, despite the existence of some
controls regarding shipments for hazardous wastes outside the OECD region, the country
needs additional technical definitions about trade in non-hazardous recyclables in order to
ratify the Ban Amendment (Basel Convention, 1995). Colombia needs to reconcile
mining codes with existing regulation for biodiversity conservation and wetlands

181

protection. Inconsistent compliance with Ramsar obligations due to anthropogenic
activities has evidenced the fragmentation and weaknesses in the regulations of the Code
of Renewable Natural Resources for ecosystems protection. “The main problem in
Colombia regarding protecting areas of ecological importance, such as the paramo, is not
a deficient legal regime but the absence of compliance and enforcement measures to
ensure that it is properly implemented” (Murillo Chavarro, 2011).

Management: Institutions, strategies and engagement
Management obligations are at the core of national processes to domesticate
global environmental obligations. Implementing them involves various activities,
including the appointment of institutions to serve as focal points and authorities—the
institutions that work on the implementation—for each of the agreements, the design of
strategies and policies, and the establishment of cooperation mechanisms (see Table 23).
These arrangements create the policy spaces for countries engage with all actors involved
in the creation of the necessary conditions to achieve the obligations of each of the
agreements and solve the corresponding environmental problems.
The designation of focal points is a basic obligation and requirement in the
process of implementation. In addition, countries sometimes must establish institutions to
support the implementation of other obligations, or introduce policy spaces so that
different actors can come together around specific obligations. Algeria, for example,
established the National Observatory for Environment and Sustainable Development, the
National Centre for Environmental Training, and the National Waste Agency (Ministry of
Land Planning and the Environment, 2010) to work on the implementation of the
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chemicals conventions. Australia has also established different institutions; the
Stockholm Intergovernmental Forum facilitates consultations between the Australian
government, state, and territory agencies that work on POPs (Department of the
Environment and Heritage, 2006), and the National Measurement Institute was the first
and remains the largest facility in the country dedicated to the analysis of hazardous
substances (Department of the Environment and Heritage, 2006).
While these examples show that institutions are specifically designed for each
environmental convention, Germany has taken a different approach, connecting its
institutional arrangements for the chemical conventions to other policy areas related to
health and safety. The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and
Nuclear Safety (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und
Reaktorsicherheit) is the lead agency responsible for implementing the Stockholm
Convention. But it works closely with the Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin), which is the authority for
the export and import of POPs, in charge of permanently monitoring these substances in
blood samples (Federal Republic of Germany, 2006). The country also connects the
implementation of the different conventions to the issue of sustainable development,
through the Council for Sustainable Development, and to education and research through
the Federal Ministry for these topics (Bundeministerium für Bildung und Forschung).
Partnerships with institutions for data collection and analysis are also an
important best practice. In South Korea, the National Institute of Environmental Research
(Kyungseodong, Seo-Gu, Incheon), the Korea Environment Institute (Bulgwangdong,
Eunpyong-gu, Seoul), the Korea Environmental Management Corporation
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(Kyungseodong, Seo-Gu, Incheon), and the Korea Environment Resources Corporation
(Kyungseodong, Seo-Gu, Incheon) work together on the management and regulation of
transboundary movement of hazardous waste (Basel Convention, 2008b). Furthermore,
the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy operates the Center for Development of
Resources Recycling Technology (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2004). In
Thailand, different departments provide technical assistance and training for
implementation of the Basel Convention, including the Department of Industrial Works,
the Pollution Control Department, the Environmental Research and Training Center, the
Department of Environment Quality Promotion, and the Environmental Research
Institute of Chulalongkorn University (Basel Convention, 2011d). Some of these
institutional arrangements have also been relevant to the Stockholm Convention. The
Pollution Control Department is the focal point for the Stockholm Convention and the
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment is responsible for implementing the
National Implementation Plan (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE),
2007). As countries deal with multiple levels of governance and institutions working on
the process of implementation, coordination among them becomes a critical factor for the
achievement of the policy goals established by each convention. A good example of this
comes from Colombia, where the national government has developed a successful degree
of coordination between several ministries involved in the management of POPs,
including regional autonomous corporations (Ministerio de Ambiente Vivienda y
Desarrollo Territorial, 2010).
In the definition of policies and strategies, countries have also taken different
paths. Successful approaches have been developed by defining broad strategies and
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policies to focus national efforts around specific environmental conventions. A noticeable
process is being executed by the Czech Republic, whose State Environmental Policy
2012—2020, underlines the importance to implement provisions of multilateral
environmental agreements aimed at protecting health and the environment from harmful
effects of chemical substances, including the Basel and Stockholm Conventions, among
others (Ministry of the Environment (Ministerstvo životního prostředí), 2013). Algeria,
also reflects important connections between policy areas. The management of chemicals,
wastes and POPs is based on its National Environmental Strategy (NES) and the National
Environmental Action Plan and Sustainable Development (NEAPSD) (Ministry of Land
Planning and the Environment, 2010). The country has also established several action
plan goals related to the elimination of PCBs, limit the sources of emissions, and reduce
unintentional releases (Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de l’Environnement,
2006).
In terms of cooperation, countries collaborate at various levels from convention
secretariats to other countries and non-state actors at global and national levels. When
working with the conventions’ executive bodies, some countries, such as Canada, directly
engage with conventions’ functioning and overall operation. In the case of the Stockholm
Convention, for example, Canada’s international engagement in the process of
implementation includes institutional support and financial assistance for UN
Environment, the convention’s secretariat, and other national governments for activities
around specific obligations, providing funding and hosting different activities such as
workshops and summits to discuss implementation (UNEP, 2000). The country has also
promoted and funded the establishment of the convention’s regional centers (Basel
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Convention, 1999). Canada has also been active in the negotiation and diplomatic
processes around the Stockholm Convention. The country also was highly influential on
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, being the first signatory to provide
financial assistance. In 2000, Canada established the five-year $20 million Canada POPs
Fund, administered by the World Bank, to assist developing countries and countries with
economies in transition in building their capacities to deal with POPs and in
implementing their obligations under the convention (Government of Canada, 2006). In
2016, Canada also chaired the Effectiveness Evaluation Committee under the Stockholm
Convention (Stockholm Convention, 2016b). In 2001, Klaus Töpfer, then Executive
Director of UN Environment, recognized Canada as a “pioneer in working with other
parts of the world to achieve environmental agreements” (UNEP, 2001).
Algeria, Argentina, and the Czech Republic provide more targeted support by
hosting some of the Regional Centers established by the Basel and Stockholm
conventions. In 2002, Argentina established the Basel Convention Regional Center for
Capacity Building and Transfer of Technology for South America, and has since then
provided funding for its operation (Basel Convention, 2011a; Basel Convention Regional
Center, 2015). The government of the Czech Republic established the National Centre for
POPs, to provide expert support, coordinate, and implement goals and targets featured in
action plans for the implementation of the Stockholm Convention. The activities of the
National Centre are coordinated and overseen by a multi-ministerial Council (the
National Centre Council) composed of representatives of nine different ministries
(RECETOX, 2017b). Similarly, Algeria hosts the North Africa Regional Centre for the
Stockholm Convention, known in the region by its French acronym CNTPP (Le Centre
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National des Technologies de Production plus Propre) (Ministère de l’Aménagement du
Territoire et de l’Environnement, 2006). The center serves seven countries: Algeria,
Egypt, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, and Tunisia.
Collaboration and engagement are also important to countries, as cooperation
both with neighboring states and regionally can contribute to successful implementation.
In Canada, the implementation of the Basel and Stockholm conventions is closely
connected to the 1986 Canada-US agreement on the transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes. In 2014 “more than 99% of imports and 98% of exports [of
transboundary waste] occurred between Canada and the United States” (Environment and
Climate Change Canada, 2013). Also, under the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, both countries have created specific North American
Regional Action Plans related to management of POPs. Germany also takes part in
different multilateral and bilateral agreements on waste transportation. The most notable
are the 1994 Germany-Afghanistan agreement and the 2000 Germany-Kosovo
agreement, both designed to export the waste generated in these two places to Germany
for the purpose of environmentally sound management (Reinhardt, 2000). A similar
approach is used in the implementation of the Ramsar Convention, as Germany
cooperates with the Netherlands in practicing cross-boundary nature conservation of the
Gelderse Poort, an area where the Rhine leaves Germany and flows into the lowlands of
the Netherlands (de Jong & van Tatenhove, 1998). The country has also engaged in
bilateral collaboration in Ramsar site designation. In 2008 Germany and France jointly
designated two new Wetlands of International Importance, the Oberrhein / Rhin supérieur
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in Germany and the Rhin supérieur / Oberrhein in France (Secretariat of the Ramsar
Convention, 2008).
At the regional level, cooperation has led some countries to assume a position of
leadership, helping and supporting the implementation of the agreements in other
countries. South Korea, for example, has promoted a database of POPs monitoring results
from each country in East Asia, as well as data sharing and data exchange with
international organizations (Ministry of Environment, 2013). Eleven East Asian countries
participate in this initiative (South Korea, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR,
Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam), and they have
been holding annual workshops since 2005. In a like manner, in 2003 Thailand ratified
the Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, adopted by the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE),
2007).
This type of regional organization is also the scenario for cooperation around the
implementation of global environmental obligations. In December 2005 at a Special
Meeting of ASEAN, the Ministers responsible for CITES implementation established a
regional action plan to create a regional intergovernmental law-enforcement network for
illegal wildlife trade, as well as a mechanism to share information and collaboration
between countries and government agencies (Oswell, 2010). As a result, ASEAN
members, which include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the
Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand, launched the ASEAN Wildlife
Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN, 2017). Thailand, a leader of the network, has
worked closely on the promotion of networking among relevant law enforcement
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authorities in ASEAN countries to curb illegal trade in wild fauna and flora (ASEANWEN, 2017). This scheme for regional collaboration has favored important seizures in
the Thai/Cambodia border in 2006, when over 200 Siamese crocodiles Crocodylus
siamensis (CITES I) were recovered, and in the Thai/Laos border when 260 Malayan
Pangolins Manis javanica (CITES II) were found (TRAFFIC, 2016). In Africa,
Mozambique and twenty-four other countries are parties to the regional multilateral
Bamako Convention (Agreement on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes) within the continent.
The Bamako Convention, which came into force in 1996, prohibits the import of all
hazardous wastes, including radioactive waste, into African countries. The agreement
imposes stricter regulation than the Basel Convention, since it prohibits all imports of
hazardous wastes and provides no exemption for radioactive wastes.
Cooperation with stakeholders is also important. Countries engage with non-state
actors to develop specific projects and activities that support implementation at the local
level. Community organizations, industry conglomerates, and NGOs support and create
plans and projects to advance environmental goals. Examples of such cooperation include
the provincial Environmental Directions and the regional Environmental Inspections in
Algeria (Ministry of Land Planning and the Environment, 2010), and the work by
Argentinean state, municipal, and local governments on the adoption of specific waste
management goals and plans (International POPs Elimination Network, 2010). NGOs in
Argentina are also actively engaged in the implementation of the POPs convention. One
of the most prominent is the Citizen’s Anti-Incineration Coalition, a network of NGOs
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and citizens opposed to incineration and committed to the promotion of awareness about
the effects of POPs on human health and the environment (Bianco & Campra, 2005).
NGOs also serve purposes of agenda-setting, public awareness raising, and
institutional arrangements. Since 2008, the Arnika Association, a national NGO in the
Czech Republic, has served as a coordination center for Central and Eastern Europe on
the right to healthy environment. As part of its efforts, it hosts the secretariat of the
International POPs Elimination Project (IPEP) (Arnika Association, 2005, 2006b;
Holoubek, 2006). In Argentina, the NGO Taller Ecologista has worked on the promotion
of zero waste ordinances in main cities (International POPs Elimination Network, 2010).
Since 2005 Thailand has worked to promote the participation of NGOs and civil society
organizations in the implementation of the conventions. The National Master Plan on
Waste Management (2016-2021) supports all relevant sectors for participation in the
management of solid and hazardous waste. Thailand has hosted workshops that bring
together different organizations to foster communication and collaboration in fulfilling
the goals around environmentally sound management of POPs (Pesticide Action Network
– Philippines and Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives, 2005). Groups from
Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have taken part in its
activities. Industry participation in POP management is another important best practice in
implementation. In July 2005, the Ministry of Environment of South Korea signed an
agreement with companies that had high emissions of POPs such as dioxins and furans
(Government of the Republic of Korea, 2009), which has contributed to a dramatic
decline in the level of emissions.
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All these institutional arrangements are critical to fulfilling related management
obligations. Capacity building and training mechanisms are essential to achieving the
goals of environmental conventions. Algeria, for example, has trained high-level
technicians to analyze POPs (Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de
l’Environnement, 2006) and has designed strategies to promote stakeholder engagement.
The Ministry of Environment signed an environmental performance contract with its
industries to follow their environmental actions and encourage them to use best available
techniques (Ministry of Land Planning and the Environment, 2010). In Argentina, the
Basel Regional Centre includes among its objectives the goal of promoting Argentina’s
capacity-building role, facilitating synergy among the chemicals conventions (Basel
Convention Regional Center, 2015). Similar management strategies are used by Canada
in the implementation of CITES (Cooper & Chalifour, 2004). Environment Canada
provides interagency training in different regions, promoting regional collaboration and
the adoption of policies that clarify the roles of the different authorities—scientific,
management, and enforcement—that the convention requires.

Information: Data collection, scientific assessment, and reporting
In implementing global environmental conventions, the availability of
information is fundamental, for two reasons. First, data collection is essential to
monitoring the state of the environment, to establish baselines for future reference, to
assess progress in fulfilling obligations, and to produce the reports that constitute the
most important evidence of how countries are advancing in implementing the
conventions. Second, availability of information supports public awareness and engages
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communities and stakeholders in developing policies to achieve the objectives of each
agreement. Ultimately, information, science, and monitoring constitute fundamental
inputs to the policy-making process as countries move forward with their commitments.
Best practices in data collection and monitoring take multiple forms. In the case
of the Ramsar Convention, monitoring are critical factors since it determines and maps
the wetland sites to be protected. Countries take different initiatives in this aspect.
Algeria developed a partnership between the General Directorate of Forests and the
Mediterranean Wetlands Observatory to produce thematic maps on land use and flooding
dynamics of the country’s Ramsar sites (Guelmami, 2016). In Canada, one of the
country’s main assets in the implementation of the Ramsar Convention are the data and
information management systems. After the country ratified the convention in 1991, it
has consistently worked on the design and establishment of a national wetland inventory
that has reliable accuracy and provides information on ecosystems and natural resources
value (Fournier, Grenier, Lavoie, & Hélie, 2007; Molnar & Kubiszewski, 2012).
Although Canada has still not developed a systematic ecosystem valuation analysis, the
Canadian Wetland Inventory is a useful tool and provides baseline data for monitoring
programs (Fournier et al., 2007; Molnar & Kubiszewski, 2012). In South Korea, surveys
were critical once the country joined the Ramsar Convention in 1997 as well. Between
1999 and 2004, the country conducted its first survey of coastal wetlands of international
importance. Later, between 2008 and 2012, Korea conducted a second survey for the
establishment of a wetland information system under the operations of the Ministry of
Oceans and Fisheries (Kim, 2010). Both surveys supported the designation of Ramsar
sites.
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Data is not only important for designating Ramsar sites but also for maintaining
them and evaluating whether they are fulfilling the various requirements established by
the convention. Argentina, for example, despite its low levels of implementation has
consistently worked to improve information on Ramsar sites and has made important
progress in implementing the information-related obligations established by the
convention. In the Czech Republic, research is used to improve knowledge among
government and civil leaders about the management and multipurpose use of wetland
reservoirs. Studies are employed for both the monitoring of wetlands ecological change,
the promotion of community involvement in their management, and the inclusion of local
organizations and government authorities in the management of these ecosystems (Petřík
et al., 2007). The most recent study on the conservation, research and sustainable use of
wetlands in the Czech Republic (2014-2017), provided assessment of the ecological state
of Ramsar sites, including biodiversity.
Managing POPs also requires information and monitoring. Countries need to
collect data on the substances present in humans and the environment. One country that
has made good progress on this is the Czech Republic. The country established a national
database for records on hazardous substances, and an information system for
contaminated sites and old environmental burdens (Arnika Association, 2006a). The
Czech government, through its State Health Institute, has also worked on the creation of a
database to record and monitor the results of dietary exposure to POPs since 1994. Levels
of POPs are also made available through GENASIS, an environmental data repository
that provides comprehensive information on chemical contamination of the environment
and human matrices (Klánová et al., 2009; RECETOX, 2017a). Another country,
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Thailand, focused research on the creation of a POPs inventory to evaluate the existence
of stockpiles of some pollutants, particularly pesticides. In 2001, with the support from
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Thai government, the Thai
department of agriculture conducted an inventory of obsolete POP pesticide (Ministry of
Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), 2007). In 2004, these organizations
formed a pesticide task team engaging national expert consultants on POPs pesticides and
staff from the Pollution Control Department in conducting a new inventory (Ministry of
Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), 2007). Further inventories have showed a
decrease in obsolete POPs pesticide stockpiles and have addressed specific substances,
including DDT.
South Korea uses data collection, scientific assessment, and monitoring in a
combined effort to strengthen implementation of the Stockholm Convention. Since 1999,
the Ministry of Environment has conducted studies to evaluate the effects of industrial
POPs and their presence in the air (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2009; Ministry
of Environment, 2013; Shin et al., 2011). Additionally, each of the ministries engaged in
the reduction and eradication of POPs has a subsidiary research institute that studies the
presence of these substances in fish, food products, human breastmilk, and human blood
(Government of the Republic of Korea, 2009). Korean efforts to make information
available for the implementation of the chemicals conventions has also expanded to East
Asia. Korea has hosted the POPs Information Warehouse Project to evaluate the
implementation of the Stockholm Convention in East Asia (Ministry of Environment,
2013); as part of the project, it promoted the creation of a database of POPs monitoring
results from each country in East Asia as well as data sharing and data exchange with
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international organizations (Ministry of Environment, 2013). The Ministry of
Environment also works with stakeholders in conducting different research studies on
POPs in the country. A PCBs Policy Council and a PCBs Safety Evaluation Group
involving the utilities corporations and civic groups has conducted different studies and
established a “Roadmap for PCBs Elimination” (Government of the Republic of Korea,
2009).
Public awareness, education, and communication strategies are also necessary to
fulfill the information obligations under the environmental conventions. In the case of the
Ramsar Convention, countries carry out different activities related to information
dissemination. Algeria facilitates public awareness by distributing materials for events
including World Wetlands Day, World Tree Day, and Environment Day (Gardner et al.,
2009). In 2017, as part of the country’s celebrations for World Wetlands Day, the
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Ministry of Education held a
competition for primary school students’ artwork on wetlands (Ramsar Secretariat, 2017a).
Colombia has also developed informative campaigns and education projects alongside
local communities to teach children—and ultimately communities—about the
preservation of local wetlands (Ramsar Secretariat & Ruiz-Carvajal, 2006). The Thailand
Biodiversity Division, under the Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy
and Planning, along with WWF Thailand, have promoted public awareness of wetlands
since 2002, especially regarding the national parks system (Office of Natural Resources
and Environmental Policy and Planning & Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment, 2009). This program includes the establishment of a network of schools
and a curriculum based on wetlands and their conservation. A similar educational
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approach has been developed in Australia, where the government has established
Wetland Environment Centres in various regions to provide public education about
specific Ramsar sites and about wetlands protection in general, and to promote
cooperation with NGOs involved in wetlands management (Brisbane City Council, 2016;
Department of the Environment, 2016). All these activities are coordinated with the
Ramsar Secretariat, as part of the convention’s Communication, Education, Participation,
and Awareness Programme (CEPA), started in 1999.
Chemicals management and waste disposal also require public awareness.
Countries such as Argentina have developed a series of activities including workshops,
conferences on POPs, and media campaigns to involve communities in the
implementation of the Stockholm Convention (Bianco & Campra, 2005; Government of
Argentina, 2007). One of the main goals of these strategies is to produce a publicly
available, valid inventory of the sources of polluting substances, and an inventory of
contaminated sites. Australia has also established a consultation with non-government
organizations dealing with POPs denominated the Stockholm Reference Group (SRG).
Other governmental agencies also work in the development of a National Awareness
Plan, to ensure that government officers and stakeholders are aware of the obligations
under the convention (Government of Australia & Department of the Environment and
Heritage, 2006). Other campaigns are specifically oriented to consumers. Germany has
developed eco-labeling programs, such as the German environment label The Blue Angel
(Der Blau Engel), established in 1978. The program comprises more than a hundred
product categories (e.g. tires, copiers, paper), around 1,500 companies, and over 12,000
labeled products (The Blue Angel, 2017). The label guarantees that products meet
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standards for environment, health, and performance characteristics (Basel Convention,
2011b). Germany’s Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt) also provides
information on POPs to the public through print media, press releases, and the internet
(Federal Republic of Germany, 2006).
Germany also make efforts to promote public awareness and data and information
availability regarding endangered species, both nationally and as part of global
biodiversity conservation initiatives. The Federal Agency for Nature Conservancy
(Bundesamt für Naturschutz, BfN) is the German management authority for CITES, for
which it produces brochures and leaflets. However, its core project has to do with the
determination of age and geographical origin of ivory of African elephant (CITES,
2013b), which demonstrates the importance and value of data in tackling environmental
problems. The project led to the creation of a database—the IvoryID—that was handed
over to CITES Secretariat during COP17 in 2016. The database also embodies the
importance of modern forensic techniques in the fight against illegal wildlife trade
(CITES, 2016e). In a similar approach, South Korea has initiated public awareness on
biodiversity by launching a Natural History Research Information Center, to combine
biodiversity databases from other national sources such as natural history museums as
well as molecular and genomic databases that support biodiversity conservation efforts
(Korea Natural History Research Information Center, 2017).

Technical: Capacities and measures for problem-solving
Implementing environmental conventions also requires the setting up of technical
measures to control the environmental problems addressed by each agreement. Aspects
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such as the reduction and/or elimination of the generation of hazardous waste, permits for
endangered species trade, measures to physically protect wetlands, and control of the
stockpiles of pollutant substances are some of the technical obligations that countries
should fulfill to achieve their international environmental goals. In addition, countries
need to address technical challenges generated by the effects of other policies they put
into place, and that negatively impact the control hazardous substances and the protection
of biodiversity. In most cases, these exogenous factors result from the consequences of
other human activities.
Some countries have developed multiple best practices for putting in place
technical measures. Algeria for example, has defined specific policies to address the
negative impact of land-use activities on different ecosystems. As acknowledged by
Algeria’s forest department, that serves as the country’s Ramsar administrative authority,
“Algeria’s key environment issues include the depletion of water resources, land
degradation and desertification, overuse of forest resources and decrease in species
populations” (Gardner et al., 2009; Ramsar Secretariat, 2017a). To minimize the negative
effects of these factors on wetlands, the country had to design policies to technically
address those issues. Canada faces similar challenges regarding land-use. It set up reverse
auctions to incentivize wetlands conservation and restoration on agricultural lands. The
program is contingent upon payments and/or benefits from conservation funding
mechanisms. Expert analysis has pointed out that farmers are more interested in
agricultural benefits than wildlife protection in contrast to other countries, which calls for
decisive measures such as rotation programs and crops control (Molnar & Kubiszewski,
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2012). Canada has also established several water pollution trading schemes as another
mechanism to protect wetlands.
In the Czech Republic, technical measures to protect wetlands include specific
recognition of ecological changes in some Ramsar sites. Consequently, four sites were
listed in the Montreux Record, a register of wetland sites where changes in ecological
character have occurred, are occurring, or are likely to occur as a result of human
activities (Ministry of the Environment (Ministerstvo životního prostředí), 2005).
Specifically, sites are threatened by the need to develop adequate plans for the technical
and sound management of the fishponds, balancing current levels of protection with
anthropogenic interference (Harmáčková & Vačkář, 2015).
Other innovative initiatives are also relevant best practices in the process of
implementation. South Korea, for example, has worked on the development of a
“Wetland City Concept.” The objective of this collaboration is for the country to
designate pilot sites for wetland cities, and to contribute to application of same process in
other countries, by hosting a workshop for the guidelines on wetland city accreditation
(Ramsar Convention, 2012c; Ramsar Secretariat, 2013). Korea has also designed
technical measures to solve multiple environmental problems at once. Wetland
management programs, for example, also aim to improve the protection of migratory bird
species (Korea National Park Services, 2009). A similar approach has been developed in
Argentina, where wetland conservation policies define long-term plans that include the
conservation of endangered bird species protected, in some cases, by CITES. Examples
include the protection of the Andean flamingo at Laguna Melincué (Derlindati, 2011;
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Romano, Luppi, & Pagano, 2015). In Colombia, the designation of some national parks
aims to conserve both wetlands and endangered species (IUCN, 2013 ).
Management of POPs also requires technical procedures, ranging from certificates
that confirm the sound management of waste from cradle to grave, as they were designed
in Argentina (Basel Convention, 2011a), to the creation of policies to avoid adding new
sources of POPs (Bianco & Campra, 2005). Germany has also worked on measures and
technologies for the proper disposal of waste and to prohibit the production, placing on
the market, and use of DDT (Federal Republic of Germany, 2006). Policies are also
focused on the management of raw materials efficiency projects along the entire
production value chain (Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium
für Bildung und Forschung), 2017; German Council for Sustainable Development (RNE),
2017).
In some cases, technical measures are developed through specialized
organizations. Canada, for example, created the Habitat Stewardship Program for Species
at Risk, one of three pillars in Canada’s national strategy to protect species at risk.
Canada strengthened the program in 2014 by allocating funding to protect nonendangered species as well (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2017). However,
external factors continue impacting the technical components of environmental
conventions. In South Korea, technical measures have not been enough to control the
trade and farming of moon bears (Ursus thibetanus), a species declared protected by
CITES. Despite strict oversight on international trade, domestic activities in Korea still
contradict the fundamentals of the convention and its global goals (IAKA, 2014).
Because of beliefs about the medicinal properties of bear bile, its price—estimated at
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more than US$20,000 per specimen—makes it an attractive source of income, and more
than one third of traditional medicine shops in South Korea still sell it, thereby creating
demand for bear farms. Since 2010, the National Assembly has been considering a law
that will prohibit the further breeding and sale of bears. As part of these efforts, a
research project was conducted in 2011 on the logistics of ending bear farming (IAKA,
2014). In a similar way, measures to control turtle hunting in Colombia have not been
effective because of their religious value. Despite strategies to arrest smugglers of
Matamata turtles (Chelus fimbriatus), red-eared slider turtles (Trachemys scripta), and
poison frogs (Dendrobates histrionicus), seizures still take place and the species remain
listed under CITES Appendix II (TRAFFIC, 2016).

Financial
As expected, countries only list the availability of financial resources as a
challenge, not a best practice. However, only two countries do so. Argentina has
historically struggled with its contributions to the Stockholm Convention, which are the
core financial obligations that countries are expected to comply with as part of the
agreement. As of January 31, 2016, Argentina had $29,129 in unpaid pledges for 2015
and years prior, and $28,410 for 2016 and future years, for a total of $57,539 in unpaid
dues. This ranked it as the twentieth country with most unpaid dues out of 180 parties
that were analyzed. This was partially explained by the fact that the country, in the
aftermath of its financial crisis, had reallocated resources originally dedicated to
environmental protection to other programs and initiatives. However, since then
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Argentina has met these obligations and, as of the end of 2016, had no pending payments
(Stockholm Convention, 2016c).
Other countries also struggle to implement specific projects because of the lack of
financial resources. Mozambique, for example, has faced challenges in implementing the
National Ivory and Rhino Action Plan, which was requested by the CITES Standing
Committee because of Mozambique’s lack of regulatory progress to include significant
penalties for illegal killing of elephants and rhinos and for the possession of ivory and
rhino horn (CITES, 2016d; TRAFFIC, 2013). However, a new report presented to the
67th meeting of the CITES Standing Committee in 2016 reported “substantial
achievements” in most of the actions (Ministry of Land & National Administration for
Conservation Areas (ANAC), 2016). To implement the not-yet-executed activities, the
World Bank gave a grant to the Mozambique’s Conservation Areas for Biodiversity and
Development Project (CITES, 2016d).

Overall lessons for cooperation and implementation
The analysis of the ten qualitative national implementation profiles presented in
this chapter confirms that the process of implementation is intrinsically connected with
the measures countries establish to fulfill the obligations they acquire when joining
conventions. This connection confirms the complexity of the process of implementation,
and the relevance of evaluating and explaining it.
All countries identified best practices for the conventions. Germany and the
Czech Republic listed more factors as best practices, which could reflect their experience
in implementing the conventions, the positive results that they have achieved, their
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engagement with the conventions, and the availability of information. Analyzing the data
by convention confirms the experience of both countries, since they have listed more best
practices for the conventions in which they perform relatively better than the rest of the
countries in the study: Stockholm for the Czech Republic and CITES for Germany.
Algeria, on the contrary, is the country with the least factors, which is the result of the
lack of data about the process of implementation in the country, especially for CITES, in
which the country failed to submit even the national reports it was obliged to.
Figure 35 Percentage of countries listing best practices, by convention
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Legislation, institutions, and public awareness seem to be the factors that have
more influence in the process of implementation (see Figure 35 and Table 26). Eight out
of the 10 countries indicate that legislation is a critical factor to implement the Basel
Convention, while 7 percent reflect the same for CITES. In the case of public awareness,
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the factor is critical for 6 and 5 countries for CITES and the Stockholm Convention
respectively.
Table 26 Most relevant best practices in implementation, by country
Legislation
DZA
ARG
AUS
CAN
COL
CZE
DEU
MOZ
KOR
THA

Institutions,
Information,
Public
strategies Cooperation science &
awareness
& policies
monitoring
X
X
X
X
X

Technical
measures
X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

Figure 36 Percentage of countries listing challenges, by convention
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Countries also identified challenges for all conventions, except the Basel
Convention in Korea, and CITES in the Czech Republic and Germany. For the Basel
Convention, this could be partially explained by the fact that there is no clear information
about its implementation in Korea after 2008. The most challenges were identified for
Algeria and Mozambique. Algeria appears to have more issues with the Stockholm
Convention. Mozambique has challenges with both conventions, which is particularly
interesting since the country is at the top of the results for implementation. However, this
apparent contradiction can be explained by the fact that the distance to the target of
“complete” implementation remains high. Three factors appear to be critical to successful
implementation: technical capacity, exogenous factors, and information, science and
monitoring (see Figure 36 and Table 27). Technical capacity was shown to be critical for
at least two of the conventions in Australia, Colombia, Czech Republic, Mozambique,
South Korea, and Canada, while exogenous factors affected all countries except
Argentina in at least one convention.
Table 27 Most relevant challenges in implementation, by country
Legislation

Institutions,
strategies &
policies

Cooperation

Information,
science &
monitoring

ARG

X
X

CZE
MOZ

X

X

COL

X
X

X
X
X

KOR
THA
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Finances

X
X

AUS

DEU

Exogenous
factors

X
X

DZA

CAN

Technical
measures

X
X

Best practices and challenges are then the departure point for understanding the
lessons that conventions and governments need to learn from the process of
implementation. By evaluating the extent to which countries are implementing the
environmental conventions and how they are achieving those results, it will be possible to
design technical assistance and capacity-building mechanisms that are targeted to specific
needs and characteristics, in order to guarantee that any investment in improving
implementation obtains the most and best-possible outcomes.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION: ASSESSMENT, LEARNING, AND POLICY SPACE

Problems such as pollution, the presence of harmful chemicals, biodiversity loss,
and illegal wildlife trade have come to exemplify the importance of international
environmental cooperation. Environmental conventions are policy responses that regulate
behaviors and raise awareness about the specific issues they address. In the system of
global governance, traditional scholarly analyses argue that such conventions are
effective instruments of governance, since most of the countries fulfill the obligations
they acquire. However, international environmental conventions have not stopped most
problems they were designed to address. Meanwhile, new mechanisms of cooperation are
emerging to protect the environment and promote sustainable development. The recent
adoption of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the 2030 UN Agenda on
Sustainable Development reinforces the need for more compelling and effective policies
that translate international commitments into national strategies. In particular, the fact
that the SDGs integrate many existing environmental goals—not only as specific goals
(see Table 29) but also in ways that cut across multiple SDGs—shows the importance of
monitoring environmental goals to guarantee their effectiveness and implementation.
This study has argued that implementation requires the expansion of existing
analytical frameworks. By focusing on four global environmental conventions—the Basel
and Stockholm conventions in the chemicals and waste cluster, and the Ramsar
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Convention and CITES in the biodiversity cluster—this analysis uses the Environmental
Conventions Index to measure implementation and creates a baseline. This research,
therefore, offers new understanding about how countries translate international
environmental conventions into domestic policies. In addition, this methodological
construction also can be applied to other international legal instruments. Furthermore,
this is the first step of a comprehensive method to improve the implementation and
effectiveness of international environmental conventions. This concluding chapter
summarizes the analytical foundations that underlie the study and outlines the main
theoretical and empirical contributions of this work. It also describes the next steps for a
suggested research agenda, and maps possible paths to use the main findings as inputs for
the policy world, creating a science-policy interface that leads to a more effective system
of global environmental governance.

Implementing global environmental conventions: What is missing?
Scholars of global environmental governance and international environmental
conventions have explained that these agreements bring together governments and
stakeholders around the establishment of common obligations and mechanisms to
improve the state of the environment. Since the creation of UN Environment in 1972, the
number of environmental agreements has increased greatly. Global environmental
conventions—classified as such because of their global scope and universal
membership—ensure that governments take coordinated and effective actions to protect
and improve the environment. Evaluating the implementation and effectiveness of these
conventions, therefore, is particularly important. Countries need to assess how well they
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are succeeding at adopting domestic regulations, designing strategies, appointing
institutions, establishing technical measures, and allocating financial resources to fulfill
their international environmental obligations. It would then be possible to evaluate how
the agreements contribute overall to resolving global environmental problems.
However, evaluating implementation is a complex task. Each convention’s
definition of implementation differs, and in most cases, it does not consider adoption of
specific measures to comply with obligations, but focuses exclusively on the solution of
the environmental problems. Furthermore, the literature argues that implementation
results depend directly on the capacities and resources available in each country. It also
fails to offer specific evidence that offers the possibility for comparisons, and for the
analysis of historical trends. Therefore—as explained in Chapter 1—the puzzle behind
the implementation of global environmental conventions is based on three specific gaps:
First, analyses are focused purely on effectiveness, without understanding first how the
conventions are implemented. Second, no empirical metrics assess the extent to which
individual countries are fulfilling their global environmental obligations. And third, the
scope of existing implementation studies is limited to specific group of countries, which
halts comparisons across countries and conventions. Only by using a standard empirical
methodology would it be possible to determine the degree of implementation and the
reasons for variations in countries’ performance. This study addressed these three gaps,
offering rigorous data and analysis that could inform policy-making processes.
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Measuring and explaining the implementation of environmental conventions
Chapters 4 and 5 presented a detailed analysis of the degree of implementation of
four global environmental conventions. In addition to this baseline for national
performance, other findings also deserve attention. First, compliance with national
reporting obligations is critical. By using national reports as sources material, this study
reflected on the nature of these information mechanisms. National reports are the most
basic method used by the agreements for ensuring compliance. However, it is concerning
that the number of countries submitting reports has been decreasing over the past fifteen
years, as the cases of the Basel Convention and CITES illustrate starkly (see Figure 37).
The fact that there are important gaps both in national reporting rates and in the rate of
compliance with reporting obligations also raises important questions about the structure
of national report questionnaires, the data collection process to answer them, the timing
of reporting cycles, and the kinds of instruments that the conventions need to put in place
to prepare and coordinate with state parties for the submission of information.
Evidence from the four conventions covered by this research demonstrates that
close collaborations among the secretariats and countries, together with a clear structure
of the reports and a specific purpose for the information they collect, could improve the
results for this important obligation, generating consistent and coherent data about
implementation. Governments and the conventions’ executive bodies could determine the
obstacles to the submission of national reports and best practices around structure and
frequency of those reports, to guarantee that all state parties submit the required
information to assess progress towards the environmental commitments defined by each
agreement.
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Evidence from the four conventions covered by this research demonstrates that
close collaborations between the secretariats and the countries, together with a clear
structure of the reports, and a specific purpose for the information they collect, could
improve the results for this important obligation, generating consistent and coherent data
about implementation. Governments and the conventions’ executive bodies could
determine the obstacles to the submission of national reports and the best practices in
terms of the structure and frequency of national reports, to guarantee that all state parties
submit the required information to assess their progress towards the environmental
commitments defined by each agreement.
Figure 37 National reporting rates over time
Rate of compliance – Reporting obligations

100.0%
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Reporting cycles
Basel

Stockholm

211

CITES

Ramsar

The measurement of implementation for each of the conventions included in this
study also resulted in important findings. On average, there is still progress to be made in
all the conventions. There are also marked differences across clusters. Differences in
index scores between developed and developing countries are more pronounced in the
chemicals and waste conventions while, on average, scores are equal for the biodiversity
conventions. This reflects the importance of technical capacities, science, and financial
resources to achieve the obligations of the Basel and Stockholm Conventions (see Figure
38). For the Stockholm Convention, the gap between developed and developing countries
has not narrowed, which calls for additional support for developing countries to
environmentally sound manage POPs.
Figure 38 Environmental Conventions Index, by convention and type of country
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In the biodiversity cluster, the positive results of some developing countries in the
implementation of the Ramsar Convention, can certainly be used to identify best
practices for CITES and other agreements. For CITES, results show a lower degree of
implementation than the other agreements, calling for new strategies that integrate the
measures that parties are expected to establish in terms of institutions and legislation,
with the mechanisms of international cooperation, and the specific factors that increase
the complexity of illegal wildlife trade.
Individual country results also confirm the degree of variation in the process of
implementation. No country has positive similar scores across all the conventions
included in this study. As Chapter 6 pointed out, even developed countries face
challenges, especially at the institutional level, and in balancing the outcomes of their
economic and environmental policies. Also, the individual countries’ results for the ECI
show some exceptional cases that require additional analysis. The fact that several
developing countries rank among the top performers in the Basel and Ramsar
conventions as well as CITES, indicates that even when dealing with the challenges of
development, some countries have created successful policies and measures that
contribute to achieving global environmental goals. Interestingly, these are not the same
countries for all four conventions. The performance of Argentina, Colombia, Rwanda,
and Nigeria for the Basel Convention; Malaysia, Peru, Mozambique, and Thailand for
CITES; and Mali, Uganda, Viet Nam, Kenya, Indonesia, and Bahamas for Ramsar
illustrates this diversity.
The results of the ECI illustrate the need for a more detailed analysis that
examines each of the indicators and explains the reasons for the decline that some
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countries are experiencing in the degree of implementation. ECI analysis also offers
important insights about the factors that explain implementation, going beyond traditional
approaches that focus solely on countries’ performance and indicate that developed
countries with strong institutional backgrounds perform better. The best practices and
challenges identified in Chapter 6 illustrate these assumptions and demonstrate the need
for targeted implementation mechanisms across conventions (see Table 28). The fact that
the countries recognize cooperation as a best practice most of the times demonstrates the
increasing role of stakeholders and IGOs in the system of governance. Countries need to
work with international organizations, with the conventions’ executive bodies, and with
stakeholders to achieve their commitments. Challenges in terms of technical measures,
exogenous factors and information, scientific assessment, and data availability also
require urgent action.
Table 28 Best practices and challenges ranked by importance
Best practices
1. Cooperation
2. Institutions, strategies, and policies
3. Legislation
4. Information, science, and monitoring
5. Public awareness
6. Technical measures

Challenges
1. Technical measures
2. Exogenous factors
3. Information, science, and
monitoring
4. Institutions, strategies, and policies
5. Legislation
6. Finances
7. Cooperation

Rethinking the process of implementation
This research brings a new dimension to the understanding of the process of
implementation of global environmental conventions. First, this study recognized that
implementation is a decisive step towards effectiveness that needs to be measured and
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understood separately. Secondly, this research introduced empirical data that allows for
comparisons across countries and conventions; and third, it designed a systematic
methodology for the assessment of implementation. The national implementation profiles
presented in Chapter 6 complement existing models of the variables and issues that
influence countries’ engagement to global environmental commitments. They also
connect national policies with specific global environmental obligations, to improve
countries’ outcomes in terms of implementation. Countries and conventions now have
information available both to strengthen their systems of environmental governance, and
to support the creation of better and more effective approaches to environmental
protection and sustainable development.
Questions also emerge regarding the connection between the degree of
implementation and the role of the conventions in solving environmental problems. For
example, the different ECI results between the chemicals and waste and the biodiversity
clusters inform discussions about how the nature of environmental problems influences
the implementation of agreements. Establishing the relationship between the ECI and
variables that measure the state of the environment—in the issues addressed by the
conventions—will serve to determine if implementation and effectiveness are correlated.
Variables such as the presence of POPs in the environment, changes in wetlands’ surface,
or variations in trade in endangered species can be used to assess the status of the
environmental issues addressed by each of the conventions, and will offer new insights
about the actual contributions of the conventions to improvement or decline of the
environmental conditions they address
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The analysis of the institutional arrangements behind each environmental
convention also offers a new vision about how the interaction between governments and
executive bodies influences the implementation of international environmental law.
Traditionally, conventions act as agents of the mandate given to them by state parties.
The evidence from the conventions presented in this dissertation explains the interactions
between secretariats and states, and the extent to which the executive bodies perform the
mandate given to them by the state parties. Results from the ECI and this study’s analysis
of the conventions explain that the extent to which the secretariats are fulfilling their
functions—and in some cases additional functions oriented to coordination, visibility, and
engagement—and contributing to the successful implementation of conventions.

Connecting academia and the policy world
By expanding our understanding about the effective implementation of global
environmental conventions, academia can provide input for policy processes that address
planetary challenges and proscribe human activities harmful to the environment.
Measuring and explaining implementation support effective and better governance,
through the definition of a series of policy recommendations that inform governments
and international organizations. The best practices identified in this dissertation can be
used to design strategies in specific policy areas, and new research projects that can be
developed to expand the work to other global conventions as well as other international
agreements in policy areas related to environment, development, and sustainability.
The Environmental Conventions Index also can be used as a public information
resource. The Center for Governance and Sustainability plans to make to make the ECI
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available to the public in 2018, in a user-friendly online format. Furthermore, since the
index is composed of specific indicators on issues such as legislation institutions,
information, technical environmental operations, and finances, it offers a wealth of data
on areas of implementation that require more progress, contributing to the definition of
targeted capacity-building mechanisms that can improve national performance and
consequently how successfully conventions themselves address environmental
problems. The Environmental Conventions Project will comprise six analytical outreach
strands:
•

Data analysis, through the development of a systematic protocol and
methodology to evaluate the level of implementation of the four conventions
included in this study, applicable not only to environmental conventions but also
to other international law instruments. Making all the data on implementation
available will constitute a central body of information for governments,
conventions, and other stakeholders, providing insights on variables relevant to
policy processes beyond implementation.

•

Policy recommendations, opening space for using the outcomes of the proposed
research in additional projects directed not only to governments and the
secretariats of global environmental conventions but also to stakeholders and civil
society representatives, and fostering dialogue about the need to enhance the
capacity of countries and conventions to improve their policies and strategic
approaches towards the achievement of global environmental goals. This is
particularly relevant in the current context, when the international community is
embarking on a new development agenda oriented towards sustainable
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development and with a significant emphasis on several environmental challenges
included in the conventions.
•

Creation of a policy space, to bring together and stimulate collaboration among
officials from the convention secretariats and national governments as well as
scientific and policy experts. Developing this research within the Center for
Governance and Sustainability will provide information significant to the
analysis, since the center will convene, consult with, and engage officials from
environmental conventions in developing the data analysis framework, evaluation
of policy processes, and articulation of future strategies.

•

Communication, since the ECI is a powerful tool for users to communicate which
countries are leaders and laggards in meeting global environmental goals. In turn,
this will engage and inform the public and empower citizens to demand improved
performance.

•

Leadership development, as the Center for Governance and Sustainability, using
the key findings in this project, will create training programs to provide guidance
to governments and environmental conventions officials in substantive
environmental policy issues as well as in negotiation and conflict resolution
processes.

•

Solution of global environmental problems, supporting countries and
environmental conventions with information needed to take actions to improve
environmental performance. Offering a scientific perspective on the process of
implementation and its connections to solving environmental problems will
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improve the policy-making processes and the conventions’ effectiveness in
addressing environmental challenges.
The ECI, its national implementation profiles and explanatory analysis, together
with the results of additional projects in terms of policy recommendations and potential
training modules for capacity building, constitute a robust portfolio of resources for
giving governments, international organizations and stakeholders fresh ideas to enhance
international cooperation and bridge the gap between policy and solutions. Furthermore,
with its emphasis on transparency and accountability, this Environmental Conventions
Project will challenge assumptions about reporting and performance on the treaties it
analyzes, and can offer strategies for improvement on a case-by-case basis.

What is next?
While multiple studies have previously tried to evaluate implementation, the
systematic approach created by this research project provides a new repository of data
that can be the departure point for academic analysis and policy recommendations. In
terms of future research, the application of the methodology to other environmental
conventions is an obvious and necessary next step. Additional in-depth analyses that
focus on the results that individual countries are achieving could also be developed.
Countries could then increase the salience of environmental issues in foreign policy,
which has traditionally been dominated by issues of security, conflict, and development.
Furthermore, the role and relevance of environmental conventions in achieving the SDGs
under the umbrella of the new Sustainable Development Agenda is critical. The
conventions and the indicators that comprise the ECI can provide data and information to
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measure progress on some of the goals. The SDGs, targets, and indicators include direct
and indirect references to environmental conventions (see Table 29). Some references are
specific to environmental problems, while others are linked to the system of governance
as means of implementation. For example, all conventions can contribute to the
implementation of SDG16 (Peaceful and Inclusive Societies), and SDG17 (Partnerships
for the Goals). The SDGs, therefore, connect with the international environmental
conventions, and governments can learn from the agreements about the challenges of
governance instruments, implementation, and responsibilities such as national reporting,
monitoring, and follow-up.
Table 29 Reference to environmental conventions in the SDGs
SDG
SDG2
Zero Hunger

2.4.

SDG3
Good Health and
Well-being

3.9

SDG6
Clean Water and
Sanitation

6.3

SDG11
Sustainable Cities
and Communities
SDG12
Sustainable
consumption and
production

11.6

3.d

6.6

12.2
12.4
12.5

SDG13
Climate Action

13.b

Target
Ensure sustainable food production systems and
implement resilient agricultural practices

Conventions
Basel
Stockholm
Ramsar
Basel
Stockholm
Basel
Stockholm
Basel
Stockholm
Ramsar

Reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from
hazardous chemicals, pollution, and contamination
Strengthen countries’ capacity for risk reduction and
management of global and national health risks
Improve water quality by reducing pollution and
eliminating release of hazardous chemicals
Protect and restore water-related ecosystems,
including mountains, forests, wetlands, rivers,
aquifers and lakes
Reduce the adverse environment per capita impact of Basel
cities by paying attention to waste management
Stockholm
Achieve the sustainable management and efficient
use of natural resources
Achieve the environmentally sound management of
chemicals and all wastes throughout their life cycle
Achieve the environmentally sound management of
chemicals and all wastes throughout their life cycle
Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for
effective climate change-related planning and
management in least developed countries and small
island developing states
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Ramsar
CITES
Basel
Stockholm
Basel
Stockholm
Ramsar

SDG
SDG14
Life Below Water

14.1
14.2
14.4

SDG15
Life on Land

15.1

15.7
15.b

Target
Prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of
all kinds, in particular from land-based activities,
including marine debris and nutrient pollution
Sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal
ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts,
Effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing,
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and
destructive fishing practices, and implement sciencebased management plans, in order to restore fish
stocks
Ensure the conservation, restoration, and sustainable
use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems
and their services, in particular forests, wetlands,
mountains and drylands, in line with obligations
under international agreements
Take urgent action to end poaching and trafficking
of protected species of flora and fauna and address
both demand and supply of illegal wildlife products
Mobilize significant resources from all sources and
at all levels to finance sustainable forest
management and provide adequate incentives to
developing countries to advance such management,
including for conservation and reforestation

Conventions
Basel
Stockholm
CITES
CITES

Ramsar

CITES
CITES

Sources of data: (UN General Assembly, 2015; UNEP, 2016b)

Better understanding of implementation also offers the space for policy action and
cooperation to create a new generation of leadership—at the national level, in global
institutions, and in the higher education system—motivating organizations to produce
this type of analysis and to support policy-making processes with rigor and engagement.
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